The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing

Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken

Introduction

In infrastructure-intensive sectors such as cloud computing and electricity distribution, service providers face significant costs not just from total resource consumption, but from the necessity of maintaining "buffer capacity." This capacity is required to accommodate unpredictable spikes in user demand. Traditionally, these markets have relied on fixed per-unit pricing models. However, such models fail to account for the cost disparities between steady users and "bursty" users who impose higher infrastructure burdens. This research investigates the competitive dynamics of "variance-based pricing"—a model where users are charged based on the fluctuation of their demand.

Modeling Competitive Pricing Strategies

The study employs a game-theoretic framework to analyze a duopoly competing for a diverse set of users. Each user is characterized by a type $t$, representing their demand variance. The authors evaluate a linear pricing rule: $$\rho_i(t) = p^f_i + p^v_i t$$ where $p^f_i$ is a fixed per-unit price and $p^v_i$ is the variance-based component. Providers are classified as either "conservative" (using only fixed pricing) or "innovative" (adopting variance-based pricing).

The core of the analysis focuses on identifying Bayes-Nash Equilibria (BNE)—situations where neither provider can improve their profit by unilaterally changing their pricing strategy, given the other's strategy and the users' rational choices.

Figure 1: Analysis of provider profits relative to pricing adjustments, illustrating the 'best response' dynamics in a competitive setting.

The Innovator's Advantage and Market Segmentation

A primary finding is the "Innovator's Advantage." If one provider remains conservative, an innovative competitor can strategically "cherry-pick" low-variance users by offering lower prices, leaving the more expensive, high-variance users to the conservative provider. This dynamic suggests that variance-based pricing is not just a tool for efficiency but a potent competitive weapon.

When both providers adopt innovative pricing, the market does not necessarily collapse into a price war. Instead, providers tend to segment the market based on their relative cost efficiencies. For instance, a provider better equipped to handle high-variance loads will naturally attract those users at a specific price point.

Equilibrium and Social Welfare

The researchers provide a mathematical characterization of the equilibria in these competitive settings. Numerical simulations using synthetic cost functions and a uniform distribution of user types demonstrate that a stable BNE exists.

Figure 3: Profit levels for both providers as a function of the market cutoff $t$, highlighting the stable Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE).

As shown in Figure 3, the BNE represents a stable point where both providers achieve positive profits by effectively partitioning the user base. Crucially, the study finds that social welfare (the negative of total system costs) weakly increases when both providers transition to variance-based pricing. This improvement occurs because the pricing model forces the market to assign users to the provider who can serve them most efficiently.

Conclusion

Variance-based pricing offers a path toward more efficient and "fairer" infrastructure markets by aligning prices with actual physical costs. While the current analysis is limited to a duopoly with linear pricing, it establishes a foundational understanding of how competition interacts with sophisticated pricing models. Future work may explore non-linear pricing functions and the impact of dynamic user behavior, where users might actively reduce their demand variance in response to price signals.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{dierks2020competitive,
  author = {Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken},
  title = {{The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing}},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2020/51},
}
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