Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

Leora Schmerler, Noam Hazon, Sarit Kraus

Abstract

In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However, there are many cases in which each member of M or W represents a team that consists of several individuals with common interests. For example, students may need to be matched to professors for their final projects, but each project is carried out by a team of students. Thus, the students first form teams, and the matching is between teams of students and professors.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{schmerler2022strategic,
  author = {Leora Schmerler and Noam Hazon and Sarit Kraus},
  title = {{Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams}},
  booktitle = {SAGT},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1\_32},
}

Loading related content...

Figure