Solving Strongly Convex and Smooth Stackelberg Games Without Modeling the Follower

Yansong Li, Shuo HanOpenReview 2024 · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel algorithm for solving Stackelberg games that bypasses the need to know the follower's cost function or their exact decision-making dynamics. Instead, it leverages an "approximately optimal" response from the follower, making it more practical for real-world scenarios involving imperfectly rational agents. The proposed method is shown to converge linearly to a solution neighborhood.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Stackelberg games are powerful tools for modeling scenarios where one agent (the leader) makes a decision anticipating the optimal response of another agent (the follower). These games find applications in diverse fields like energy systems, transportation, and cybersecurity. However, a significant hurdle in applying existing Stackelberg game algorithms is the requirement to know the follower's cost function or their precise learning dynamics. Furthermore, many algorithms assume the follower can always provide an exact best response. This is often unrealistic, especially when the follower is a human agent who may exhibit bounded rationality, have an unknown cost function, or simply not act perfectly optimally. This paper aims to bridge this gap by developing an algorithm that relaxes these stringent assumptions, making Stackelberg game solutions more accessible for practical, real-world applications.

Methods

The core innovation of this paper lies in its approach to handling the follower's response. Instead of requiring an exact best response, the algorithm accepts an ɛ-inexact best response (ɛ-IBR), meaning the follower's action is within a small tolerance (ɛ) of their true optimal action. This inexact response is then used to compute an approximate gradient for the leader's objective function.

The algorithm employs a gradient-based learning approach for the leader. Specifically, it uses an inexact gradient derived from the leader's cost function and the follower's (inexact) best response. This inexact gradient is then used in a standard gradient descent-like update rule for the leader's action. The paper details how to approximate the necessary gradient components using the ɛ-IBR, including a method for approximating the derivative of the best response function using a finite-difference approach on the leader's cost function, leveraging the ɛ-IBR at perturbed leader actions.

The theoretical analysis relies on bilevel optimization concepts and Lipschitz continuity assumptions for the leader's cost function and the follower's best response function. The convergence proof draws parallels to standard gradient descent analysis for strongly convex and smooth functions, but incorporates an upper bound on the error introduced by the inexact gradient.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical development and numerical simulations with synthetic data.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Relaxing the "Exact Best Response" Assumption: This is the most significant contribution. Realizing that perfect rationality and knowledge are rare in practice, the paper shows that an approximate best response is sufficient for convergence, opening doors for applications with human agents or imperfect systems.
  • Leveraging Inexact Gradients: The algorithm demonstrates that even with imperfect information about the follower's response, a well-constructed inexact gradient can still guide the leader towards an optimal solution.
  • Bounded Sensitivity as a Practical Assumption: The introduction of "bounded sensitivity" (Assumption 4) provides a practical condition under which the algorithm's convergence guarantees hold, relating the leader's cost sensitivity to the follower's actions to the overall gradient. This assumption is shown to be naturally satisfied in fully collaborative scenarios (where leader and follower have the same cost function).
  • Trade-off between Inexactness and Convergence: The theoretical and numerical results highlight a clear trade-off: a larger inexactness (larger ɛ) leads to a larger steady-state error, meaning the algorithm converges to a wider neighborhood of the optimum.

Key Results

  • Linear Convergence: The proposed algorithm is theoretically proven to converge to a neighborhood of the optimal solution at a linear rate.
  • Dependence on Inexactness: The size of the convergence neighborhood is shown to depend on the degree of inexactness (ɛ) in the follower's best response. A larger ɛ leads to a larger steady-state error.
  • Numerical Validation: Simulations with quadratic cost functions demonstrate that the algorithm converges to a neighborhood of the optimal point, and the steady-state error increases with the level of inexactness in the follower's response, aligning with theoretical predictions.
  • Tightness of Error Bound: While the theoretical error bound is shown to be tight for the exact best response case (ɛ=0), numerical experiments suggest the bound becomes more conservative as ɛ increases.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Assumptions: The algorithm still relies on certain assumptions, including the differentiability of the follower's best response function and the Lipschitz continuity of the leader's cost function. While these are common in optimization literature, they might not hold in all real-world scenarios.
  • Neighborhood Convergence: The algorithm converges to a neighborhood of the optimal solution, not necessarily the exact optimum. The size of this neighborhood is directly influenced by the follower's inexactness.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest exploring the effect of the inexactness parameter ɛ on the convergence more deeply. Further research could investigate extending the algorithm to more general settings, such as non-convex games or scenarios with multiple followers. The practical implications of the bounded sensitivity assumption in more complex, real-world systems could also be a fruitful area for future exploration.

Summary updated

Abstract

Stackelberg games have been widely used to model interactive decision-making problems in a variety of domains such as energy systems, transportation, cybersecurity, and human-robot interaction. However, existing algorithms for solving Stackelberg games often require knowledge of the follower's cost function or learning dynamics and may also require the follower to provide an exact best response, which can be difficult to obtain in practice. To circumvent this difficulty, we develop an algorithm that does not require knowledge of the follower's cost function or an exact best response, making it more applicable to real-world scenarios. Specifically, our algorithm only requires the follower to provide an approximately optimal action in response to the leader's action. The inexact best response is used in computing an approximate gradient of the leader's objective function, with which zeroth-order bilevel optimization can be applied to obtain an optimal action for the leader. Our algorithm is proved to converge at a linear rate to a neighborhood of the optimal point when the leader's cost function under the follower's best response is strongly convex and smooth.
BibTeX
@misc{li2024solving,
  author = {Yansong Li and Shuo Han},
  title = {{Solving Strongly Convex and Smooth Stackelberg Games Without Modeling the Follower}},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=rdz5RDQ4Ye},
  howpublished = {OpenReview},
}
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