Social norms and trust among strangers

Huan Xie, Yong-Ju LeeGames Econ. Behav 2012 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates how social norms of trust and reciprocity can emerge and be sustained among anonymous strangers in an infinitely repeated trust game. They find that a crucial condition for such norms to persist is a sufficiently attractive "outside option" for investors, which surprisingly implies that trust is only supported when it offers minimal gains.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Sustaining cooperation in economic interactions is a fundamental challenge, especially when individuals are anonymous and have short-term incentives to defect. While reputation and community enforcement mechanisms have been studied, particularly in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma, their applicability to other game structures, like the trust game, remains less understood. The trust game presents a one-sided incentive problem: only the second mover (the trustee) has an incentive to deviate from cooperation once trust is established. This paper extends the concept of "contagious strategies" (where a defection leads to permanent non-cooperation) to this trust game setting, aiming to understand the conditions under which trust and reciprocity can be sustained among strangers in a large, anonymous community.

Methods

The authors model the scenario using an infinitely repeated random matching game. In each period, investors are randomly paired with trustees. The core of the model is a binary trust game where an investor decides to invest or take an "outside option." If they invest, the endowment is multiplied, and the trustee decides whether to return a portion or keep it all. The key innovation is the application of the "contagious strategy" concept, originally developed for the Prisoner's Dilemma, to this trust game. They analyze the conditions for a sequential equilibrium, focusing on the role of the investor's outside option and consistent beliefs (using the framework of Kreps and Wilson).

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Contagious Strategy" in Trust Games: The paper successfully adapts the contagious strategy concept to a trust game, where a defection by a trustee triggers a community-wide breakdown of trust.
  • The Crucial Role of the Outside Option: The existence of a sufficiently high "outside option" for investors is shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for sustaining contagious equilibria. This option acts as a credible threat for investors to punish defecting trustees.
  • Trust is Only Supported When It's Almost Worthless: Perhaps the most striking finding is that for trust and reciprocity to be sustained in a large community, the investor's outside option must converge to the payoff from successful trust and reciprocity. This implies that the gains from trust itself become negligible, meaning trust is only supported when it offers almost no additional benefit.
  • One-Sided Incentive Problem Matters: The paper suggests that the negative result (the low value of trust) is more due to the investor lacking a dominant strategy in the trust game, rather than the sequential nature of the moves.

Key Results

The paper establishes that for a contagious equilibrium to exist in the trust game, the investor's outside option payoff ($a$) must be greater than or equal to $(1 - 1/n)b$, where $b$ is the fraction of the return the trustee is supposed to give back, and $n$ is the number of trustees. As the community size ($n$) grows to infinity, this condition becomes $a \ge b$. This means the outside option must be almost as good as the payoff from successful trust and reciprocity. Theorem 1 proves that if $a < (1 - 1/n)b$, no contagious strategy profile can be supported as a sequential equilibrium.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their results are based on the assumption that trustees adopt the contagious strategy. They suggest future research could explore strategies with more "forgiveness" to sustain trust and reciprocity. Additionally, they propose investigating scenarios with less information restriction and the coexistence of different mechanisms, such as some investors having access to reputational information while others do not. The paper also notes that the negative result is linked to the investor not having a dominant strategy, which could be further explored by comparing it to other game structures.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{xie2012social,
  author = {Huan Xie and Yong-Ju Lee},
  title = {{Social norms and trust among strangers}},
  journal = {Games Econ. Behav.},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.010},
}
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