Self-Conscious or Fear of Hurting Another’s Feeling? An Experimental Investigation on Promise-Keeping

Wenjie Zhang, Xianchen Zhu, Hongyu Guan, Tao LiFrontiers in Psychology 2020 · DOI

Abstract

We conducted an experimental investigation into whether the effect of non-binding verbal promises in enhancing cooperation among promisors is derived from the internalized norm mechanism or the expectation-based mechanism. We proposed a new experimental design based on the standard trust game to separate the two possible influence mechanisms of promises and assess the empirical support for these two mechanisms for the effect of promises. We also identified individuals' cooperation preferences to further investigate whether the effect of promises and its underlying mechanism differ between individuals with different preferences. The results show that promises significantly improve promisors' cooperation level, and this effect is only in line with the internalized norm mechanism rather than with the expectation-based mechanism. Additionally, the introduction of non-binding promises has different impacts on the behavior of selfish individuals and conditional cooperators, but both sets of the impacts can be interpreted as evidence for the internalized norm mechanism, while neither is supportive of the expectation-based mechanism. This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the internalized norm mechanism for the effect of promises in promoting cooperation. There appears to be no support for the expectation-based mechanism.

Introduction

Why do we keep our word even when there’s no legal or financial penalty for breaking it? In behavioral economics and psychology, it is well-established that non-binding verbal promises ("cheap talk") significantly increase cooperation. However, researchers disagree on the underlying motivation.

Two main theories exist:

  1. Internalized Norm Mechanism: Making a promise activates a personal rule. Breaking it causes internal "self-conscious" discomfort (shame or loss of self-integrity), regardless of what others think.
  2. Expectation-Based Mechanism (Guilt Aversion): A promise raises the other person’s expectations. We keep the promise because we fear the guilt of letting them down.

This study aims to settle the debate by using a cleaner experimental design that eliminates "self-selection" bias—the idea that only naturally trustworthy people make promises in the first place.

Experimental Design and Methodology

The researchers recruited 60 undergraduate students for a modified Trust Game involving a "Trustor" (Player A) and a "Trustee" (Player B). In this game, Player A sends money which is tripled; Player B then decides how much to return. The study used a within-subject design, meaning every participant played through three distinct scenarios (treatments) to control for individual personality differences.

Experimental design across the three treatments (T1, T2, and T3).

The treatments were structured as follows:

  • $T_1$ (No Promise): The baseline standard trust game.
  • $T_2$ (Self-Promise): Player B makes a promise about the return amount, but is explicitly told this promise will not be shown to Player A. This isolates the "internalized norm."
  • $T_3$ (Public Promise): Player B makes a promise that is shown to Player A before Player A decides how much to send. This includes both the internal norm and the external expectation.

Results and Key Insights

The most striking finding is that trustees in the "Self-Promise" ($T_2$) condition returned significantly more money than in the "No Promise" ($T_1$) condition. Since the trustor was unaware of the promise, the increase in cooperation must stem from an internal sense of obligation.

Summary statistics for transfers and returns across experimental treatments.

Key statistical results include:

  • Trustee Return Levels: The mean amount returned rose from 54.30 in $T_1$ to 60.12 in $T_2$ (statistically significant at $p < 0.05$).
  • Publicity Impact: The mean return in $T_3$ was 65.03. Notably, the difference between $T_2$ and $T_3$ was not statistically significant. If guilt aversion were the primary driver, we would expect cooperation to jump significantly when the promise becomes public; it did not.
  • Selfish People Have Norms Too: Even participants categorized as "selfish" showed a significant increase in cooperation after making a private promise. While their overall return levels were lower than conditional cooperators, the relative boost from the promise remained.
  • The "Unreal Promise" Trap: In the public condition ($T_3$), some trustees made "excessively high" promises to bait the trustor into sending more money. This strategic behavior actually led to a lower percentage of kept promises compared to the private condition, as the promises became unrealistic to fulfill.

Discussion and Conclusion

This research provides empirical evidence consistent with the internalized norm mechanism. Promises significantly improve cooperation, and this effect appears to be driven by a personal desire for consistency rather than fear of disappointing others.

Future work could involve "belief elicitation" to directly measure what trustees think trustors expect, further clarifying the role of guilt aversion. Additionally, the authors suggest that spontaneous brain activity related to the self might predispose individuals to social norms, opening doors for interdisciplinary research connecting behavioral findings with neuroscience.

Summary updated

Abstract

We conducted an experimental investigation into whether the effect of non-binding verbal promises in enhancing cooperation among promisors is derived from the internalized norm mechanism or the expectation-based mechanism. We proposed a new experimental design based on the standard trust game to separate the two possible influence mechanisms of promises and assess the empirical support for these two mechanisms for the effect of promises. We also identified individuals' cooperation preferences to further investigate whether the effect of promises and its underlying mechanism differ between individuals with different preferences. The results show that promises significantly improve promisors' cooperation level, and this effect is only in line with the internalized norm mechanism rather than with the expectation-based mechanism. Additionally, the introduction of non-binding promises has different impacts on the behavior of selfish individuals and conditional cooperators, but both sets of the impacts can be interpreted as evidence for the internalized norm mechanism, while neither is supportive of the expectation-based mechanism. This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the internalized norm mechanism for the effect of promises in promoting cooperation. There appears to be no support for the expectation-based mechanism.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhang2020self,
  author = {Wenjie Zhang and Xianchen Zhu and Hongyu Guan and Tao Li},
  title = {{Self-Conscious or Fear of Hurting Another’s Feeling? An Experimental Investigation on Promise-Keeping}},
  booktitle = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2020.576824},
}
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