Moral Intuitions of Promise Keeping

Florian Ederer, Alexander StremitzerPrincipia 2019 · DOI

Abstract: Promises are a pervasive and important feature of real-world economic exchange situations. We investigate lay people's intuitions of promise keeping. We study the effect of mutual promises, the dynamic of promising and performance over time, the effect of continuous as opposed to binary performance decisions, the effect of income, and the role the receipt of a promise plays on promise-keeping. Assuming that law serves as a backstop of moral intuitions, our results cast some light on the mutuality requirement, the doctrine of substantial performance, doctrines of divisible obligations, and doctrines of contract formation.

Introduction

In classical economic theory, a promise is frequently dismissed as "cheap talk"—a non-binding communication that should not influence behavior in the absence of external sanctions, such as legal penalties or reputational damage. However, empirical reality often contradicts this model; individuals frequently adhere to their word even when no mechanism exists to punish a breach. This research seeks to bridge the gap between economic theory, philosophy, and law by investigating the "moral force" of a promise. By identifying the specific conditions that make individuals feel bound to their word, we can better understand the psychological foundations of contract law and economic exchange.

Methodology

The study utilized two primary laboratory experiments based on a modified Dictator Game, conducted at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL) with 107 undergraduate students from UCLA. The experiments were programmed using z-Tree software.

Experiment I: Binary Performance

In this setup, a "Dictator" chose between two options: Roll (sacrificing personal payout to provide the recipient a high chance of a payout) and Don't Roll (retaining more money for themselves). Before the game, players exchanged pre-coded messages: "I promise to Roll" or "I do NOT promise." A critical variable was introduced: a computer randomly determined whether these messages were delivered, allowing researchers to isolate whether the moral obligation stems from the act of sending a promise or the knowledge that it was received.

Experiment II: Continuous Performance

This experiment introduced granularity by allowing for "intermediate" options (e.g., 1/4 Roll, 1/2 Roll). Instead of a binary choice, dictators could decide the extent to which they fulfilled their promise. This allowed the researchers to study the doctrine of substantial performance and how the option to partially comply affects the likelihood of any compliance at all.

Key Insights and Results

The Requirement of Receipt

One of the most significant findings involves the "receipt requirement." Participants felt substantially less bound by a promise if it was not received by the other party. In the continuous breach experiment, the contribution rate was 73% when the promise was received, compared to only 53% when it was not. This suggests that promising is viewed as a bilateral act—a "meeting of the minds"—rather than a unilateral moral vow to oneself.

Mutuality and the Benefit of the Doubt

The research explored whether a "counter-promise" strengthens the original promisor's commitment. Interestingly, while receiving a return promise increased "Roll" rates from 21% to 49%, the most significant driver was the absence of an explicit refusal. If a partner remained silent (due to a technical glitch or choice), the promisor typically gave them the benefit of the doubt. However, if the partner explicitly stated, "I do not promise," the promisor’s commitment to their own promise plummeted.

The Socioeconomics of Morality

Promise-keeping behavior showed a staggering correlation with self-reported income levels. Participants from affluent families kept their promises 77% of the time, while those from very poor families did so only 6% of the time. The authors suggest this is not a reflection of differing moral character, but rather the marginal utility of money. For a lower-income individual, the cost of keeping a $4 promise is significantly higher in terms of relative value than it is for a wealthy individual.

Granularity and Partial Performance

When given the option to partially fulfill a promise, more participants chose to give something rather than nothing. However, this granularity acted as a double-edged sword: while it encouraged broader participation, the rate of full performance dropped. This suggests that the ability to "partially comply" may erode the absolute commitment to a promise.

These findings have direct implications for legal doctrines. For example, the "Mailbox Rule" in common law—which posits that a contract is formed the moment an acceptance is mailed—appears to run counter to moral intuition, which favors the "Civil Law" approach where a promise is only binding upon receipt. Furthermore, the results provide empirical context for the doctrine of substantial performance and how divisible obligations are perceived by laypeople.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the study provides a robust framework for understanding moral intuitions, it is limited by its sample of UCLA undergraduates, who may not represent broader global or cultural intuitions. Additionally, the eight-round game structure makes it difficult to fully disentangle purely moral behavior from strategic learning. Future research should explore whether the observed income gap is driven solely by the relative cost of money or if different socioeconomic groups possess distinct cultural definitions of what constitutes a binding obligation.

Summary updated

Abstract

Promises are a pervasive and important feature of real-world economic exchange situations. We investigate lay people's intuitions of promise keeping. We study the effect of mutual promises, the dynamic of promising and performance over time, the effect of continuous as opposed to binary performance decisions, the effect of income, and the role the receipt of a promise plays on promise-keeping. Assuming that law serves as a backstop of moral intuitions, our results cast some light on the mutuality requirement, the doctrine of substantial performance, doctrines of divisible obligations, and doctrines of contract formation.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ederer2019moral,
  author = {Florian Ederer and Alexander Stremitzer},
  title = {{Moral Intuitions of Promise Keeping}},
  booktitle = {Principia},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.4467/20843887pi.18.010.10869},
}
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