Revenue-Maximizing Mechanism Design for Quasi-Proportional Auctions

Zheng Wen, Eric Bax, James Li

Abstract

In quasi-proportional auctions, each bidder receives a fraction of the allocation equal to the weight of their bid divided by the sum of weights of all bids, where each bid's weight is determined by a weight function. We study the relationship between the weight function, bidders' private values, number of bidders, and the seller's revenue in equilibrium. It has been shown that if one bidder has a much higher private value than the others, then a nearly flat weight function maximizes revenue. Essentially, threatening the bidder who has the highest valuation with having to share the allocation maximizes the revenue. We show that as bidder private values approach parity, steeper weight functions maximize revenue by making the quasi-proportional auction more like a winner-take-all auction. We also show that steeper weight functions maximize revenue as the number of bidders increases. For flatter weight functions, there is known to be a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium also exists for steeper weight functions, and we give lower bounds for bids at an equilibrium. For a special case that includes the two-bidder auction, we show that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique, and we show how to compute the revenue at equilibrium. We also show that selecting a weight function based on private value ratios and number of bidders is necessary for a quasi-proportional auction to produce more revenue than a second-price auction.

Introduction

In standard auction formats, such as the second-price auction, the highest bidder typically receives the entire allocation. While these mechanisms are efficient, they often fail to maximize revenue for the seller when there is a significant disparity between bidder valuations. In such cases, the "strong" bidder only needs to marginally outbid the second-highest valuation, which may be quite low. While reserve prices can mitigate this, setting an optimal reserve requires the seller to know the probability distribution of bidder values (the "priors").

This paper explores quasi-proportional auctions (also known as Tullock auctions) as a prior-free alternative. In these auctions, the prize is shared among all participants. Each bidder receives a fraction of the prize proportional to the "weight" of their bid, defined by a function $f(bid) = bid^p$. By adjusting the exponent $p$, a seller can tune the auction's steepness, balancing the incentive for competition against the threat of sharing the prize.

Equilibrium Analysis and the Role of Steepness

A primary contribution of this research is the analysis of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for steep weight functions ($p > 1$). Previous literature largely focused on flatter functions ($p \le 1$). Using Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, the authors prove that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists for higher values of $p$.

Behavior of the utility function $u(x)$ and its derivatives for different values of the exponent $p$.

As shown in the figure above, the exponent $p$ fundamentally alters the mathematical landscape of the auction. For $p=1$, the utility functions are relatively smooth. As $p$ increases to 4, the functions become more peaked and steeper, reflecting a transition toward a "winner-take-all" dynamic. This steepness forces bidders to compete more aggressively to secure a meaningful share of the allocation.

Revenue Maximization Strategies

The researchers identify a critical Parity/Competition Trade-off that dictates the optimal choice of $p$:

  1. Parity (Similar Valuations): When bidders have similar private values, a steeper weight function (higher $p$) maximizes revenue. The auction behaves more like a standard competitive auction, spurring intense bidding for the majority share.
  2. Disparity (One Strong Bidder): When one bidder has a much higher valuation than the others (the "One Large, Others Symmetric" or OLOS case), a flatter function (lower $p$) is superior. By making it easier for "weak" bidders to capture a slice of the prize, the mechanism forces the strong bidder to bid significantly higher to protect their dominant share.

Key Results and Performance

The study demonstrates that with a properly tuned $p$, a quasi-proportional auction can produce significantly more revenue than a second-price auction. In the OLOS model, where second-price revenue is capped by the second-highest valuation, the quasi-proportional format leverages the strong bidder's desire for a larger share to extract higher bids.

Furthermore, the authors show that as $p \to \infty$, the revenue of the quasi-proportional auction converges to at least the revenue of a second-price auction. This provides a "safety net" for sellers: even if the exponent is not perfectly optimized, a sufficiently steep quasi-proportional auction will not perform worse than standard formats.

Conclusion

Maximizing revenue in auctions without prior knowledge of bidder distributions requires a flexible mechanism. Quasi-proportional auctions provide this flexibility through the tunable parameter $p$. While the optimal $p$ is sensitive to the ratio of bidder valuations, it remains relatively robust to the total number of bidders. Future work remains in proving the uniqueness of equilibria in general cases and exploring non-power weight functions, but these results establish quasi-proportional auctions as a powerful tool for revenue-maximizing mechanism design.

Summary updated

Abstract

In quasi-proportional auctions, each bidder receives a fraction of the allocation equal to the weight of their bid divided by the sum of weights of all bids, where each bid's weight is determined by a weight function. We study the relationship between the weight function, bidders' private values, number of bidders, and the seller's revenue in equilibrium. It has been shown that if one bidder has a much higher private value than the others, then a nearly flat weight function maximizes revenue. Essentially, threatening the bidder who has the highest valuation with having to share the allocation maximizes the revenue. We show that as bidder private values approach parity, steeper weight functions maximize revenue by making the quasi-proportional auction more like a winner-take-all auction. We also show that steeper weight functions maximize revenue as the number of bidders increases. For flatter weight functions, there is known to be a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium also exists for steeper weight functions, and we give lower bounds for bids at an equilibrium. For a special case that includes the two-bidder auction, we show that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique, and we show how to compute the revenue at equilibrium. We also show that selecting a weight function based on private value ratios and number of bidders is necessary for a quasi-proportional auction to produce more revenue than a second-price auction.
BibTeX
@misc{wen2015revenue,
  author = {Zheng Wen and Eric Bax and James Li},
  title = {{Revenue-Maximizing Mechanism Design for Quasi-Proportional Auctions}},
  year = {2015},
  eprint = {1504.08333},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.08333},
}
Figure