Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey

Gildas Avoine, Muhammed Ali Bingöl, Ioana Boureanu, Srdjan Capkun, Gerhard P. Hancke, Süleyman Kardas, Chong Hee Kim, Cédric Lauradoux, Benjamin Martin, Jorge Munilla, Alberto Peinado, Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Dave Singelée, Aslan Tchamkerten, Rolando Trujillo-Rasua, Serge Vaudenay

Abstract

Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.
BibTeX
@article{avoine2019security,
  author = {Gildas Avoine and Muhammed Ali Bingöl and Ioana Boureanu and Srdjan Capkun and Gerhard P. Hancke and Süleyman Kardas and Chong Hee Kim and Cédric Lauradoux and Benjamin Martin and Jorge Munilla and Alberto Peinado and Kasper Bonne Rasmussen and Dave Singelée and Aslan Tchamkerten and Rolando Trujillo-Rasua and Serge Vaudenay},
  title = {{Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey}},
  journal = {ACM Computing Surveys},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1145/3264628},
}

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