Abstract
Decision makers often need to rely on imperfect probabilistic forecasts. While average performance metrics are typically available, it is difficult to assess the quality of individual forecasts and the corresponding utilities. To convey confidence about individual predictions to decision-makers, we propose a compensation mechanism ensuring that the forecasted utility matches the actually accrued utility. While a naive scheme to compensate decision-makers for prediction errors can be exploited and might not be sustainable in the long run, we propose a mechanism based on fair bets and online learning that provably cannot be exploited. We demonstrate an application showing how passengers could confidently optimize individual travel plans based on flight delay probabilities estimated by an airline.
Introduction
Probabilistic forecasts are essential for decision-making in fields ranging from healthcare to logistics. However, a fundamental gap exists between a model's average performance and its reliability for a specific, individual instance. While a model might be 70% accurate across a large population, achieving individual calibration—ensuring the prediction is accurate for a specific patient or flight—is mathematically impossible in most real-world scenarios because unique instances are rarely repeated.
This limitation leaves decision-makers in a bind: how can one trust a forecast when its accuracy for the current case is unverifiable? This paper addresses this lack of confidence by shifting the problem from pure machine learning to mechanism design. Instead of striving for perfect predictions, we introduce a mechanism that allows decision-makers to hedge against forecast errors, ensuring their realized utility aligns with their expectations.
The Betting Mechanism: Insurance for Predictions
The core of our approach is a protocol for decision-making with bets. In this framework, the forecaster provides a probability $\mu_t$ and a confidence interval, agreeing to accept "fair bets" based on these values.
- Fair Bets as Insurance: An agent (decision-maker) selects an action and a "stake." If the outcome deviates from the prediction, the forecaster provides a side payment. By choosing the stake appropriately based on their own loss function, the agent can make their total utility predictable, effectively "insuring" themselves against the forecast's inaccuracy.
- Sustainability through Online Learning: To prevent the forecaster from being exploited, we implement a post-processing algorithm (Algorithm 1) using Swap Regret Minimization. This ensures that while the agent has a "last-move advantage" (betting after seeing the forecast), the forecaster's average payout converges to zero over time.
- Asymptotic Exactness: We prove that the forecaster's total cost vanishes at a rate of $O(\sqrt{\log T / T})$, making the mechanism sustainable in the long run while providing a robust safety net for users.
Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated the mechanism using several datasets, including MNIST, the UCI Adult census dataset, and a real-world case study on flight delays using Department of Transportation (DoT) data.
In the flight delay scenario, we modeled an airline providing delay probabilities to passengers. Passengers use these probabilities to decide whether to book a flight or seek alternative transportation. Without the betting mechanism, cautious passengers might avoid flights due to uncertainty.
As shown in the figure above, the introduction of the betting mechanism (middle column) significantly boosts both airline revenue and total passenger utility compared to the baseline without betting (left column). By providing a way to offset risk, the mechanism increases consumer confidence, allowing more passengers to participate in the market and optimize their travel plans effectively.
Key Insights
- Probability as a Commitment: We treat probability not just as a statistical estimate but as a willingness to bet. If a forecaster claims a 50% chance of an event, they should be prepared to take either side of a fair wager.
- Decoupling Accuracy from Utility: A decision-maker can achieve optimal outcomes even with "wrong" predictions, provided the risk of error is offset. This mechanism makes the agent's utility invariant to the specific errors of the forecast.
- Robustness to Adversarial Data: The mechanism does not require data to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.); it remains effective even if the underlying data source is adversarial.
Limitations and Future Outlook
While promising, several challenges remain. The convergence of forecaster costs to zero is an asymptotic property; finite-time performance can be sensitive to the quality of the base prediction model. Additionally, implementing "betting" in sensitive areas like personalized medicine or legal rulings faces significant social, moral, and regulatory hurdles. Finally, while we have explored binary outcomes, extending this to high-dimensional, multi-class scenarios remains a complex area for future research.
Summary updated