Ride the Lightning: The Game Theory of Payment Channels

Zeta Avarikioti, Lioba Heimbach, Yuyi Wang, Roger Wattenhofer

Abstract

As decentralized payment networks like Bitcoin's Lightning Network grow, understanding their emergent structure becomes critical. This paper provides a formal game-theoretic analysis of payment channel network (PCN) formation. By modeling participants as selfish agents in a "network creation game," the researchers analyze how the balance between channel costs, routing fee earnings, and transaction costs influences network topology. The findings suggest that a centralized "star" structure is not only the most socially efficient configuration under realistic conditions but also a stable Nash Equilibrium, explaining the natural trend toward hub-and-spoke models in practice.

Introduction

Blockchain protocols like Bitcoin face significant scalability challenges, often limited to a handful of transactions per second. Layer 2 solutions, specifically Payment Channel Networks (PCNs), address this by allowing users to transact off-chain through a series of interconnected channels. However, because these networks are decentralized, their structure is determined by the independent decisions of selfish participants. This paper investigates whether individual greed leads to an efficient system or a fragile, expensive network.

Methodology: The Network Creation Game

The authors utilize the framework of Network Creation Games to model PCN formation. Each player $u$ seeks to minimize a cost function that incorporates three primary factors:

  1. Channel Creation Cost: The fixed cost (e.g., blockchain transaction fees) required to open a new channel.
  2. Betweenness Centrality ($b$): A proxy for the routing fees a player earns. Players aim to maximize their presence on shortest paths between others to collect rewards.
  3. Closeness Centrality ($c$): A proxy for the fees a player pays. Players aim to minimize the number of hops to other nodes to reduce their own transaction expenses.

The study analyzes the parameter space of $b$ and $c$ to identify Nash Equilibria (stable states where no player wants to change their connections) and the Social Optimum (the most efficient state for the network as a whole).

Social Optima and Network Topology

The research identifies distinct regions where different graph topologies become socially optimal based on the weights of routing fees ($b$) and transaction costs ($c$).

Phase diagram of social optimum topologies as a function of routing fee weight (b) and transaction cost weight (c).

As illustrated in the phase diagram above:

  • Complete Graphs: When transaction costs ($c$) are extremely high ($c > 1$), it is socially optimal for everyone to connect directly to everyone else to avoid intermediate hops.
  • Path Graphs: When the desire to earn routing fees ($b$) is the dominant concern, a path graph becomes optimal as it maximizes the number of nodes that must route through others.
  • Star Graphs: In the "realistic" middle ground, the star graph (a central hub connected to all other nodes) emerges as the social optimum.

Key Insights and Stability

A significant finding of the paper is the stability of the star graph. Not only is it the social optimum for realistic parameters, but it is also a Nash Equilibrium. This suggests that the "hub-and-spoke" model observed in the real-world Lightning Network is not a fluke, but a mathematically stable outcome of individual incentives.

However, the authors also prove that calculating a "best response" for an individual player is NP-hard, implying that real-world networks likely settle into "good enough" configurations rather than perfect ones. Furthermore, the Price of Anarchy (PoA)—the ratio between the worst Nash Equilibrium and the Social Optimum—remains constant ($O(1)$) when players prioritize their own transaction costs. If earning fees becomes the sole focus, the PoA can grow linearly with the number of players ($O(n)$), indicating potential for significant systemic inefficiency.

Conclusion and Future Work

The analysis confirms that centralized structures in decentralized payment networks are a natural byproduct of selfish optimization. While the star graph is efficient, the model's current limitations—such as uniform transaction patterns and unlimited channel liquidity—provide avenues for future research. Real-world dynamics, including skewed transaction volumes and capital constraints, may further complicate the game-theoretic landscape of payment channels.

Summary updated

Abstract

Payment channels were introduced to solve various eminent cryptocurrency scalability issues. Multiple payment channels build a network on top of a blockchain, the so-called layer 2. In this work, we analyze payment networks through the lens of network creation games. We identify betweenness and closeness centrality as central concepts regarding payment networks. We study the topologies that emerge when players act selfishly and determine the parameter space in which they constitute a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we determine the social optima depending on the correlation of betweenness and closeness centrality. When possible, we bound the price of anarchy. We also briefly discuss the price of stability.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{avarikioti2020ride,
  author = {Zeta Avarikioti and Lioba Heimbach and Yuyi Wang and Roger Wattenhofer},
  title = {{Ride the Lightning: The Game Theory of Payment Channels}},
  booktitle = {Financial Cryptography},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4\_15},
}
Figure