Resource Allocation in Wireless Powered Relay Networks: A Bargaining Game Approach

Zijie Zheng, Lingyang Song, Dusit Niyato, Zhu Han

TL;DR

This paper introduces a Nash bargaining game to solve the resource allocation problem in wireless networks where a relay harvests energy from sources to forward their data. By decomposing a complex, non-convex optimization problem into manageable sub-problems, the authors develop an algorithm that balances the data efficiency of users with the relay's desire to save harvested energy for its own future use.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In the world of the Internet of Things (IoT), many relay nodes (like sensors or mobile phones) have limited battery life. A promising solution is Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT), where these relays harvest Radio Frequency (RF) energy from the sources they are helping.

However, most existing research assumes all nodes work toward a single "global" goal, like maximizing total network throughput. In reality, nodes are often "selfish." Source-destination pairs want to maximize their bits-per-Joule efficiency, while the relay wants to harvest as much energy as possible but spend as little as possible on forwarding, keeping the "residual energy" for its own tasks (like sensing or its own transmissions). This creates a fundamental conflict of interest. The challenge is to find a "fair" resource allocation (power and time) that satisfies both the sources and the relay in a mathematically tractable way.

Methods

The authors model the interaction as a Nash Bargaining Game. The goal is to maximize the "Nash product"—the product of the utilities of all players (sources and the relay).

Because the resulting optimization problem is non-convex (and thus very hard to solve directly), the authors decompose it into three sub-problems:

  1. Energy Transmission Power Optimization: Determining how much power sources should send specifically for the relay to harvest.
  2. Data Transmission Power Control: Optimizing the power used by sources and the relay during the actual data forwarding phase.
  3. Time Division: Deciding how to split a single time block between energy harvesting, source-to-relay transmission, and relay-to-destination transmission.

The authors prove that while the overall problem is messy, these sub-problems are either discretizable or quasi-concave. They then propose an Alternating Power Control and Time Division Algorithm that iterates between these sub-problems using Lagrangian multipliers and gradient ascent methods to reach a suboptimal but effective solution.

Datasets

The paper does not use a real-world dataset. Instead, it evaluates the proposed algorithm through numerical simulations using standard wireless communication parameters:

  • Network Topology: A 20m × 20m area with 7 source-destination pairs and one relay.
  • Channel Model: Rayleigh fading with a path loss exponent of 2.
  • Parameters: Maximum transmission power of 10mW, noise power of -95dBm, and varying energy costs for relay circuit operation.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Dedicators vs. Enjoyers: One of the most interesting theoretical findings is that in a Nash bargaining solution, sources naturally split into two groups. Dedicators transmit energy to the relay at maximum power, while Enjoyers transmit no energy at all, simply benefiting from the relay's services.
  • Discreteness of Energy Harvesting: The authors prove that for any source, the optimal energy transmission power is a binary choice: either maximum power ($P_0^s$) or zero. This significantly simplifies the search space for the algorithm.
  • Fairness Trade-offs: The Nash bargaining approach provides a mathematical framework for "fairness," but the simulation shows a massive utility gap: "Enjoyers" can have utilities up to $10^4$ times higher than "Dedicators" in a single time block. This highlights that "fairness" in a single snapshot might look very unfair to individual nodes, requiring long-term rotation of roles.

Key Results

  • Convergence: The alternating algorithm is shown to converge reliably, typically within 7 to 8 iterations, making it computationally feasible.
  • Capacity vs. Number of Dedicators: As more sources act as "dedicators," the total system capacity increases because the relay harvests more energy and can spend more time on data forwarding rather than harvesting.
  • Feasibility Thresholds: The objective function is "unfeasible" if there aren't enough dedicators to cover the relay's basic circuit operation costs ($E_0$). The algorithm successfully identifies the minimum number of dedicators needed to keep the relay active.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Single Relay Constraint: The model assumes a single relay. Real-world deployments would involve multiple relays, introducing complex problems like relay selection and inter-relay interference.
  • Centralized Computation: The current bargaining process is simulated in a centralized way. Developing a distributed version where nodes negotiate without a central controller would be more practical for ad-hoc networks.
  • Long-term Incentive Mechanisms: Since "dedicators" take a hit to their utility to power the relay, the authors note that future work must include incentive mechanisms (like credit systems) to ensure that nodes are willing to take turns being the dedicator over multiple time blocks.

Summary updated

Abstract

Information and power transfer in mobile relay networks have recently emerged simultaneously, where the relay can harvest the radio frequency (RF) energy and then use this energy for data forwarding and system operation. Most of the previous works do not consider that the relay may have its own objectives, such as using the harvested energy for its own transmission instead of maximizing transmission of the network. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a Nash bargaining approach to balance the information transmission efficiency of source-destination pairs and the harvested energy of the relay in a wireless powered relay network with multiple source-destination pairs and one relay. We analyze and prove that the Nash bargaining problem has several desirable properties such as the discreteness and quasi-concavity, when it is decomposed into three subproblems: the energy transmission power optimization, the power control for data transmission, and the time division between energy transmission and data transmission. Based on the theoretical analysis, we propose an alternating power control and time-division algorithm to find a suboptimal solution. Simulation results clearly show and demonstrate the properties of the problem and the convergence of our algorithm.
BibTeX
@article{zheng2017resource,
  author = {Zijie Zheng and Lingyang Song and Dusit Niyato and Zhu Han},
  title = {{Resource Allocation in Wireless Powered Relay Networks: A Bargaining Game Approach}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=WiVAmnvzqy},
}
Figure