Abstract
The temporal change of embodied $CO_2$ emissions in the Russia-China trade was examined using a multiregional input-output model. Results revealed that Russia had a large amount of net embodied $CO_2$ emissions owing to its trade with China at the country level, which decreased from 1405.03 Mt in 2000 to 500.61 Mt in 2014. The top five sectors of embodied $CO_2$ emissions in exports from Russia to China are the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, production of basic metals, production of chemicals and chemical products, electricity and gas, and mining and quarrying. Besides, the two sectors, the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum, and mining and quarrying, contribute to embodied $CO_2$ emissions in per unit exports significantly due to their high energy intensities. Conversely, the emission embodied values in unit export are relatively small for basic metals, electricity and gas, and chemicals and chemical products because of their relatively low energy intensities. Furthermore, by decomposing carbon terms of trade using structural decomposition analysis, the results reveal that the main reason for the increase in embodied $CO_2$ emissions in Russia's exports to China is the increase in the scale of exports. The intensity effect has weak restraints on the increase of embodied $CO_2$ emissions in exports of coke and refined petroleum products, and mining and quarrying sectors, while strong restraints exist in electricity and gas, manufacturing of chemical products, and basic metals sectors. Accordingly, our findings have practical significance and propose targeted policies to reduce embodied $CO_2$ emissions.
Introduction
In the era of globalized supply chains, a country’s domestic carbon footprint doesn't tell the whole story. When Russia produces steel or oil to sell to China, the emissions happen on Russian soil, but the economic utility is consumed in China. This phenomenon is known as embodied carbon.
This study addresses a critical gap in bilateral trade analysis. While Russia is the world’s fourth-largest $CO_2$ emitter and China is its largest trading partner, the specific sectoral drivers of carbon transfer between them have remained opaque. Understanding these drivers is essential for both nations to meet their respective climate goals—Russia’s 2060 carbon neutrality target and China’s "Dual Carbon" goals—without simply "offshoring" pollution to one another.
Methodology and Data
The researchers employed two primary econometric frameworks to analyze data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (2016 release) and trade data from UN Comtrade:
- Environmental Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output (EE-MRIO) Model: This tracks $CO_2$ flows across 32 industrial sectors, accounting for both direct and indirect emissions throughout the supply chain.
- Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA): This technique breaks down emission changes into three drivers: the Intensity Effect (carbon efficiency), the Intermediate Input Effect (production technology), and the Export Structure Effect (volume and mix of goods).
Additionally, the Carbon Terms of Trade (CTT) indicator was used to compare the carbon intensity of exports versus imports. A CTT > 1 indicates a country is a net exporter of pollution.
Key Findings: The Carbon Terms of Trade
Russia consistently acted as a "carbon source" for China during the study period. The Carbon Terms of Trade (CTT) remained consistently above 1, averaging 2.03. This indicates that Russian exports are significantly more carbon-intensive than the goods it imports from China.
As shown in Figure 3, while the carbon intensity of Russian exports (blue line) followed a general downward trend—indicating improved efficiency per dollar—the rate of improvement slowed after 2010. Furthermore, the CTT ratio (orange line) highlights that Russia continues to bear a disproportionate environmental burden to fuel Chinese industrial demand.
Sectoral Drivers and the Scale Problem
The primary driver for the increase in embodied emissions was the massive growth in the scale of exports. Even as sectors became more efficient, the sheer volume of goods sold often wiped out environmental gains. This is particularly evident in "dirty" sectors like coke, refined petroleum, and mining, where the intensity effect had only weak restraints on emission growth.
Figure 4 illustrates the divergence between economic value and environmental impact. Five sectors accounted for the vast majority of embodied carbon: manufacture of coke and refined petroleum, basic metals, chemicals, electricity and gas, and mining. Notably, sectors like coke and petroleum contribute significantly more to emissions (left side of the chart) relative to their share of export value (right side) due to high energy intensities.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Between 2000 and 2007, Russia achieved a rare "win-win" by increasing export value while decreasing embodied emissions. However, this trend reversed after 2007 as the scale of energy-intensive exports accelerated.
To address this, the authors suggest policies focused on internalizing carbon costs. This could involve making the consumer (China) share the burden of carbon emitted during production through adjusted energy pricing or technology exchange. However, the study acknowledges a significant "decoupling" challenge: reducing the scale of energy exports to curb emissions would likely lead to a substantial economic slowdown for Russia, necessitating a careful balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability.
Summary updated