Remote Estimation Games with Random Walk Processes: Stackelberg Equilibrium

Atahan Dokme, Raj Kiriti Velicheti, Melih Baştopçu, Tamer Başar

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel game-theoretic framework for remote estimation, where an attacker and defender strategically sample a target's state. They analyze this "remote estimation game" using a Stackelberg equilibrium, where one player leads and the other follows, considering the trade-off between timely estimation and information leakage. The work provides a characterization of optimal sampling strategies under these adversarial conditions.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The paper addresses the critical challenge of remote estimation in cyber-physical systems, where a system's state needs to be monitored from a distance. Traditional approaches focus on optimizing sampling strategies for efficiency. However, this work highlights a crucial gap: the increasing threat of malicious attacks and surveillance. In such scenarios, the act of sampling itself can reveal information about the sampler's own state to an adversary, creating a strategic dilemma. The authors frame this as a game between an attacker and a defender, where each player's sampling decision impacts both their own estimation accuracy and the information they leak to the other. This is particularly relevant in contexts like autonomous driving, privacy-preserving systems, and strategic warfare, where timely state information is vital but must be balanced against the risk of revealing sensitive data.

Methods

The core of the paper's methodology lies in modeling the remote estimation problem as a game. Specifically, they adopt a Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) framework. In this setup, one player (the leader, designated as Player 1, often the defender) commits to a strategy first, and the other player (the follower, Player 2, often the attacker) observes this strategy and then chooses their best response.

The system involves two independent random walk processes representing the states of two players. Each player aims to estimate the other's state while minimizing their own estimation error and the cost of sampling. A key innovation is the introduction of an information leakage mechanism: when a player samples the other's state, they inadvertently reveal their own state to the opponent. The authors analyze this using stationary probabilistic sampling policies, meaning each player samples with a fixed probability at each time step. They derive closed-form expressions for the players' cost functions, which incorporate estimation error, sampling costs, and a parameter representing the importance of information leakage. The SE is then characterized by finding the leader's optimal strategy that anticipates the follower's best response.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on a theoretical model and simulation-based evaluation rather than empirical datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Sampling as a Double-Edged Sword: The most significant insight is that sampling is not just about gaining information but also about revealing it. This creates a fundamental trade-off: to get better estimates, you might expose yourself to the adversary.
  • Strategic Importance of Information Leakage: The parameter 'α' (alpha) effectively quantifies how much a player's sampling reveals their own state. This parameter plays a crucial role in determining the equilibrium strategies, highlighting that the perceived risk of information leakage can drastically alter optimal behavior.
  • Stackelberg Equilibrium is Key: The choice of a Stackelberg game is critical. It models scenarios where one party has a commitment advantage (e.g., a defender setting up defenses before an attacker probes). This allows for a more nuanced analysis than a simultaneous-move game.
  • Defender's Dilemma: The paper shows that even when the defender (Player 1) is the leader, they might be forced into suboptimal sampling strategies (like not sampling at all) if the attacker (Player 2) prioritizes information leakage over accurate estimation (indicated by negative K2 values).
  • The Role of Costs: The relative costs of sampling (c1, c2) and the inherent dynamics of the random walks (α1, α2) significantly influence the equilibrium. High sampling costs can lead to players choosing not to sample, even if it means higher estimation errors.

Key Results

The paper derives the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) for the remote estimation game under stationary probabilistic sampling policies. The SE is characterized by pairs of sampling probabilities $(p_1, p_2)$ for the leader and follower, respectively.

  • Case 1: $K_2 \le 0$: In this scenario, the follower (Player 2) always chooses to not sample ($p_2 = 0$). The leader's strategy ($p_1$) then depends on $K_1$. If $K_1 \le 0$, the leader also chooses not to sample ($p_1 = 0$). If $K_1 > 0$, the leader samples with probability $p_1 = \min\{\sqrt{K_1}, 1\}$.
  • Case 2: $K_2 > 0$: This case is more complex, leading to three distinct regions for the leader's strategy ($p_1$) and the follower's best response ($p_2$). The specific SE depends on the signs of $K_1$ and $K_2$. For instance, if $K_1 > 0$ and $K_2 > 1$, the SE is $(p_1, p_2) = (0, 1)$, meaning the leader doesn't sample, and the follower samples with probability 1. Numerical simulations illustrate how the objective function of the leader changes across these regions, leading to different equilibrium outcomes.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Stationary Policies: The analysis is restricted to stationary probabilistic sampling policies. The authors acknowledge that more sophisticated, time-varying or state-dependent policies could lead to different equilibria.
  • Two Players Only: The current model considers only two players. Extending the framework to multi-player scenarios would introduce further complexity.
  • Specific Random Walk Model: The random walk model is a simplification. Future work could explore other types of stochastic processes.
  • Perfect Observation and No Delay: The model assumes perfect, instantaneous observation when a sample is taken. Relaxing these assumptions would add realism.
  • Information Leakage Model: The current leakage model is simplified. More nuanced models of information revelation could be explored.

The authors suggest that future work could investigate these extensions, particularly exploring non-stationary policies and multi-player dynamics to capture a wider range of real-world strategic interactions in remote estimation.

Summary updated

Abstract

Remote estimation is a crucial element of real time monitoring of a stochastic process. While most of the existing works have concentrated on obtaining optimal sampling strategies, motivated by malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems, we model sensing under surveillance as a game between an attacker and a defender. This introduces strategic elements to conventional remote estimation problems. Additionally, inspired by increasing detection capabilities, we model an element of information leakage for each player. Parameterizing the game in terms of uncertainty on each side, information leakage, and cost of sampling, we consider the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) concept where one of the players acts as the leader and the other one as the follower. By focusing our attention on stationary probabilistic sampling policies, we characterize the SE of this game and provide simulations to show the efficacy of our results.
BibTeX
@misc{dokme2024remote,
  author = {Atahan Dokme and Raj Kiriti Velicheti and Melih Baştopçu and Tamer Başar},
  title = {{Remote Estimation Games with Random Walk Processes: Stackelberg Equilibrium}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2412.00679},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.00679},
}
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