Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions
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Abstract
We show a regret minimization algorithm for setting the reserve price in a sequence of second-price auctions, under the assumption that all bids are independently drawn from the same unknown and arbitrary distribution. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and achieves a regret of Õ(√T) in a sequence of T auctions. This holds even when the number of bidders is stochastic with a known distribution.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{cesabianchi2013regret,
author = {Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi and Claudio Gentile and Yishay Mansour},
title = {{Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions}},
booktitle = {SODA},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1137/1.9781611973105.86},
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