Redistribution Mechanism Design on Networks.

Wen Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Hanyu Chen

Abstract

Traditional mechanism design often focuses on revenue maximization, but many public-sector and non-profit scenarios require redistributing auction proceeds back to participants. In social networks, this is complicated by the "invitation paradox," where agents may withhold information to avoid competition. We present the Network-based Redistribution Mechanism (NRM), which incentivizes information diffusion by linking redistribution rewards to the size of an agent's recruited subtree. NRM is shown to be incentive-compatible, individually rational, and budget-balanced in the limit, significantly outperforming existing static redistribution models in networked environments.

Introduction

In many resource allocation problems, such as government contracts or charitable distributions, the goal is to find the participant with the highest valuation without generating profit for the auctioneer. While the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism can identify the highest valuer, it generates revenue that must be redistributed to maintain a non-profit status. In a social network, the resource owner typically only knows a small subset of potential bidders. Finding the global highest valuer requires these "neighbors" to pass information to their own connections.

However, participants face a conflict of interest known as the invitation paradox: inviting a neighbor increases the chance that a competitor with a higher valuation enters the auction, potentially causing the original participant to lose the item. Existing redistribution mechanisms, such as the Cavallo mechanism, are designed for static groups and fail to provide sufficient incentives for information diffusion in networks, often leading to budget deficits or strategic information withholding.

The Network-based Redistribution Mechanism (NRM)

The authors propose the Network-based Redistribution Mechanism (NRM) to address these challenges. NRM leverages the network's hierarchical structure to align individual incentives with the goal of global information diffusion.

Mechanism Logic

NRM operates through a sequential logic that identifies the highest bidder and the path of intermediaries (ancestors) who facilitated the information flow to that bidder.

  1. Subtree-Based Rewards: The core innovation of NRM is that an agent's redistribution payment is a monotone increasing function of the number of participants in their "subtree"—the set of people who received the information solely through that agent. This ensures that the more people an agent invites, the higher their potential reward, offsetting the risk of losing the item.
  2. Cut-Points in Graphs: While initially defined for trees, NRM generalizes to complex graphs by identifying "cut-points." These are critical nodes whose removal would disconnect certain sub-segments of the network from the source.
Figure 1: Illustration of network structures and subtrees. Tree (a) shows a full network of bidders with their valuations, while (b) demonstrates the impact of removing a node and its associated subtree.

Theoretical Insights

The paper establishes several critical properties for NRM:

  • Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC): Participants are never worse off by joining, and their dominant strategy is to report valuations truthfully and invite all neighbors.
  • Non-Deficit (ND): The mechanism is guaranteed never to pay out more than the total payment received from the winner.
  • Asymptotic Budget-Balance (ABB): As the network grows, the surplus retained by the owner approaches zero, effectively redistributing nearly all wealth back to the participants.

A significant theoretical contribution is the proof of an Efficiency Impossibility Result. The authors demonstrate that no mechanism can simultaneously guarantee 100% efficiency (always finding the absolute highest valuer), non-deficit, IR, and IC in a diffusion setting. This highlights NRM's achievement in maximizing efficiency within these fundamental constraints.

Results and Discussion

NRM demonstrates superior performance compared to applying static mechanisms like Cavallo to a local neighborhood. By incentivizing deep diffusion, NRM consistently reaches higher-value bidders.

Figure 3: Detailed walkthrough of the NRM redistribution process. (a) Highlights the winner 'q' and the ancestor path. (b-d) Illustrate the calculation of redistribution payments and the flow of incentives through the network.

The mechanism's primary limitation is the assumption of cost-free information diffusion. In scenarios where advertising or outreach incurs significant costs, the incentive structure would need further adjustment. Additionally, while NRM is optimized for single-item allocation, extending these principles to multi-item or heterogeneous resource scenarios remains an open area for future research.

Conclusion

The Network-based Redistribution Mechanism provides a robust framework for non-profit resource allocation in social networks. By mathematically linking rewards to the value added through information diffusion, NRM overcomes the invitation paradox and ensures that resources are allocated efficiently while maintaining budget neutrality.

Summary updated

Abstract

Redistribution mechanisms have been proposed for more efficient resource allocation but not for profit. We consider redistribution mechanism design in a setting where participants are connected and the resource owner is only connected to some of them. In this setting, to make the resource allocation more efficient, the resource owner has to inform the others who are not her neighbours, but her neighbours do not want more participants to compete with them. Hence, the goal is to design a redistribution mechanism such that participants are incentivized to invite more participants and the resource owner does not earn or lose much money from the allocation. We first show that existing redistribution mechanisms cannot be directly applied in the network setting and prove the impossibility to achieve efficiency without a deficit. Then we propose a novel network-based redistribution mechanism such that all participants on the network are invited, the allocation is more efficient and the resource owner has no deficit.
BibTeX
@misc{zhang2019redistribution,
  author = {Wen Zhang and Dengji Zhao and Hanyu Chen},
  title = {{Redistribution Mechanism Design on Networks.}},
  year = {2019},
  eprint = {1910.09335},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.09335},
}
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