Reconciling Security and Utility in Next-Generation Epidemic Risk Mitigation Systems

Gilles Barthe, Roberta De Viti, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez, Pierfrancesco Ingo, Matthew Lentz, Aastha Mehta, Bernhard Schölkopf, Druschel, Peter, Mehta, Aastha

Abstract

Epidemics like the recent COVID-19 require proactive contact tracing and epidemiological analysis to predict and subsequently contain infection transmissions. The proactive measures require large scale data collection, which simultaneously raise concerns regarding users' privacy. Digital contact tracing systems developed in response to COVID-19 either collected extensive data for effective analytics at the cost of users' privacy or collected minimal data for the sake of user privacy but were ineffective in predicting and mitigating the epidemic risks. We present Silmarillion—in preparation for future epidemics—a system that reconciles user's privacy with rich data collection for higher utility. In Silmarillion, user devices record Bluetooth encounters with beacons installed in strategic locations. The beacons further enrich the encounters with geo-location, location type, and environment conditions at the beacon installation site. This enriched information enables detailed scientific analysis of disease parameters as well as more accurate personalized exposure risk notification. At the same time, Silmarillion provides privacy to all participants and non-participants at the same level as that guaranteed in digital and manual contact tracing. We describe the design of Silmarillion and its communication protocols that ensure user privacy and data security. We also evaluate a prototype of Silmarillion built using low-end IoT boards, showing that the power consumption and user latencies are adequately low for a practical deployment. Finally, we briefly report on a small-scale deployment within a university building as a proof-of-concept.

The Utility-Privacy Gap in Contact Tracing

During the COVID-19 pandemic, digital contact tracing efforts were largely divided into two suboptimal paradigms. Centralized systems collected extensive data, including location and demographics, which empowered health authorities with robust analytics but triggered significant surveillance concerns. Conversely, decentralized Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems, such as the Apple/Google Exposure Notification (GAEN) framework, prioritized privacy by recording only anonymous "handshakes" between devices. However, these systems left epidemiologists without critical context; they could not identify infection hotspots or environmental factors like poor ventilation that drive "superspreading" events.

Silmarillion addresses this "utility-privacy gap" by enabling the collection of rich environmental data—allowing researchers to identify high-risk room types and conditions—without ever compromising individual user trajectories.

System Architecture: Person-to-Infrastructure (P2I)

Silmarillion shifts the architecture from P2P to Person-to-Infrastructure (P2I). The system relies on low-cost BLE beacons placed in strategic locations (e.g., classrooms, markets). These beacons broadcast ephemeral IDs (ephIDs) that rotate every 15 minutes, alongside static metadata descriptors such as room volume, ventilation type, and average temperature.

Overview of the Silmarillion system architecture, illustrating the flow from encounter data collection to backend interaction via privacy-preserving channels.

As shown in the architecture diagram, the process is divided into two main phases:

  1. Encounter Data Collection: User devices (smartphones or low-cost dongles) record broadcasts from BLE beacons.
  2. Interaction with Backend: When a user is diagnosed as "sick," their encounter history is uploaded. To protect privacy, this data is routed through a mixnet—a series of servers that shuffle messages to decouple the data from the user's identity. This "chunking" of encounter history prevents the backend from reconstructing a user's full 14-day trajectory.

Privacy and Security Protocols

To ensure both utility and security, Silmarillion employs several advanced cryptographic techniques:

  • Authenticated Anonymity: To prevent malicious "trolling" or fake data uploads, users obtain one-time signing keys from authorized test centers. An Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol is used during key retrieval, ensuring the backend can verify a user's legitimacy without knowing which specific keys they possess.
  • Private Risk Retrieval: Healthy users check their exposure risk using Information-Theoretic Private Information Retrieval (IT-PIR). This allows a device to query the backend about risks in a specific region without the backend learning which region is being queried.
  • Contextual Risk Scoring: By leveraging beacon metadata, the system can generate "intelligent" risk scores. For instance, an encounter in a poorly ventilated room with high CO2 levels can be weighted more heavily than one in an open-air park.

Evaluation and Key Results

The system was evaluated through microbenchmarks on IoT hardware (Nordic nRF52832 and SiLabs Thunderboard) and a pilot deployment involving 15 volunteers over 16 days in a university setting.

  • Efficiency and Battery Life: Beacons can operate for over three years on a single coin cell battery. User dongles, designed for inclusivity (e.g., for children or the elderly), last approximately 8.8 days per charge.
  • Scalability: In a simulated city of 100,000 people, the mixnet overhead remains manageable at roughly 1.8 MB of traffic per device per day. PIR queries are highly efficient, with a user device retrieving risk info from a database of 430,000 regions in just 2.3 seconds.
  • Pilot Success: The proof-of-concept deployment successfully captured over 11,000 unique ephIDs and accurately identified matches for simulated infected participants.

Conclusion and Future Work

Silmarillion demonstrates that high-utility epidemiological data collection is compatible with stringent user privacy. While the system's effectiveness depends on beacon density and faces challenges like the "analog loophole" (where IDs could be recorded and replayed), it provides a robust blueprint for future epidemic response. Future work will focus on refining risk logic for non-contemporaneous exposures, such as lingering aerosols in enclosed spaces.

Summary updated

Abstract

Epidemics like the recent COVID-19 require proactive contact tracing and epidemiological analysis to predict and subsequently contain infection transmissions. The proactive measures require large scale data collection, which simultaneously raise concerns regarding users' privacy. Digital contact tracing systems developed in response to COVID-19 either collected extensive data for effective analytics at the cost of users' privacy or collected minimal data for the sake of user privacy but were ineffective in predicting and mitigating the epidemic risks. We present Silmarillion--in preparation for future epidemics--a system that reconciles user's privacy with rich data collection for higher utility. In Silmarillion, user devices record Bluetooth encounters with beacons installed in strategic locations. The beacons further enrich the encounters with geo-location, location type, and environment conditions at the beacon installation site. This enriched information enables detailed scientific analysis of disease parameters as well as more accurate personalized exposure risk notification. At the same time, Silmarillion provides privacy to all participants and non-participants at the same level as that guaranteed in digital and manual contact tracing. We describe the design of Silmarillion and its communication protocols that ensure user privacy and data security. We also evaluate a prototype of Silmarillion built using low-end IoT boards, showing that the power consumption and user latencies are adequately low for a practical deployment. Finally, we briefly report on a small-scale deployment within a university building as a proof-of-concept.
BibTeX
@misc{barthe2020reconciling,
  author = {Gilles Barthe and Roberta De Viti and Peter Druschel and Deepak Garg and Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez and Pierfrancesco Ingo and Matthew Lentz and Aastha Mehta and Bernhard Schölkopf and Druschel, Peter and Mehta, Aastha},
  title = {{Reconciling Security and Utility in Next-Generation Epidemic Risk Mitigation Systems}},
  year = {2020},
  eprint = {2011.08069},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.08069},
}
Figure