Recommending Fair Payments for Large-Scale Social Ridesharing

Filippo Bistaffa, Alessandro Farinelli, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn

Abstract

We perform recommendations for the Social Ridesharing scenario, in which a set of commuters, connected through a social network, arrange one-time rides at short notice. In particular, we focus on how much one should pay for taking a ride with friends. More formally, we propose the first approach that can compute fair coalitional payments that are also stable according to the game-theoretic concept of the kernel for systems with thousands of agents in real-world scenarios. Our tests, based on real datasets for both spatial (GeoLife) and social data (Twitter), show that our approach is significantly faster than the state-of-the-art (up to 84 times), allowing us to compute stable payments for 2000 agents in 50 minutes. We also develop a parallel version of our approach, which achieves a near-optimal speed-up in the number of processors used. Finally, our empirical analysis reveals new insights into the relationship between payments incurred by a user by virtue of its position in its social network and its role (rider or driver).
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bistaffa2015recommending,
  author = {Filippo Bistaffa and Alessandro Farinelli and Georgios Chalkiadakis and Sarvapali D. Ramchurn},
  title = {{Recommending Fair Payments for Large-Scale Social Ridesharing}},
  booktitle = {RecSys},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1145/2792838.2800177},
}

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