Abstract
This paper presents a radar target tracking framework for addressing main-beam range deception jamming attacks using random finite sets (RFSs). Our system handles false alarms and detections with false range information through multiple hypothesis tracking (MHT) to resolve data association uncertainties. We focus on range gate pull-off (RGPO) attacks, where the attacker adds positive delays to the radar pulse, thereby mimicking the target trajectory while appearing at a larger distance from the radar. The proposed framework incorporates knowledge about the spatial behavior of the attack into the assumed RFS clutter model and uses only position information without relying on additional signal features. We present an adaptive solution that estimates the jammer-induced biases to improve tracking accuracy as well as a simpler non-adaptive version that performs well when accurate priors on the jamming range are available. Furthermore, an expression for RGPO attack detection is derived, where the adaptive solution offers superior performance. The presented strategies provide tracking resilience against multiple RGPO attacks in terms of position estimation accuracy and jamming detection without degrading tracking performance in the absence of jamming.
Introduction
Target Tracking Radars (TTR) are increasingly vulnerable to deceptive electronic countermeasures. A primary threat is Range Gate Pull-Off (RGPO) jamming, where a repeater jammer intercepts radar pulses and retransmits them with an incrementally increasing delay. This creates a "fake" target that appears to move away from the actual target's position. Standard trackers often follow this deceptive signal, losing the real target once the range gate is successfully "pulled off."
Traditional countermeasures often rely on signal feature discrimination, such as analyzing amplitude fluctuations or angle-of-arrival. However, modern Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology allows jammers to replicate target signals with high fidelity, making feature-based separation difficult. This research proposes a resilient tracking framework that relies solely on spatial position data, leveraging the geometric constraints of the attack.
Methodology
The proposed framework utilizes Random Finite Sets (RFS) to model the tracking environment. Unlike traditional methods that assume a fixed number of targets, RFS treats the entire set of detections—including the target, background clutter, and jammer signals—as a single mathematical entity.
Structured Clutter Modeling
The core innovation is treating deceptive measurements as "structured clutter." Because an RGPO jammer is co-located with the target, its deceptive signals must appear further away along the same Line-of-Sight (LOS). By incorporating this spatial bias directly into the clutter model, the tracker can distinguish between random noise and the systematic "pull-off" of a jammer.
Adaptive Bias Estimation
The system offers an adaptive solution that augments the target's state vector to include jammer-induced biases. This allows the tracker to estimate the jammer's pull-off velocity in real-time. To handle multiple simultaneous attacks, the framework maintains several Gaussian components, including a "vigilant" component designed to detect the onset of new jamming events.
Experimental Evaluation
The framework was validated using four simulated radar scenarios involving different target behaviors and jamming configurations:
- Scenario 1: Straight-line trajectory with a single RGPO attack.
- Scenario 2: Maneuvering target (3g turns) with a single attack.
- Scenario 3: Straight-line trajectory with multiple simultaneous RGPO attacks.
- Scenario 4: Maneuvering target with multiple simultaneous RGPO attacks.
Results and Discussion
The resilient tracker demonstrated significant performance improvements over naive systems. In all scenarios, the adaptive tracker maintained a position Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) comparable to a theoretical "clairvoyant" benchmark.
- Resilience to Maneuvers: During high-G turns, the tracker experienced brief error spikes but successfully re-locked onto the target within approximately five time steps.
- Jamming Detection: The adaptive solution provided a reliable "Jamming Event Probability," identifying attacks even when the deceptive signal was spatially close to the real target.
- Computational Efficiency: Through pruning and capping of hypotheses, the system handled multiple simultaneous jammers without excessive computational overhead.
Conclusion
By rethinking deceptive jamming as a form of structured spatial clutter within an RFS framework, this research provides a robust method for radar tracking that does not depend on fragile signal features. Future work will focus on integrating more complex motion models and testing against real-world environmental clutter.
Reference: Calatrava, H., et al. "Mitigation of Radar Range Deception Jamming Using Random Finite Sets." IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2024.
Summary updated