Proof of Travel for Trust-Based Data Validation in V2I Communication

Dajiang Suo, Baichuan Mo, Jinhua Zhao, Sanjay E. SarmaIEEE Internet of Things Journal 2023 · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper introduces Proof-of-Travel (POT), a novel "whitelisting" approach to secure Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication. POT leverages cryptographic proofs of a vehicle's physical movement to build trust and incentivize data sharing, making it more costly for malicious actors to falsify information and enhancing the robustness of V2I data validation through a game-theoretic voting mechanism.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Connected vehicles (CVs) generate valuable data for traffic management, emergency response, and road condition monitoring. However, ensuring the trustworthiness of this data is a significant challenge. Existing "blacklisting" approaches focus on detecting and removing malicious vehicles, but they struggle in the early stages of V2X deployment due to a lack of "witness" vehicles. Furthermore, incentivizing vehicles to share their data and observations is crucial for widespread adoption. This paper addresses the need for a proactive security mechanism that not only validates V2I data but also incentivizes participation by making it more difficult and costly for malicious actors to operate within the V2I ecosystem.

Methods

The core of the proposed solution is the Proof-of-Travel (POT) protocol. POT works by having vehicles collect "location signatures" from roadside units (RSUs) as they travel. These signatures are cryptographically linked, forming a chain of proofs that attest to a vehicle's spatial movement. This chain of proofs is used to calculate a Verifiable Vehicle Miles Traveled (VVMT) score, which serves as a measure of a vehicle's reputation and contribution.

Key aspects of the method include:

  • Proof Collection: Vehicles request location signatures from RSUs, which verify the vehicle's identity and plausibility of its reported information. These signatures are then chained together using cryptographic hashes.
  • VVMT Calculation: The VVMT score is derived from the collected location signatures. The paper proposes both "vanilla" (linear or logistic) and "resilient" (accounting for missed signatures) VVMT equations.
  • Incentive Mechanism: A higher VVMT score translates to a higher reputation, incentivizing vehicles to participate in V2I data sharing. The cost of acquiring these proofs is low for normal vehicles but high for malicious ones attempting to forge them.
  • POT-Enhanced Voting: The VVMT score is integrated into a voting game for V2I data validation. Only vehicles with a sufficient VVMT score are eligible to vote, making the voting process more robust against malicious actors.
  • Game-Theoretic Analysis: The authors use game theory to prove that the POT-enhanced voting scheme eliminates the "all vehicles cheat" Nash Equilibrium, as the cost of acquiring proofs outweighs potential rewards for malicious actors.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The evaluation is based on simulations using the V2X Simulation Runtime Infrastructure (VSimRTI) with parameters mimicking real-world traffic conditions on a highway.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Shifting from Blacklisting to Whitelisting: POT offers a proactive "whitelisting" approach by making it costly to be malicious, rather than solely relying on detecting and removing bad actors. This is particularly effective in early-stage V2X deployments.
  • Movement as a Trust Metric: The paper innovatively uses physical travel distance, cryptographically verified, as a primary indicator of a vehicle's trustworthiness and contribution. This is a novel way to quantify reputation in V2I systems.
  • Incentivizing Participation: By linking reputation and potential rewards to VVMT, POT provides a strong incentive for vehicles to opt into V2X services and share data, addressing a key adoption barrier.
  • Game Theory for Security: The application of game theory to demonstrate the elimination of the "all cheat" equilibrium is a powerful way to mathematically prove the security benefits of the POT protocol against rational adversaries.
  • Flexibility in VVMT Design: The paper offers different VVMT calculation methods (linear vs. logistic, vanilla vs. resilient) to cater to various V2X scenarios and deployment stages, allowing for adjustable difficulty in earning reputation.

Key Results

  • Enhanced Robustness: Simulation results show that the POT-enhanced voting algorithm (PPV) is significantly more robust to malicious V2I reports than conventional plurality voting (CPV). A decrease of at least 10% in the percentage of invalid events was observed with reasonable voting parameters.
  • Reduced Malicious Influence: PPV effectively mitigates the impact of malicious vehicles by requiring a minimum VVMT score for voting eligibility, thereby reducing the proportion of invalid events compared to CPV, especially as the percentage of malicious vehicles increases.
  • Trade-off Analysis: The paper provides insights into the trade-off between event criticality and confirmation delay, suggesting that higher VVMT thresholds and vote requirements can improve accuracy at the cost of increased latency.
  • Game-Theoretic Proof: The authors mathematically prove that under POT, the scenario where all vehicles choose to cheat is not a pure Nash Equilibrium, indicating that rational adversaries will be deterred by the cost of acquiring travel proofs.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Adversary Assumptions: The current analysis primarily focuses on "rational" adversaries motivated by profit. Future work aims to address "irrational" adversaries with unlimited resources.
  • Privacy Concerns: While POT aims to protect privacy, the paper acknowledges that further exploration of techniques like zero-knowledge proofs is needed for enhanced privacy in V2I authentication.
  • Scalability and Deployment: Real-world deployment considerations include managing long chains of proofs, memory consumption, and communication overhead. The paper suggests blockchain technology as a potential solution for storing reputation scores securely.
  • Weighted Voting: The paper discusses the potential of weighted voting for fairness but notes its vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. Future work will explore achieving a tradeoff between fairness and security in weighted voting.
  • Transition to High Penetration: The paper acknowledges the need for trust management mechanisms to adapt to evolving V2X usage scenarios and higher penetration rates, including more transparent credential management and handling of multimodal data.

Summary updated

Abstract

Previous work on misbehavior detection and trust management for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication security is effective in identifying falsified and malicious V2X data. Each vehicle in a given region can be a witness to report on the misbehavior of other nearby vehicles, which will then be added to a “blacklist.” However, there may not exist enough witness vehicles that are willing to opt-in in the early stage of connected-vehicle deployment. In this article, we propose a “whitelisting” approach to V2X security, titled proof-of-travel (POT), which leverages the support of roadside infrastructure. Our goal is to transform the power of cryptography techniques embedded within vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) protocols into game-theoretic mechanisms to incentivize connected-vehicle data sharing and validate data trustworthiness simultaneously. The key idea is to determine the reputation and the contribution made by a vehicle based on its distance traveled and the information it shared through V2I channels. In particular, the total vehicle miles traveled for a vehicle must be testified by digital signatures signed by each infrastructure component along the path of its movement. While building a chain of proofs of spatial movement creates burdens for malicious vehicles, acquiring proofs does not result in extra costs for normal vehicles, which naturally want to move from the origin to the destination. The POT protocol is used to enhance the security of previous voting-based data validation algorithms for V2I crowdsensing applications. For the POT-enhanced voting, we prove that all vehicles choosing to cheat are not a pure Nash equilibrium using game-theoretic analysis. Simulation results suggest that the POT-enhanced voting is more robust to malicious data.
BibTeX
@article{suo2023proof,
  author = {Dajiang Suo and Baichuan Mo and Jinhua Zhao and Sanjay E. Sarma},
  title = {{Proof of Travel for Trust-Based Data Validation in V2I Communication}},
  journal = {IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=zu28XvOfvS},
}
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