Pricing Online Decisions: Beyond Auctions

Ilan Reuven Cohen, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, Lukasz Jez

TL;DR

This paper introduces dynamic posted pricing as a novel mechanism for influencing the decisions of self-interested agents in online settings. By strategically setting prices, the authors demonstrate how to achieve near-optimal social welfare or cost minimization, even when agents act purely out of self-interest and without revealing their true preferences. This approach offers a powerful alternative to traditional online algorithms and mechanisms, with applications ranging from resource allocation to reducing parking congestion.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The paper tackles the challenge of coordinating the decisions of multiple self-interested agents in dynamic online environments. Traditional approaches often rely on centralized online algorithms that make decisions based on observed events, or on online mechanisms that can enforce outcomes. However, these methods can be complex to implement or may require agents to reveal private information. The authors propose a new paradigm: dynamic posted pricing. In this model, a central entity sets prices for available options, and self-interested agents then make their own decisions to maximize their utility, given these prices. The core problem is to design pricing schemes that incentivize agents to make decisions that collectively lead to efficient outcomes, minimizing social cost or maximizing social welfare, without knowing future events or agents' true types.

Methods

The paper's core contribution lies in developing dynamic posted pricing schemes that achieve strong performance guarantees. The authors reframe the standard online algorithm setting: instead of a central algorithm making decisions in response to events, strategic agents initiate events and make decisions themselves. The pricing scheme acts as a "surcharge" on these decisions.

Key techniques include:

  • Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC): The proposed pricing schemes are designed to be DSIC, meaning agents have an incentive to act in their own best interest regardless of what other agents do. This is achieved by making prices dependent only on past observable information, not on future events or other agents' private types.
  • Competitive Analysis and Price of Anarchy: The performance of these pricing schemes is analyzed using the price of anarchy (PoA), which measures the ratio between the outcome achieved by selfish agents and the optimal outcome. The goal is to minimize this PoA.
  • Dynamic Pricing Functions: The paper introduces dynamic pricing functions $P_i$ that can adapt over time based on the history of observed states and decisions.
  • Metrical Task Systems and k-Server Problem: The authors apply their framework to specific problems like metrical task systems and the k-server problem, demonstrating how to design pricing schemes that induce agents to follow algorithms like the fractional traversal algorithm or the "Follow the Traversal" algorithm.
  • Imaginary Tasks: To handle situations where the pricing scheme needs to simulate an algorithm that relies on unobservable task information, the paper introduces the concept of "imaginary tasks" that satisfy consistency properties.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical analysis and algorithmic design for abstract problem settings rather than empirical evaluation on specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Pricing as a Coordination Mechanism: The most significant insight is that dynamic posted pricing can effectively coordinate the actions of self-interested agents in online settings, achieving outcomes close to optimal without explicit enforcement or full information revelation.
  • DSIC Without Full Revelation: The paper shows that DSIC can be achieved even when agents' true types (e.g., valuations, destinations) are not revealed, by carefully designing prices based on observable actions and system states.
  • Bridging Online Algorithms and Mechanism Design: The work bridges the gap between online algorithms (which assume a central decision-maker) and mechanism design (which deals with strategic agents) by using pricing to make agents emulate the behavior of an online algorithm.
  • Application to Real-World Problems: The paper highlights the potential of this approach for practical problems like reducing social costs in parking, where current systems often lead to congestion and inefficiency due to a lack of coordination.
  • Trade-off Between Information and PoA: The discussion section hints at a trade-off between the amount of observable history a pricing scheme uses and its resulting price of anarchy, suggesting that more information might lead to better performance but also increased complexity.

Key Results

  • Efficient Mechanisms for Metrical Task Systems and k-Server: The paper provides dynamic posted pricing mechanisms for metrical task systems and the k-server problem that achieve significantly improved prices of anarchy compared to settings without pricing. For instance, they achieve a price of anarchy of $16(m-1)$ for metrical task systems and $10$ for the 2-server problem.
  • Logarithmic Approximation for Metric Matching: For metric matching problems, they show that a randomized dynamic posted pricing scheme can achieve a competitive ratio logarithmic in the ratio of distances, leading to an exponential improvement over schemes without surcharges.
  • Simulation of Online Algorithms: The paper demonstrates how to design pricing schemes that make agents "follow" specific online algorithms (like the fractional traversal algorithm or the harmonic algorithm) by acting selfishly.
  • Parking Application: The work proposes a dynamic pricing scheme for parking that emulates the harmonic algorithm, leading to an $O(\log n)$ approximation for the optimal assignment in expectation on weighted line graphs.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Information Requirements: While the schemes are designed to work with limited information, they still rely on observing certain aspects of the system state and agent decisions. The paper acknowledges that the amount of observable history can impact the price of anarchy.
  • Tie-Breaking: The paper notes that agents' tie-breaking behavior can affect the exact outcome, leading to "weakly following" an algorithm rather than perfectly emulating it. This is particularly relevant in the k-server problem.
  • Generalizability: While the paper addresses several important problems, extending the dynamic pricing approach to more complex online settings or arbitrary algorithms remains an open challenge. The authors explicitly mention that it's not clear how to apply their simulation technique to arbitrary online algorithms, especially for problems like metric matching on general metric spaces.
  • Commitment and Rate of Change: The paper briefly touches upon the desirability of committing to prices in advance and slowing the rate of price change, suggesting these as areas for future research.
  • Promptness of Payment: The timing of payments (when they are determined relative to the agent's decision) is also raised as an open question for future investigation.

Summary updated

Abstract

We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings where selfish agents generate online events. Previous work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an auction settings. This paper deals with quite general settings and minimizing social costs. We show that appropriately computed posted prices allow one to achieve essentially the same performance as the best online algorithm. This holds in a wide variety of settings. Unlike online algorithms that learn about the event, and then make enforceable decisions, prices are posted without knowing the future events or even the current event, and are thus inherently dominant strategy incentive compatible. In particular we show that one can give efficient posted price mechanisms for metrical task systems, some instances of the $k$-server problem, and metrical matching problems. We give both deterministic and randomized algorithms. Such posted price mechanisms decrease the social cost dramatically over selfish behavior where no decision incurs a charge. One alluring application of this is reducing the social cost of free parking exponentially.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{cohen2015pricing,
  author = {Ilan Reuven Cohen and Alon Eden and Amos Fiat and Lukasz Jez},
  title = {{Pricing Online Decisions: Beyond Auctions}},
  booktitle = {SODA},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1137/1.9781611973730.7},
}

Loading related content...

Figure