Price Competition with LTE-U and WiFi

Xu Wang, Randall Berry

Abstract

LTE-U is an extension of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard for operation in unlicensed spectrum. LTE-U differs from WiFi, the predominant technology used in unlicensed spectrum, in that it utilizes a duty cycle mode for accessing the spectrum and allows for a more seamless integration with LTE deployments in licensed spectrum. While there have been a number of technical studies on the co-existence of LTE-U and WiFi, this paper investigates the impact of such technology from an economic perspective. We consider a model in which an incumbent service provider (SP) deploys a duty cycle-based technology like LTE-U in an unlicensed band alongside a licensed band, competing with entrants that only operate in the unlicensed band using WiFi. We characterize the impact of LTE-U on market outcomes and show that the welfare impacts are subtle, depending on the amount of unlicensed spectrum, the number of entrants, and the spectral efficiency difference between LTE and WiFi. Finally, we investigate the impact of the duty cycle and the portion of unlicensed spectrum used by the technology.

Introduction

As mobile data demand continues to grow, service providers (SPs) are increasingly looking toward unlicensed bands (such as the 5GHz band used by WiFi) to offload traffic. LTE-U (LTE in Unlicensed) allows cellular providers to utilize these bands via a duty-cycle mechanism, alternating between "ON" states (using both licensed and unlicensed spectrum) and "OFF" states (using only licensed spectrum). While technical coexistence has been widely studied, this paper investigates the economic implications of LTE-U on market competition between incumbent service providers and WiFi-only entrants.

Modeling Market Competition

The authors employ a game-theoretic framework to model a market consisting of an incumbent SP with licensed spectrum and one or more entrant SPs relying solely on unlicensed WiFi. Users are modeled as agents who choose providers based on a "delivered price," which includes both the subscription fee and a congestion cost determined by the Wardrop equilibrium.

The incumbent uses LTE-U to aggregate its licensed band with a portion of the unlicensed band. To analyze this, the authors derive "equivalent bandwidth" formulas that translate the duty-cycle behavior into a steady-state model, allowing for the characterization of Nash equilibria in various competitive scenarios, including monopoly and multi-entrant markets.

Strategic Impacts of LTE-U

In a competitive market, LTE-U serves as a strategic tool for the incumbent. By utilizing the unlicensed band during the "ON" cycle, the incumbent increases its own equivalent bandwidth while simultaneously "squeezing" the bandwidth available to WiFi-only competitors. This dynamic allows the incumbent to raise prices while maintaining or growing its customer base.

Incumbent revenue vs. duty cycle α, showing the potential for revenue gains or losses.

However, the impact on the incumbent's revenue is sensitive to the duty cycle (α). As shown in Figure 2, while LTE-U can enhance revenue, an excessively high duty cycle or specific market conditions might lead to diminishing returns or even lower revenue compared to not using LTE-U at all, particularly if it triggers aggressive price wars in spectrum-rich environments.

Welfare and Revenue Outcomes

The welfare impacts of LTE-U are complex and depend on spectral efficiency and the total amount of available spectrum. LTE is generally more efficient than WiFi due to advanced scheduling and Hybrid ARQ. If this efficiency advantage is significant, LTE-U can create a "win-win" scenario where both incumbent revenue and social welfare increase.

Welfare thresholds for LTE-U adoption based on licensed (B) and unlicensed (W) bandwidth.

Conversely, when unlicensed spectrum is abundant, the competitive advantage granted to the incumbent can lead to higher prices that harm consumer surplus. Figure 1 illustrates the welfare threshold: for a given licensed bandwidth B, there is a critical amount of unlicensed bandwidth W beyond which LTE-U becomes detrimental to social welfare. In markets with multiple WiFi entrants, competition typically drives WiFi prices to zero; here, LTE-U always increases incumbent revenue but consistently decreases consumer surplus.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The study concludes that while LTE-U offers strategic advantages for incumbents, its regulatory approval should consider the specific market context, particularly the scarcity of unlicensed spectrum and the number of competitors. Future research could extend this model by incorporating investment costs for LTE-U deployment, considering competition between multiple incumbents, and exploring the economic differences between duty-cycle LTE-U and "Listen-Before-Talk" protocols like License Assisted Access (LAA).

Summary updated

Abstract

LTE-U is an extension of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard for operation in unlicensed spectrum. LTE-U differs from WiFi, the predominant technology used in unlicensed spectrum in that it utilizes a duty cycle mode for accessing the spectrum and allows for a more seamless integration with LTE deployments in licensed spectrum. There have been a number of technical studies on the co-existence of LTE-U and WiFi in unlicensed spectrum In this paper, we instead investigate the impact of such a technology from an economic perspective. We consider a model in which an incumbent service provider (SP) deploys a duty cycle-based technology like LTE-U in an unlicensed band along with operating in a licensed band and competes with one or more entrants that only operate in the unlicensed band using a different technology like WiFi. We characterize the impact of a technology like LTE-U on the market outcome and show that the welfare impacts of this technology are subtle, depending in part on the amount of unlicensed spectrum and number of entrants. The difference in spectral efficiency between LTE and WiFi also plays a role in the competition among SPs. Finally, we investigate the impact of the duty cycle and the portion of unlicensed spectrum used by the technology.
BibTeX
@misc{wang2020price,
  author = {Xu Wang and Randall Berry},
  title = {{Price Competition with LTE-U and WiFi}},
  year = {2020},
  eprint = {2001.01388},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.01388},
}
Figure