Preserving Location Privacy in Mobile Edge Computing

Yuhang Wang, Zhihong Tian, Shen Su, Yanbin Sun, Chunsheng Zhu

Abstract

Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) enhances service delivery by moving computation closer to the user, but this proximity introduces significant privacy risks. Specifically, Location-Based Services (LBS) at the edge often require raw wireless fingerprints—lists of nearby Wi-Fi Access Points (APs)—to calculate user coordinates. This paper introduces LoPEC, a privacy-preserving scheme that generates believable fake fingerprints from a locally-maintained noise pool. By leveraging graph-theoretic approaches, LoPEC provides efficient, trajectory-aware privacy protection against untrusted edge servers.

The Privacy Challenge in MEC

In traditional cloud-based systems, privacy research focuses on obfuscating final GPS coordinates. However, in MEC environments, the "Location Service" (LS) often resides at the edge and calculates the user's position based on a wireless fingerprint. This fingerprint consists of a list of nearby Wi-Fi APs and their respective signal strengths.

MEC architecture showing the exchange of wireless fingerprints between a mobile device and an edge server.

As shown in the architecture above, the raw signal data is the primary privacy leak. To an attacker at the edge, the fingerprint is the location. The authors identify two major gaps in existing solutions: the need for "believable" noise (using real-world APs rather than fake MAC addresses) and the inherent vulnerability of edge nodes, which may be less secure than centralized clouds.

The LoPEC Framework

To address these gaps, the authors propose LoPEC (Location Privacy in Edge Computing). The core idea is to send multiple fingerprints to the edge server—one real and several decoys—so the server cannot distinguish the true user location.

Illustration of a mobile device sending multiple sets of Wi-Fi fingerprints (real in green, decoys in blue) to a location provider to mask its true position.

LoPEC consists of three algorithmic components:

  1. SCSOA (Self-Collect and Self-Organize Algorithm): The mobile device builds its own "noise pool" by recording APs encountered during daily movement. It constructs an undigraph where edges represent overlapping coverage areas.
  2. CSDA (Complete Subgraph Discovery Algorithm): To generate a valid fake location, the system identifies "cliques" (groups of overlapping APs) within the graph. CSDA uses clustering coefficients to find these dense areas in linear time, ensuring the decoys are geographically plausible.
  3. e-CSDA (Enhanced CSDA): For users in motion, e-CSDA ensures that fake locations follow a logical trajectory. By selecting noise APs adjacent to the previous noise set, it prevents "homogeneity attacks" where an attacker might spot the only location moving realistically.

Evaluation and Key Results

The researchers evaluated LoPEC using the Harbin Dataset, which contains data from 2,016 Wi-Fi routers in a business district in Harbin, China. The system was tested against two standard positioning algorithms: RADAR (deterministic) and PBL (probabilistic).

  • Effectiveness: LoPEC achieved a success rate of over 85% in generating valid clique noise, even with relatively small initial datasets.
  • Efficiency: Unlike brute-force clique discovery which is NP-complete, LoPEC’s computational cost scales linearly with the size of the AP graph, making it suitable for real-time mobile use.
  • Trajectory Realism: Visual analysis confirmed that e-CSDA generates continuous "ghost" trajectories, making it nearly impossible for an attacker to distinguish the real user from the decoys.

Conclusion and Future Work

LoPEC demonstrates that mobile devices can serve as their own privacy providers by leveraging local knowledge and graph theory. While highly effective, the authors note that future iterations could improve kinematic realism by accounting for velocity and direction. Additionally, the system's performance is currently dependent on the maturity of the user's locally-mapped AP graph, suggesting a need for strategies to handle new or sparsely mapped environments.

Summary updated

Abstract

The burgeoning technology of Mobile Edge Computing is attracting the traditional LBS and LS to deploy due to its nature characters such as low latency and location awareness. Although this transplant will avoid the location privacy threat from the central cloud provider, there still exists the privacy concerns in the LS of MEC scenario. Location privacy threat arises during the procedure of the fingerprint localization, and the previous studies on location privacy are ineffective because of the different threat model and information semantic. To address the location privacy in MEC environment, we designed LoPEC, a novel and effective scheme for protecting location privacy for the MEC devices. By the proper model of the RAN access points, we proposed the noise-addition method for the fingerprint data, and successfully induce the attacker from recognizing the real location. Our evaluation proves that LoPEC effectively prevents the attacker from obtaining the user's location precisely in both single-point and trajectory scenarios.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{wang2018preserving,
  author = {Yuhang Wang and Zhihong Tian and Shen Su and Yanbin Sun and Chunsheng Zhu},
  title = {{Preserving Location Privacy in Mobile Edge Computing}},
  booktitle = {ICC},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.1109/icc.2019.8761370},
}
Figure