Abstract
Sensors are critical components in modern infrastructure, enabling applications from home security to environmental monitoring. While software and physical defenses are common, this paper introduces PowerRadio, a novel threat vector that bypasses existing protections to manipulate sensor readings from a distance. PowerRadio exploits interconnected ground (GND) wires—a standard safety feature in buildings—to inject malicious signals. These signals couple with a sensor's analog measurement wires and survive noise filters, inducing incorrect data. We demonstrate three manipulation methods: inducing static bias, periodical signals, or pulses. Our evaluation shows that PowerRadio can inject stripes into surveillance footage to evade detection or transmit inaudible voice commands to microphones. We identify two root causes: the lack of shielding between ground and signal wires and circuit impedance asymmetry. PowerRadio represents a significant emerging threat, combining the range of radiated EMI with the bypass capabilities of conducted EMI.
Introduction
Sensors are the primary interface between the physical and digital worlds, but their reliance on sensitive analog circuitry makes them inherently vulnerable to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). Traditional EMI attacks are categorized as either radiated (requiring proximity and line-of-sight) or conducted (injecting noise into power lines). Modern hardware typically defends against these via voltage regulators, noise filters on live/neutral wires, and metal shielding.
However, PowerRadio identifies a neglected "backdoor": the Ground (GND) wire. Because GND is a shared reference point for electrical safety and is rarely filtered or shielded against internal signal wires, it provides an unobstructed path for malicious signals to travel through a building's infrastructure and leap directly into a sensor’s sensitive analog path.
The PowerRadio Attack Mechanism
The PowerRadio attack operates through a two-stage physical process that exploits the fundamental design of modern electrical systems.
1. The Coupling Stage
An attacker injects a high-voltage signal (up to 300Vpp) into the GND port of an accessible wall socket. The building's internal GND wiring acts as a massive antenna, radiating this signal to nearby analog signal wires within a victim device. This induces a Common Mode (CM) current, where the malicious signal flows in the same direction on both the signal and ground lines.
2. The Converting Stage
In an ideal circuit, CM noise would be cancelled out. However, real-world circuits suffer from impedance asymmetry due to manufacturing tolerances or PCB layout choices. This asymmetry converts the CM current into a Differential Mode (DM) voltage. The sensor’s microcontroller (MCU) cannot distinguish this induced voltage from legitimate physical stimuli, leading to an incorrect measurement.
Experimental Validation
We validated PowerRadio across a wide array of hardware, including 13 functional modules (amplifiers, ADCs), 17 common sensors (light, accelerometers, encoders), and several commercial systems.
- Surveillance Evasion: By injecting specific frequencies, we successfully added "stripes" to analog HD camera feeds. This distortion caused state-of-the-art object detection algorithms like YOLOv8 and FaceNet to fail, effectively rendering an intruder invisible to automated security systems.
- Voice Command Injection: We successfully injected inaudible voice commands into professional broadcast and conference microphones. Using the Wav2Vec metric, we achieved a similarity score of ~0.6, proving that the semantic meaning of the injected audio remained intact.
- Safety-Critical Spoofing: In a Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) autonomous driving simulation, PowerRadio manipulated a vehicle's speed (ABS) sensor, causing the car to lose control and deviate from its intended path.
Discussion and Mitigation
PowerRadio is a potent hybrid threat. It achieves an effective attack distance of up to 15 meters, works through walls, and does not require line-of-sight. Its primary advantage is bypassing the voltage regulators that protect the "Live" and "Neutral" power lines.
To mitigate this threat, we recommend that sensor designers prioritize Common Mode Chokes (CMC) and ensure perfectly symmetrical PCB layouts to minimize CM-to-DM conversion. Additionally, we propose a detection circuit based on a three-phase CMC that can sense malicious magnetic flux on the GND line before it reaches sensitive components. These insights provide a roadmap for enhancing the security of the next generation of smart sensors and power wiring.
Summary updated