Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs

Alexander StremitzerOpen 2008 · DOI

Alexander Stremitzer

Abstract

We consider a model of a single defendant and $N$ plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other plaintiffs. It was shown in Che and Spier (2007) that failure to internalize this externality can often be exploited by the defendant. However, if plaintiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers, we can show that they will actually be exploited by one of their fellow plaintiffs rather than by the defendant. Moreover, if litigation is a public good as is the case in shareholder derivative suits, parties may fail to reach a settlement even having complete information. This may explain why we observe derivative suits in the US but not in Europe.

Title page of the research paper 'Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs' by Alexander Stremitzer.

Introduction: The Negative Externality of Settlement

In complex litigation involving multiple plaintiffs and a single defendant, the structure of legal costs can create perverse incentives. When the costs of trial—such as expert testimony and discovery—are fixed ($C_P$), they are shared among the active plaintiffs. This creates a negative externality: when one plaintiff settles and exits the case, the remaining plaintiffs must shoulder a larger portion of the fixed costs.

Previous research by Che and Spier (2007) suggested that defendants could exploit this dynamic through "divide and conquer" tactics, forcing plaintiffs to settle for amounts significantly lower than their actual damages. Alexander Stremitzer’s research challenges this by examining what happens when the plaintiffs themselves control the bargaining process.

Methodology: Sequential Bargaining and Public Goods

The paper utilizes non-cooperative game theory to model sequential bargaining between $N$ plaintiffs and one defendant. The plaintiffs make sequential "take-it-or-leave-it" (TIOLI) settlement offers. If the defendant rejects an offer, that plaintiff remains part of the coalition for a potential trial.

The model analyzes two distinct scenarios:

  1. Standard Litigation: Settlements reduce the defendant's total liability at trial by the amount of the settling plaintiff's claim.
  2. Derivative Suits: Litigation is treated as a "public good." Damages are paid to the company treasury, meaning a private settlement with one shareholder does not reduce the defendant's total liability if other shareholders continue the suit.

The "Pivotal Plaintiff" and Internal Exploitation

A central finding of the model is that when plaintiffs make the offers, the defendant does not necessarily pay less in total. Instead, the exploitation becomes internal to the plaintiff group.

In the sequential bargaining chain, there exists a pivotal plaintiff. By settling with this specific individual, the defendant ensures that the remaining plaintiffs no longer have a "credible threat" to sue because the remaining group is too small to afford the fixed litigation costs. Recognizing this leverage, the pivotal plaintiff makes a massive settlement demand, effectively "skimming off" the value that would have gone to the plaintiffs later in the sequence.

Consequently, while the total recovery for the group remains the same as it would be without externalities, the distribution is highly skewed: the pivotal plaintiff extracts a high payment, while the final plaintiffs receive nothing. This demonstrates that the power to make offers allows plaintiffs to capture the surplus, but it does not solve the coordination problem among themselves.

Derivative Suits: Explaining the US-Europe Divide

The model provides a compelling explanation for why shareholder derivative suits (suing directors on behalf of a company) are common in the US but rare in Europe.

  • The US (Dispersed Ownership): In the US, corporate ownership is typically dispersed among many small shareholders. No single shareholder has enough "veto power" to stop a suit by settling. Because the defendant's trial liability remains constant regardless of individual settlements, reaching a deal is difficult. This leads to cases proceeding to trial or collective settlement.
  • Europe (Concentrated Ownership): European companies often have large "blockholders." A single large shareholder often holds enough power that if they settle, the remaining minority shareholders cannot afford to continue the suit. The defendant can settle privately with this large player, effectively buying off the threat of litigation.

Conclusion

Stremitzer’s work highlights a critical trade-off between efficiency and distribution. While the European model of concentrated ownership may lead to fewer lawsuits and lower aggregate litigation costs, it results in the systematic "expropriation" of minority shareholders by larger ones and the defendant. The US system, despite its higher litigation frequency, offers better protection against such internal exploitation by preventing any single player from holding veto power over the group's legal interests.

Limitations and Future Directions

The model assumes that plaintiffs hold all the bargaining power through TIOLI offers. Results might vary if the defendant makes the offers or if bargaining power is more evenly distributed. Additionally, the study assumes complete information; in practice, asymmetric information regarding costs and damages is a primary driver of the trial-versus-settlement decision. Future research could integrate these factors to provide a more comprehensive view of international legal disparities.

Summary updated

Abstract

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other plaintiffs. It was shown in Che and Spier (2007) that failure to internalize this externality can often be exploited by the defendant. However, if plaintiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers, we can show that they will actually be exploited by one of their fellow plaintiffs rather than by the defendant. Moreover, if litigation is a public good as is the case in shareholder derivative suits, parties may fail to reach a settlement even having complete information. This may explain why we observe derivative suits in the US but not in Europe.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{stremitzer2008plaintiffs,
  author = {Alexander Stremitzer},
  title = {{Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs}},
  booktitle = {Open},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.5282/ubm/epub.13328},
}
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