A Strategyproof Mechanism for Ownership Restructuring in Privately Owned Assets

Gal Danino, Moran Koren

Introduction

In the lifecycle of a private company, particularly within the startup ecosystem, the "cap table"—the record of ownership—often becomes increasingly complex. Early employees, angel investors, and multiple venture capital firms may hold varying stakes. As a company matures, pivots, or prepares for acquisition, this fragmented ownership can become a liability, complicating decision-making and governance.

To address this, companies often undergo ownership restructuring or recapitalization to reduce the number of shareholders. However, private assets lack a public market price, creating a significant challenge: how do you determine a fair buyout price when every owner has a strategic incentive to misrepresent their true valuation? This paper, authored by researchers from Technion and Ben Gurion University, introduces the Multi-BMBY Mechanism (MBM), a game-theoretic solution designed to facilitate efficient, truthful, and budget-balanced restructuring.

The Limitations of Traditional Buyouts

In simple two-partner ventures, the standard tool for a "corporate divorce" is the BMBY ("Buy Me Buy You") mechanism. In this setup, one partner names a price for the entire company, and the other partner must choose to either buy the first partner out or sell their own share at that price. While BMBY is intuitive, it is highly susceptible to strategic manipulation and does not scale to the multi-owner environments typical of modern startups.

Existing multi-owner solutions frequently suffer from three primary flaws:

  1. Strategic Distortion: Owners may lowball or overbid to manipulate the final buyout price.
  2. Inefficiency: Mechanisms may inadvertently remove the owners who value the company the most, destroying long-term value.
  3. Disruption of Power Dynamics: Most auction formats result in a single winner. In a corporate context, it is often preferable to retain a core group of key players while maintaining their relative influence and voting blocks.

The Multi-BMBY Mechanism (MBM)

The authors propose the MBM to scale the "I cut, you choose" logic to $n$ participants. The process begins with a "planner" (the company) setting a target number of remaining owners, denoted as $\bar{m}$. The mechanism then proceeds through five distinct stages:

  1. Bidding: Every owner submits a private bid representing their valuation of the entire company.
  2. Ranking: Bids are ranked from highest to lowest.
  3. The Randomization Trick: To ensure the mechanism is "strategyproof" (meaning the best move for any participant is to bid their true valuation), the mechanism does not always retain exactly $\bar{m}$ owners. Instead, it employs a specific probability distribution to randomly choose between keeping $\bar{m}$ or $\bar{m}-1$ owners.
  4. Pricing: The price per share is determined based on the $\bar{m}$-th highest bid.
  5. Allocation: The top bidders remain as owners. Their shares are increased proportionally to fill the void left by departing owners, while the lower bidders are paid out based on the established price.

The mathematical innovation of MBM lies in the randomization step. By making the "marginal" bidder (the one at the cutoff) have an expected utility of zero, the mechanism removes the incentive for any player to shade their bid to influence the price.

Key Insights and Theoretical Guarantees

The MBM offers several critical advantages for private asset restructuring:

Proportionality Preservation

Unlike standard auctions that consolidate ownership into a single hand, MBM is proportionality-preserving. If an investor owned twice as much as another before the restructuring, they will still own twice as much relative to that investor afterward. This is essential for maintaining established voting blocks and the internal political balance of a firm.

Strategyproofness and Stability

The MBM is a "dominant strategy" mechanism. Participants do not need to guess the bids of others or anticipate market trends; their optimal strategy is always to report their true internal valuation. Furthermore, the mechanism is individually rational (no participant is worse off for having joined) and budget balanced (the payments from those staying exactly cover the payouts to those leaving, requiring no outside capital).

Welfare Analysis

Using a simulated model of "Uniform Valuations," the authors demonstrate the efficiency of the mechanism. They prove that as the number of agents grows, the MBM is guaranteed to preserve at least 50% of the maximum possible social welfare, even in the most pessimistic worst-case scenarios.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the MBM provides a robust framework for restructuring, the authors acknowledge certain limitations that provide avenues for future research:

  • Linear Utilities: The model assumes that utility is linear—that owning 20% of a company is exactly twice as valuable as owning 10%. In practice, "control premiums" (the disproportionate value of owning a majority stake) may introduce non-linearities.
  • Ownership Caps: The current mechanism does not allow for a cap on individual ownership. Future iterations might need to incorporate constraints to prevent an investor from unintentionally crossing a specific ownership threshold (e.g., 50%).
  • Capital Injection: Currently, MBM is a zero-sum transfer between owners. The authors suggest that future work could explore using the valuation gap between buyers and sellers to raise new capital for the firm during the restructuring process.

Conclusion

The Multi-BMBY Mechanism represents a significant step forward in mechanism design for private equity. By combining randomization with proportional allocation, it provides a simple, computationally efficient, and strategyproof way to streamline company ownership without the need for external valuation or additional capital.

Summary updated

Abstract

In privately held startups, restructuring ownership is challenging due to diverse and uncertain valuations among owners. Traditional approaches, including the BMBY mechanism for equal partnerships, fail to address the complexities of multi-owner settings and don't elicit true valuations. We propose a novel mechanism that extends the BMBY rationale to accommodate these complex scenarios. Our mechanism ensures truthful valuation elicitation while offering several advantages: it is easy to implement, budget balanced, resistant to collusion, individually rational, and allocates shares to those who value them most. Crucially, it preserves proportionality among remaining owners, maintaining existing power dynamics. The mechanism allows for adaptive control of the eventual number of owners, addressing unique startup needs such as incentivizing employee ownership. This paper contributes to the field of ownership restructuring by providing a practical, theoretically-grounded solution for the complex dynamics of startup recapitalization, potentially improving decision-making processes and stakeholder relationships in these pivotal business transitions.
BibTeX
@misc{danino2022strategyproof,
  author = {Gal Danino and Moran Koren},
  title = {{A Strategyproof Mechanism for Ownership Restructuring in Privately Owned Assets}},
  year = {2022},
  eprint = {2311.06780},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.06780},
}
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