Abstract
Personalizing Reinforcement Learning (RL) models for large user populations is often hindered by the high cost of regulatory approval for each individual model. We introduce represented Markov Decision Processes (r-MDPs), a framework that learns a small budget of $k$ representative policies to serve $n$ diverse users. By optimizing for social welfare through EM-like and end-to-end algorithms, we demonstrate that a minimal number of policies can achieve near-optimal personalization, effectively bypassing the regulatory bottleneck in high-stakes applications.
Introduction
The "holy grail" of machine learning is personalization—tailoring AI behavior to specific user needs. However, in high-stakes domains like healthcare or autonomous driving, every new model requires rigorous regulatory audits (e.g., FDA approval). This creates a "regulatory bottleneck": while we might have 10,000 users, we cannot afford to audit 10,000 unique models. Conversely, a "one-size-fits-all" model often fails to meet individual requirements. This research explores the middle ground: finding the optimal $k$ policies to satisfy $n$ users, where $k$ is a small, manageable budget.
Methodology: Represented MDPs
The authors formalize this problem as the represented Markov Decision Process (r-MDP). In this framework, $n$ agents (users) each possess unique reward functions. Instead of individual models, users are assigned to one of $k$ "representative" policies. The objective is to maximize "social welfare" (the average reward across the entire population) by simultaneously learning the $k$ policies and the optimal user-to-policy mapping.
Two primary algorithms are proposed:
- EM-like Algorithm (Hard Assignment): An iterative process where users are assigned to the representative policy yielding the highest reward (E-step), followed by updating the policies to better serve their assigned groups (M-step).
- End-to-End Algorithm (Soft Assignment): This approach treats user assignment as a differentiable parameter, using gradient descent to learn the mapping and policies concurrently.
Both methods utilize Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) as the core RL engine.
Experimental Evaluation
The framework was evaluated on two distinct environments:
- Resource Gathering: A 5x5 grid world where 25 agents aim to collect specific resources and return to a home base. This environment tests spatial division efficiency.
- MuJoCo Benchmarks: Continuous control tasks (Ant, HalfCheetah, etc.) modified so that 100–1,000 agents have varying target velocities, testing the ability to handle continuous preference spaces.
Key Insights
Optimization over Heuristics
Unlike traditional clustering methods that group users based on observed behavior (trajectories), r-MDPs group users based on their underlying preferences (reward functions). This preference-based optimization leads to significantly higher performance when the policy budget is constrained.
The Efficiency of Small Budgets
A critical finding is the rapid plateauing of performance as $k$ increases. In the Resource Gathering task, a budget of just $k=3$ policies for 25 agents captured over 90% of the performance of a fully personalized system ($k=25$). This suggests that most populations can be effectively served by a very small number of specialized models.
Automatic Niche Discovery
The algorithms naturally partition the preference space. In MuJoCo tasks, agents were automatically categorized into velocity "buckets" (e.g., slow, medium, fast) without manual intervention, demonstrating the framework's ability to discover latent user segments.
Results and Discussion
The proposed EM-like and End-to-End algorithms consistently outperformed standard clustering-based baselines and random assignments across all benchmarks. The framework scaled effectively to populations of 1,000 agents. Furthermore, the authors provided theoretical guarantees that the EM-like algorithm converges to a local maximum of social welfare, a crucial property for deployment in regulated environments.
Limitations and Future Directions
While maximizing average social welfare is efficient, it can lead to a "tyranny of the majority," where users with outlier preferences are underserved. Future work should incorporate "egalitarian" fairness metrics to ensure equitable service across the population. Additionally, addressing the "cold start" problem—identifying user preferences in real-time without prior simulation—and developing methods to dynamically determine the optimal budget $k$ remain open challenges.
Summary updated