Permutation Matrix Encryption Based Ultralightweight Secure RFID Scheme in Internet of Vehicles

Kai Fan, Junbin Kang, Shanshan Zhu, Hui Li, Yintang Yang

TL;DR

This paper proposes a new ultralightweight RFID authentication scheme for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) that uses permutation matrix encryption. The scheme aims to enhance security and privacy by resisting common attacks like replay and tag-tracking, while also being fast and cost-effective for widespread adoption in IoV applications.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) relies heavily on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology for various applications like traffic management and electronic toll collection. However, the open wireless communication nature of RFID systems makes them vulnerable to security threats and privacy breaches, such as unauthorized tracking and disclosure of personal or location information. Existing RFID authentication schemes often struggle to balance security, privacy, and the computational constraints of low-cost RFID tags, especially in the high-speed, dynamic environment of the IoV. This paper addresses the need for a secure, privacy-preserving, and efficient RFID authentication protocol specifically tailored for the IoV.

Methods

The core of the proposed scheme is an ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol that leverages permutation matrix encryption. A permutation matrix, characterized by having exactly one '1' in each row and column, is used for both encryption and decryption. This approach simplifies the tag's circuitry and reduces its computational overhead.

The protocol operates in two phases: initialization and authentication. During initialization, a secret key (S) is shared between the back-end server and legitimate tags, and permutation matrices (M1, M2) are stored in the tag and their transposed versions (M1⁻¹, M2⁻¹) in the reader.

The authentication phase involves:

  1. Reader to Tag: The reader generates a random number (R) and the current network time (T1). It then encrypts T1 using the permutation matrices and combines it with R to form a challenge (H2), which is sent to the tag.
  2. Tag to Reader: The tag uses its stored permutation matrices and R to decrypt H2 and retrieve T1. It compares T1 with its last successful authentication time (To). If T1 is within a specified time window (less than 48 hours but greater than To), the reader is authenticated. The tag then encrypts its unique identification (ID) using permutation matrices and the secret key S, generating Y2 and G.
  3. Reader to Back-end Server: The reader forwards G, ID, and R to the back-end server. The server uses the secret key S to decrypt G and verify the ID. Successful verification confirms mutual authentication.

The scheme also incorporates a Unix timestamp for T1 to resist replay attacks and uses the permutation matrix for efficient encryption/decryption, aiming for a single communication round between the tag and reader.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on a theoretical protocol design and its security/performance analysis, with simulation results presented rather than evaluation on specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Permutation Matrices for Ultralightweight Security: The novel application of permutation matrices for encryption/decryption on resource-constrained RFID tags is a key innovation. This method is computationally less intensive than traditional cryptographic algorithms, making it suitable for low-cost tags.
  • Timestamp-Based Replay Attack Resistance: Using a Unix timestamp (T1) as part of the authentication process, and comparing it with the last successful authentication time (To) stored on the tag, effectively prevents replay attacks. This is a simple yet powerful mechanism for ensuring freshness.
  • Single-Round Authentication for IoV: The design aims for a single communication round between the tag and reader. This is crucial for high-speed scenarios in the IoV, where multiple communication rounds could lead to authentication failures or delays.
  • Balancing Security and Cost: The paper demonstrates how to achieve robust security and privacy features (tag anonymity, resistance to tracking, mutual authentication) without significantly increasing the tag's complexity or cost, which is a critical factor for large-scale IoV deployments.

Key Results

  • Security: The proposed scheme is claimed to effectively resist common RFID attacks, including replay attacks, tag-tracking attacks, and de-synchronization attacks. It also ensures tag anonymity and mutual authentication between the reader, tag, and back-end server.
  • Performance: The use of permutation matrices and a single communication round leads to fast authentication speeds, suitable for the high-speed requirements of the IoV. The scheme requires fewer logic gates and computational resources on the tag compared to other ultralightweight protocols.
  • Resource Utilization: FPGA simulation results (Figure 2) and resource comparison (Table 3) indicate that the proposed tag design requires a low number of slice registers and LUTs, making it cost-effective for mass production. For instance, the proposed protocol uses 384 slice registers and 197 LUTs, significantly less than Umar Mujahid's protocol (879 registers, 1126 LUTs).

Limitations and Future Work

  • Fixed Keys and Matrices: The paper acknowledges that the permutation matrices and the shared secret key (S) are fixed. This could potentially increase the risk of information leakage if these elements are compromised.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest improving security by dynamically updating the permutation matrices and the shared secret key after each authentication. They also propose further reducing tag costs by optimizing data length and encryption methods. The protocol's applicability to location-based IoV services is also highlighted as a future direction.

Summary updated

Abstract

Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a kind of non-contact automatic identification technology. The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a derivative of the Internet of Things (IoT), and RFID technology has become one of the key technologies of IoV. Due to the open wireless communication environment in RFID system, the RFID system is easy to be exposed to various malicious attacks, which may result in privacy disclosure. The provision of privacy protection for users is a prerequisite for the wide acceptance of the IoV. In this paper, we discuss the privacy problem of the RFID system in the IoV and present a lightweight RFID authentication scheme based on permutation matrix encryption, which can resist some typical attacks and ensure the user’s personal privacy and location privacy. The fast certification speed of the scheme and the low cost of the tag is in line with the high-speed certification requirement in the Internet of vehicles. In this thesis, the specific application scenarios of the proposed RFID authentication scheme in the IoV is also discussed.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{fan2019permutation,
  author = {Kai Fan and Junbin Kang and Shanshan Zhu and Hui Li and Yintang Yang},
  title = {{Permutation Matrix Encryption Based Ultralightweight Secure RFID Scheme in Internet of Vehicles}},
  booktitle = {Sensors},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=vogxmI---05},
}
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