Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

Gagan Goel, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme

Abstract

Standard auction theory often assumes quasi-linear utility, where a bidder's satisfaction is simply their valuation minus the price paid. However, in high-stakes environments like housing or spectrum auctions, bidders are often budget-constrained and must borrow capital at a cost. This paper introduces the Taxed Ascending Auction, the first incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient mechanism designed for bidders with fixed interest rates. By bridging the gap between "unlimited cash" and "hard budget" models, the authors provide a robust theoretical framework for auctions where borrowing costs create non-linear convex utility functions.

Introduction

Most classical auction mechanisms rely on the assumption of quasi-linear utility ($u = v - \pi$). While this model is sufficient for small-scale transactions, it fails to capture the realities of massive financial commitments. In these scenarios, bidders face budget constraints. Previous research has largely focused on "hard" budgets, where spending cannot exceed a fixed limit $B$.

In practice, however, budgets are often "soft"; bidders can exceed their liquid cash by borrowing, albeit at the cost of interest. This creates a non-linear utility curve: the first dollars spent (cash on hand) are relatively "cheap," while subsequent dollars (borrowed) become increasingly expensive. Designing truthful (incentive-compatible) and efficient auctions in this setting is challenging because standard tools, such as Myerson’s Lemma, are not directly applicable to non-linear utilities.

The Taxation Equivalence and Mechanism Design

The authors address this complexity through a novel theoretical insight termed Taxation Equivalence. They prove that an auction involving bidders with interest rates is mathematically equivalent to a standard quasi-linear auction where the auctioneer must pay a tax on their revenue. This "effective payment" transformation allows the use of modified tools from classical mechanism design.

Non-linear utility and effective payment functions with a budget kink at B.

As illustrated in the figure above, the utility function $\beta(\pi)$ (left) shows a distinct kink at budget $B$, where the cost of payment accelerates due to interest. Conversely, the effective revenue $\tau(\hat{\pi})$ (right) shows that the auctioneer's realized gain grows more slowly once the bidder enters the borrowing phase.

Building on this, the authors propose the Taxed Ascending Auction, a dynamic clock auction that generalizes the classic Ausubel clinching auction. Key features include:

  • Dynamic Price Updates: The price for goods already "clinched" by a bidder can increase if dictated by interest rate logic.
  • De-allocation and the *-Pool: If rising interest costs make a previously clinched good unaffordable, the good is returned to a temporary holding area called the "*-pool."
  • Re-assignment: To ensure Pareto efficiency, goods in the pool are eventually re-allocated to the bidder with the higher valuation.

Key Insights and Results

The paper's primary contribution is the existence proof of an individually rational (IR), incentive-compatible (IC), and Pareto-efficient auction for two players with symmetric interest rates.

One of the most significant departures from standard auction theory is the loss of monotonicity. In typical efficient auctions, a bidder's allocation only increases over time. Here, the authors demonstrate that to maintain efficiency under interest rates, the auctioneer must be able to take goods back and re-allocate them. The proposed mechanism is a strict generalization: setting the interest rate to infinity recovers the Ausubel clinching auction for hard budgets, while setting it to zero recovers a standard social-welfare-maximizing auction.

Furthermore, the authors model the auction design as a system of first-order ordinary differential equations (ODEs). This provides a mathematical foundation for the rules of the Taxed Ascending Auction and characterizes Pareto-optimal outcomes in the presence of taxation.

Limitations and Future Work

While the paper establishes a groundbreaking framework, several limitations remain for future exploration:

  • Scalability: The current mechanism and proof are limited to two bidders. Extending this to three or more players is difficult as the characterization of Pareto efficiency becomes significantly more complex.
  • Symmetry: The model assumes all bidders share the same interest rate, whereas real-world borrowing costs vary based on creditworthiness.
  • Divisibility: The auction assumes goods are infinitely divisible (e.g., electricity or budget shares). Adapting this logic to indivisible goods, like a single piece of real estate, remains an open challenge.
  • Implementation Complexity: The mechanism's reliance on de-allocation and re-assignment makes it less intuitive than a standard English auction, which may impact its adoption in practical settings.

Summary updated

Abstract

We consider auction settings in which agents have limited access to monetary resources but are able to make payments larger than their available resources by taking loans with a certain interest rate. This setting is a strict generalization of budget constrained utility functions (which corresponds to infinite interest rates). Our main result is an incentive compatible and Pareto-efficient auction for a divisible multi-unit setting with 2 players who are able to borrow money with the same interest rate. The auction is an ascending price clock auction that bears some similarities to the clinching auction but at the same time is a considerable departure from this framework: allocated goods can be de-allocated in future and given to other agents and prices for previously allocated goods can be raised.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{goel2019pareto,
  author = {Gagan Goel and Vahab S. Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme},
  title = {{Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011989},
}
Figure