Owner Risk Averse and Enterprise Technological Innovation Mode: Focus on Major Equipment Manufacturing Industry

Guofeng Zhang, Yuan Yi-jun, Lin HuInternational Journal of Economics and Finance 2012 · DOI

Abstract

The major equipment manufacturing industry is a strategic pillar for national defense and economic development. Despite China's long-standing "market for technology" strategy initiated in the 1990s, the industry remains heavily dependent on foreign imports for core technologies. This paper examines the role of buyer (owner) risk aversion—stemming from product complexity and information asymmetry—in shaping the innovation strategies of domestic firms. Through a dynamic game model, we demonstrate that under high risk-aversion constraints, rational enterprises prioritize collaborative innovation over independent R&D to mitigate market risks.

Introduction

Major equipment manufacturing involves high-value, complex systems where failure can lead to catastrophic financial and operational consequences. While China aimed to trade market access for technological expertise, the strategy failed to foster independent innovation. The bottleneck is identified as a demand-side failure: buyers demand "historical performance," creating a barrier for domestic "first sets" of equipment. This paper explores why domestic firms are economically incentivized to remain in a cycle of imitation or cooperation with foreign monopolies.

Theoretical Framework: The Dynamic Game Model

To analyze the decision-making process of domestic manufacturers, a sequential dynamic game model is constructed. The model features a domestic firm (Enterprise A) and a foreign competitor (Enterprise B). Enterprise A serves as the primary mover, selecting between three strategic paths: Independent Innovation, Cooperative Innovation, and Imitation Innovation.

Figure 1: Dynamic game tree of technological innovation mode selection.

In this model, the choice of strategy is influenced by the probability of innovation success and a risk aversion parameter ($\rho$). The expected utility of independent innovation is penalized by $V = \pi - \rho\pi$, representing the market share loss when risk-averse buyers reject unproven domestic technology. The game tree illustrates the payoffs for both enterprises based on the competitor's agreement or disagreement with the proposed cooperation or imitation.

Analysis of Innovation Choices

The "First Set" Curse and Information Asymmetry

Domestic firms face a "catch-22": they cannot establish a track record without selling their first innovated product, but buyers refuse to purchase the "first set" due to the lack of a track record. This is exacerbated by information asymmetry, as buyers cannot fully evaluate complex equipment before purchase, leading them to favor established foreign brands.

Rational Stagnation

The study finds that the lack of independent innovation is a rational economic response to market conditions. When buyer risk aversion is high, the financial return of independent innovation falls below that of cooperative innovation. While cooperation provides a safer financial path, it often traps domestic firms in low-end manufacturing, as foreign partners typically withhold core technologies.

Results and Policy Implications

The mathematical analysis reveals specific thresholds for innovation selection. When risk aversion ($\rho$) is low, independent innovation is the dominant strategy ($V > \frac{(1-p_1)p_u}{2}\pi$). However, when $ ho$ is high, the inequality reverses, making collaborative innovation the rational choice.

To break this cycle, policy intervention is necessary to shift the risk from private buyers to the state. Recommended measures include:

  • Government Procurement: Mandating the purchase of domestic "first sets" to help firms build historical performance data.
  • Tax Incentives: Implementing accelerated depreciation and other tax breaks to lower the financial risk for buyers of domestic equipment.

Conclusion

Market forces alone are insufficient to drive independent innovation in the major equipment manufacturing industry due to extreme buyer risk aversion. By understanding the game-theoretic incentives of domestic firms, policymakers can design interventions that absorb innovation risks, enabling a transition from collaborative dependency to technological independence.

Summary updated

Abstract

Major equipment manufacturing industry is the strategic industry of national defense construction. In the 1990s, China began implementing the "market for technology" strategy, but the strategy did not achieve the desired results, for the important technology and equipment is still highly dependent on imports. The paper analyses the risk aversion characteristics of the owners to purchase, and points out that the risk aversion characteristics comes from the product attributes of important equipment manufacturing industry and asymmetric information. Then it elaborates a dynamic game model to study on the choices of the enterprise's technological innovation modes in the major equipment manufacturing industry. Finally, the paper concludes that under the strong risk aversion constraints, rational companies will choose collaborative innovation instead of independent innovation.
BibTeX
@article{zhang2012owner,
  author = {Guofeng Zhang and Yuan Yi-jun and Lin Hu},
  title = {{Owner Risk Averse and Enterprise Technological Innovation Mode: Focus on Major Equipment Manufacturing Industry}},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics and Finance},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.5539/ijef.v4n11p144},
}
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