Optimal Collusion with Private Information
Lists
Only you see this
Abstract
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. In the most profitable collusive schemes, firms implement productive efficiency, and high-cost firms are favored with higher expected market share in future periods. If types are discrete, there exists a discount factor strictly less than one above which first-best profits can be attained using history-dependent reallocation of market share between equally efficient firms. We also analyze the role of communication and side-payments. 1.
BibTeX
@article{athey2001optimal,
author = {Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell},
title = {{Optimal Collusion with Private Information}},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2001},
doi = {10.2307/2696363},
}Loading related content...