Why is My Secret Leaked? Discovering Vulnerabilities in Device-to-Device File Sharing

Andrei Bytes, Jay Prakash, Jianying Zhou, Tony Q. S. Quek

Abstract

With over 1.8 billion active users, Android Device-to-Device (D2D) file-sharing applications have become a cornerstone of mobile data exchange, particularly in emerging markets. However, the pursuit of a seamless user experience has introduced significant security risks. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the "security-usability trade-off" in popular D2D apps, uncovering 17 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). By prioritizing "one-click" sharing, developers have inadvertently created backdoors through hardcoded credentials and unencrypted fallbacks.

The Wi-Fi Direct Dilemma

The official Wi-Fi Direct (Wi-Fi P2P) protocol is designed for secure, high-speed transfers but is notoriously cumbersome for end-users. Establishing a connection typically requires manual discovery, PIN entry, or physical button presses.

The standard Wi-Fi Direct discovery process involves complex Search and Listen states that can lead to connection delays.

As shown in Figure 1, the discovery process involves alternating between Search and Listen states across multiple channels. To avoid the friction of this protocol, developers of apps like SHAREit and Xender implement custom workarounds. These shortcuts aim to make sharing "one-click" easy, but they often bypass the very security mechanisms intended to protect user data.

Methodology

Researchers from the Singapore University of Technology and Design employed a dual-track approach to audit these applications:

  • Technical Vulnerability Analysis: Using static analysis (reverse engineering APKs) and dynamic analysis (real-time API hooking), the team inspected the network traffic and cryptographic implementations of the top six D2D apps on Google Play.
  • Usability Evaluation: A study involving 43 participants utilized the System Usability Scale (SUS) and User Journey Mapping (UJM) to quantify the "interaction cost" of security features. This helped identify specific "pain points" that drive developers toward insecure design choices.

Key Findings: The Cost of Convenience

The study revealed a direct correlation between high usability scores and low security. The most prominent issue identified is the "Silent Fallback" Trap. When standard Wi-Fi Direct setup fails or is deemed too slow, apps often switch to a standard Wi-Fi Hotspot mode without notifying the user.

SHAREit's implementation often resets hotspot security to "None" to ensure the receiver can connect without entering a password.

As illustrated in Figure 3, these fallbacks frequently disable passwords entirely or rely on hardcoded credentials (e.g., "12345678"). This allows any nearby attacker to join the network and access shared files. Furthermore, the researchers discovered that most apps run embedded web servers for PC-to-mobile sharing that lack proper access controls, effectively serving as backdoors to the device's entire storage. In apps like Xender, these servers may even remain active in the background without user knowledge.

Results and Recommendations

The investigation resulted in 17 new CVEs disclosed to vendors. Notably, only "Files by Google" was found to consistently use application-layer encryption (SSL/TLS). Other apps relied on easily bypassed link-layer security or unencrypted HTTP traffic.

To address these systemic flaws, the authors propose a new design methodology that treats usability and security as a unified metric. By using Interaction Cost Modeling, developers can mathematically estimate the usability impact of security features—such as the difference between a simple "tap" and recalling a 6-digit PIN—before implementation. This allows for the creation of protocols that are both user-friendly and robust against local network attacks.

Conclusion

The "Next Billion Users" deserve both ease of use and data protection. This research highlights that current D2D implementations are dangerously skewed toward usability at the expense of privacy. By integrating security into the user journey from the outset, developers can eliminate the silent fallbacks and hardcoded secrets that currently leave billions of devices vulnerable.

Summary updated

Abstract

The number of active users of Wi-Fi Direct Device-to-Device file sharing applications on Android has exceeded 1.8 billion. Wi-Fi Direct, also known as Wi-Fi P2P, is commonly used for peer-to-peer, high-speed file transfer between mobile devices, as well as a close proximity connection mode for wireless cameras, network printers, TVs and other IoT and mobile devices. For its end users, such type of direct file transfer does not incur cellular data charges. However, despite the popularity of such applications, we observe that the software vendors tend to prioritize the ease of user flow over the security in their implementations, which leads to serious security flaws. We perform a comprehensive security analysis in the context of security and usability and report our findings in the form of 17 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) which have been disclosed to the corresponding vendors. To address the similar flaws at the early stage of the application design, we propose a joint consideration of security and usability for such applications and their protocols that can be visualized in form of a customised User Journey Map (UJM).
BibTeX
@misc{bytes2020why,
  author = {Andrei Bytes and Jay Prakash and Jianying Zhou and Tony Q. S. Quek},
  title = {{Why is My Secret Leaked? Discovering Vulnerabilities in Device-to-Device File Sharing}},
  year = {2020},
  eprint = {2002.03144},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03144},
}
Figure