On the Content Security Policy Violations due to the Same-Origin Policy

Dolière Francis Somé, Nataliia Bielova, Tamara Rezk

TL;DR

This paper reveals a critical security vulnerability where the Content Security Policy (CSP), designed to protect web applications, can be bypassed due to the interaction with the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) when using same-origin iframes. Their large-scale study found that a significant portion of CSP-enabled pages are vulnerable, and they also identified browser implementation inconsistencies that exacerbate the problem.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Web security relies on several layers of defense. Two key ones are the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) and the Content Security Policy (CSP). SOP is a fundamental browser security mechanism that restricts how a document or script loaded from one origin can interact with a resource from another origin. An "origin" is typically defined by the scheme (e.g., http, https), hostname (e.g., www.example.com), and port (e.g., 80). CSP, on the other hand, is a more recent security standard that allows website administrators to declare which dynamic resources (like scripts, stylesheets, images) are allowed to load for a given page. Its primary goal is to mitigate attacks like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

The problem this paper tackles is a subtle but dangerous interaction: when a web page embeds an iframe that originates from the same origin. While CSP is designed to control resource loading for a page, it doesn't inherently extend its rules to iframes from the same origin. Because SOP treats same-origin iframes as essentially part of the parent page (allowing them full access to the parent's DOM and resources), a malicious script injected into such an iframe can potentially bypass the parent page's CSP and access sensitive information. This creates a loophole where a page with a strong CSP can still be vulnerable if it embeds a same-origin iframe that is either unprotected or has a less restrictive CSP.

Methods

The researchers employed a large-scale empirical study to investigate CSP violations stemming from the SOP. Their methodology involved:

  1. Data Collection: They used a custom crawler (CasperJS on top of PhantomJS) to analyze the top 10,000 Alexa websites. This crawler not only fetched home pages but also followed links to discover other pages within the same site and extracted all same-origin iframes present on these pages.
  2. CSP Analysis: For each collected page and iframe, they extracted their respective CSP policies.
  3. Violation Detection: They developed an algorithm to compare CSP policies between parent pages and their same-origin iframes. This comparison focused on identifying discrepancies in directives and source lists. They categorized violations into three main types:
  4. Only the parent page has a CSP.
  5. Only the iframe page has a CSP.
  6. Both parent and iframe pages have different CSPs. They also considered violations that could occur if the document.domain API was used to relax origin restrictions.

  7. Browser Implementation Analysis: They specifically investigated how different browsers enforce CSP on srcdoc sandboxed iframes, identifying inconsistencies.

Datasets

The primary dataset used in this study was derived from the top 10,000 Alexa websites. The researchers collected approximately 1 million pages from these sites, including home pages, linked pages within the same site, and all same-origin iframes found on these pages. They made their dataset publicly available for reproducibility.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • SOP Undermines CSP: The core insight is that the strict isolation CSP aims to provide can be broken by the permissive nature of SOP for same-origin iframes. If a parent page has a CSP, it doesn't automatically protect its same-origin iframe, and vice-versa.
  • Ubiquitous Vulnerability: The study revealed that a substantial percentage of CSP-enabled pages are potentially vulnerable due to this SOP interaction, even without relying on complex attack vectors like document.domain.
  • Browser Inconsistencies Matter: Divergent browser implementations, particularly in how Gecko-based browsers (like Firefox) handle CSP with srcdoc sandboxed iframes, create additional security risks. This can allow third-party scripts to bypass CSP restrictions.
  • document.domain Amplifies Risk: While not the sole cause, the use of the document.domain API significantly increases the likelihood and scope of CSP violations by relaxing origin checks.
  • CSP Adoption is Patchy: While CSP is gaining traction, its adoption is often inconsistent across different pages within the same website, creating a larger attack surface.

Key Results

  • 31.1% of CSP-enabled pages are potentially vulnerable due to SOP interactions.
  • In 23.5% of real-world same-origin nested browsing contexts, CSP violations are possible without relying on document.domain.
  • When considering the document.domain API, 94% of parent-iframe pages could have their CSP violated, though this is an over-approximation as document.domain is not used on all pages.
  • 5.29% of sites contain some pages with CSPs, indicating growing adoption but also potential for inconsistent policies.
  • 72% of CSPs analyzed could be potentially violated due to inconsistencies with other pages on the same origin.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Limited Interaction Simulation: The crawling process did not simulate real user interactions, meaning the set of identified iframes and links might be an underestimate of all possible nesting scenarios.
  • Focus on Parent-Iframe Pairs: The study primarily focused on parent-iframe couples, potentially overlooking other nested contexts like sibling iframes.
  • document.domain Over-approximation: The 94% figure for document.domain violations is an over-approximation, as the study assumes its use in all relevant cases. The actual usage of document.domain is reported to be less than 3% of web pages.

The authors suggest several avenues for future work and mitigation:

  • Origin-Wide CSP: Implementing a consistent CSP across all same-origin pages within a site is recommended.
  • Preventing Origin Relaxation: Developing mechanisms to prevent the misuse of document.domain is crucial.
  • Browser Bug Fixes: Addressing the identified inconsistencies in browser implementations, particularly for srcdoc sandboxed iframes, is essential.
  • sandbox Directive: They advocate for using the sandbox attribute as a CSP directive rather than an HTML attribute for better security and programmatic control.
  • Feature Policy: The authors point to the potential of the "Feature Policy" specification as a more robust solution for deprecating document.domain.

Summary updated

Abstract

Modern browsers implement different security policies such as the Content Security Policy (CSP), a mechanism designed to mitigate popular web vulnerabilities, and the Same Origin Policy (SOP), a mechanism that governs interactions between resources of web pages. In this work, we describe how CSP may be violated due to the SOP when a page contains an embedded iframe from the same origin. We analyse 1 million pages from 10,000 top Alexa sites and report that at least 31.1% of current CSP-enabled pages are potentially vulnerable to CSP violations. Further considering real-world situations where those pages are involved in same-origin nested browsing contexts, we found that in at least 23.5% of the cases, CSP violations are possible. During our study, we also identified a divergence among browsers implementations in the enforcement of CSP in srcdoc sandboxed iframes, which actually reveals a problem in Gecko-based browsers CSP implementation. To ameliorate the problematic conflicts of the security mechanisms, we discuss measures to avoid CSP violations.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{some2017content,
  author = {Dolière Francis Somé and Nataliia Bielova and Tamara Rezk},
  title = {{On the Content Security Policy Violations due to the Same-Origin Policy}},
  booktitle = {The Web Conference},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=HJ-18WZObr},
}
Figure