On Secure mmWave RSMA Systems

Hongjiang Lei, Sha Zhou, Xinhu Chen, Imran Shafique Ansari, Yun Li, Gaofeng Pan, Mohamed-Slim Alouini

Abstract

This paper investigates the physical layer security (PLS) of Millimeter-wave (mmWave) Rate Splitting Multiple Access (RSMA) systems. By employing a Discrete Angular Domain Channel (DADC) model, the authors derive analytical expressions for Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) to evaluate system performance against passive eavesdropping. The study highlights how optimized power allocation and the directional nature of mmWave beams can enhance wireless security in 6G networks.

Introduction

As 6G networks demand higher bandwidth and improved multi-user management, the integration of mmWave and RSMA has emerged as a promising solution. mmWave provides massive bandwidth through directional beamforming, while RSMA offers a flexible transmission strategy by splitting messages into common and private streams. However, the directional nature of these beams introduces vulnerabilities; a passive eavesdropper (Eve) located within a signal path can intercept confidential data. This research addresses the need for a rigorous framework to quantify and mitigate these security risks at the physical layer.

System Model and Methodology

The researchers model a downlink scenario featuring a base station ($S$) serving two legitimate users ($U_1, U_2$) in the presence of an external passive eavesdropper ($E$). Central to their analysis is the Discrete Angular Domain Channel (DADC) model, which accounts for the specific directional paths of mmWave signals.

System model of a mmWave RSMA network with two users and a passive eavesdropper.

The security risk is categorized into four distinct scenarios based on the spatial overlap between Eve's location and the legitimate users' signal paths. These scenarios determine whether Eve can intercept only private messages or both common and private streams, depending on her angular position relative to the resolvable paths.

Four distinct eavesdropping scenarios based on the angular position of the eavesdropper relative to the signal paths.

To evaluate security, the authors derived closed-form expressions for the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) using Gaussian–Chebyshev Quadrature. This numerical approach avoids complex integration while maintaining high accuracy, as validated by Monte Carlo simulations using standardized 28 GHz mmWave propagation parameters.

Key Insights and Performance Analysis

The analysis reveals several critical factors affecting the security of mmWave RSMA systems:

  • Dynamic Bottlenecks: Security bottlenecks shift between common and private messages depending on Eve’s spatial position. RSMA provides the flexibility to reallocate power ($\tau_c$) to protect the more vulnerable stream.
  • Spatial Correlation: In mmWave systems, security is highly sensitive to spatial overlap. If Eve is near a user's line-of-sight path, secrecy performance drops significantly, regardless of transmit power.
  • Secrecy Floor: Increasing transmit power does not indefinitely improve security. Eventually, a "secrecy floor" is reached where the eavesdropper's gain scales proportionally with the legitimate user's gain.
  • RSMA Advantage: RSMA demonstrates superior security flexibility over Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) due to its finer control over interference management and message splitting.

Conclusion and Future Work

The study confirms that the directional nature of mmWave inherently creates "security zones." When an eavesdropper is outside the angular range of resolvable paths, the SOP is minimized. While the current model assumes perfect Channel State Information (CSI) and a two-user setup, it provides a foundational tool for designing secure 6G IoT environments. Future research will explore more complex scenarios involving imperfect CSI, active attackers, and internal untrusted users.

This summary is based on research published in the IEEE Internet of Things Journal.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{lei2024secure,
  author = {Hongjiang Lei and Sha Zhou and Xinhu Chen and Imran Shafique Ansari and Yun Li and Gaofeng Pan and Mohamed-Slim Alouini},
  title = {{On Secure mmWave RSMA Systems}},
  journal = {IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1109/jiot.2024.3370161},
}

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