On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games

Brian Swenson, Ryan Murray, Soummya Kar

Abstract

The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, set-valued nature of the best-response map. The paper focuses on elucidating several important properties of best-response dynamics in the class of multi-agent games known as potential games---a class of games with fundamental importance in multi-agent systems and distributed control. It is shown that in almost every potential game and for almost every initial condition, the best-response dynamics (i) have a unique solution, (ii) converge to pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and (iii) converge at an exponential rate.
BibTeX
@misc{swenson2017best,
  author = {Brian Swenson and Ryan Murray and Soummya Kar},
  title = {{On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games}},
  year = {2017},
  eprint = {1707.06465},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.06465},
}

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