OffRAMPS: An FPGA-based Intermediary for Analysis and Modification of Additive Manufacturing Control Systems

Jason Blocklove, Md Raz, Prithwish Basu Roy, Hammond Pearce, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, Ramesh Karri

Abstract

Cybersecurity threats in Additive Manufacturing (AM) are an increasing concern as AM adoption grows in aerospace, transportation, and medical domains. Threat vectors allowing for part compromise are particularly concerning due to potential life-threatening consequences. Investigating these compromises is challenging due to the difficulty in benchmarking threat vectors and detection methods. We introduce OffRAMPS, a generalized platform based on the open-source RAMPS control board, for the systematic analysis of attacks and defenses. OffRAMPS uses an FPGA to analyze, record, and modify all control signals and I/O for a 3D printer. We demonstrate its efficacy through case studies of various Trojans, showing that OffRAMPS can both emulate and detect arbitrary changes to g-code print commands.

Introduction

As Additive Manufacturing (AM) moves into safety-critical sectors, the threat of sabotage becomes a life-and-death issue. Malicious actors could introduce "Trojans"—subtle modifications to a part’s geometry or internal structure—at various stages of the digital thread, from CAD files to firmware.

The digital-to-physical pipeline of additive manufacturing, illustrating the flow from CAD software to the final printed part.

A major challenge for researchers is the lack of a generalized, open-source hardware platform to systematically test how different attacks affect physical parts. Furthermore, existing defenses often rely on noisy "side-channels" (like motor sounds or power consumption) that lack the granularity to catch subtle modifications.

The OffRAMPS Platform

OffRAMPS is a custom PCB that interfaces a Digilent Cmod-A7 FPGA with the widely used Arduino Mega/RAMPS 1.4 control stack. Acting as a "machine-in-the-middle," the FPGA sits between the controller and the hardware drivers, providing high-precision visibility into the printer's intended actions.

The FPGA operates at 100MHz, monitoring and modifying signals at a much higher resolution than the printer's own firmware. The authors implemented several VHDL modules, including an Edge Detection Module to track movements and a Homing Detection Module to synchronize the defense system with the start of a print. The platform supports three primary modes:

  • Bypass: Signals pass through untouched.
  • Signal Modification: The FPGA injects or blocks pulses (e.g., adding extra steps to an axis) to emulate hardware or firmware Trojans.
  • Signal Recording: The FPGA counts digital "step" and "direction" pulses for all axes in real-time.

Methodology and Evaluation

Evaluation is performed using a "Golden Model" approach, where pulse counts from a clean "Golden Print" are used as a reference. The platform was tested against the Flaw3D Trojan suite, which includes eight scenarios of reduced extrusion or filament relocation, and a Custom Trojan Suite of nine attacks covering part modification, Denial of Service (DoS), and destructive physical damage, such as "Thermal Runaway" attacks.

Key Results and Insights

  • 100% Detection Rate: OffRAMPS detected all eight attack scenarios in the Flaw3D suite, including a stealthy 2% reduction in extrusion that is typically invisible to the naked eye but compromises structural integrity.
  • Digital Precision: By monitoring raw digital pulses rather than secondary effects like sound or vibration, OffRAMPS achieves near-perfect visibility without environmental interference.
  • Managing "Time Noise": The researchers discovered that identical G-code prints have slight timing variations. A 5% margin of error in pulse counts was found to be the optimal threshold to ignore natural jitter while catching malicious edits.
  • Hardware-Level Stealth: Because the FPGA sits after the firmware, it can detect attacks originating within the printer’s own "brain" (malicious firmware) that would be invisible to software-based checks.
  • Negligible Overhead: The system introduces a propagation delay of only ~12.9 nanoseconds, ensuring no impact on print quality.

Conclusion and Future Work

OffRAMPS provides a robust testbed for emulating and detecting cyber-physical attacks in AM. While the current prototype requires physical access and faces data throughput limitations, it demonstrates the power of hardware-level monitoring. Future work will explore integrating multi-modal sensors (acoustic/optical) into the FPGA framework to create a more comprehensive defense system.

Summary updated

Abstract

Cybersecurity threats in Additive Manufacturing (AM) are an increasing concern as AM adoption continues to grow. AM is now being used for parts in the aerospace, transportation, and medical domains. Threat vectors which allow for part compromise are particularly concerning, as any failure in these domains would have life-threatening consequences. A major challenge to investigation of AM part-compromises comes from the difficulty in evaluating and benchmarking both identified threat vectors as well as methods for detecting adversarial actions. In this work, we introduce a generalized platform for systematic analysis of attacks against and defenses for 3D printers. Our "OFFRAMPS" platform is based on the open-source 3D printer control board "RAMPS." OFFRAMPS allows analysis, recording, and modification of all control signals and I/O for a 3D printer. We show the efficacy of OFFRAMPS by presenting a series of case studies based on several Trojans, including ones identified in the literature, and show that OFFRAMPS can both emulate and detect these attacks, i.e., it can both change and detect arbitrary changes to the g-code print commands.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{blocklove2024offramps,
  author = {Jason Blocklove and Md Raz and Prithwish Basu Roy and Hammond Pearce and Prashanth Krishnamurthy and Farshad Khorrami and Ramesh Karri},
  title = {{OffRAMPS: An FPGA-based Intermediary for Analysis and Modification of Additive Manufacturing Control Systems}},
  booktitle = {DSN},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=2AEM3nJqnp},
}
Figure