NFT Games: an Empirical Look into the Play-to-Earn Model

Yixiao Gao, Fei Li, Ruizhe Shi, Ruizhi Cheng, Jean Zhang, Bo Han, Songqing ChenarXiv 2026 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract

The past decade has witnessed the burgeoning and continuous development of blockchain and its applications. Besides various cryptocurrencies, an industry that has quickly embraced this trend is gaming. Thanks to the support of blockchain, games have started to incorporate non-fungible tokens (NFTs) that can enable a new gaming model, play-to-earn (P2E), which incentivizes users to participate and play. While recent studies looked at several NFT games qualitatively and individually, an in-depth understanding is still missing, particularly on how the P2E model has transformed traditional games. In this work, we set to conduct a measurement study of NFT games, aiming to gain a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of P2E in practice. For this purpose, we collect and analyze relevant NFT transaction data from the underlying blockchain (e.g., Ethereum) of 12 games, supplemented with various data scraped from their websites. Our study shows that (1) a few top wallets control unproportionally high percentage of NFTs, and the majority of wallets own only one or two NFTs and do not actively trade; (2) promotion events do boost the trade amount and the NFT price for some games, but their effect does not sustain; and (3) few players actually earned a profit, and players in 9 out of 12 games who traded NFTs have a negative profit on average. Motivated by these findings, we further investigate effective incentive mechanisms based on game theory to improve the trading profits that players can earn from these NFT games. Both modeling and simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism.

Introduction

The integration of blockchain into gaming birthed the "Play-to-Earn" (P2E) model. Unlike traditional "pay-to-play" or "free-to-play" games where in-game assets are locked to the platform, P2E allows players to own, trade, and theoretically profit from in-game items minted as Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). Despite the massive hype and billions of dollars flowing into this space, there is a glaring lack of large-scale, quantitative research on whether the P2E model actually works in practice. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing the asset distribution, the impact of promotional events, and the actual profitability for players across a broad ecosystem of 12 popular games.

Methodology

The researchers tackled this problem in two phases: an empirical measurement study and theoretical modeling.

  1. Empirical Analysis: The team extracted complete transaction histories from underlying blockchains (Ethereum and the Ronin sidechain). They tracked the trading history of every NFT from its initial minting, calculating profit and loss by comparing consecutive trade prices converted to USD. They also introduced the Ownership Dominance Index (ODI) to quantify how heavily concentrated NFT ownership is among top wallets compared to the average user.
  2. Game-Theoretic Modeling: After proving that the current P2E model lacks a pure Nash Equilibrium—meaning the market is inherently unstable—the authors designed a new incentive mechanism. They used dynamic programming to identify optimal trading time slots and proposed a system where the platform strategically issues "incentive NFTs" to buyers to align platform volume with player profit.

Data Sources

The study utilizes on-chain transaction data for 12 popular NFT games, including Axie Infinity, CryptoKitties, Decentraland, The Sandbox, and Sorare. Data was scraped directly from local Ethereum nodes, Etherscan, and the Ronin sidechain API. The timeframe spans from each game's launch through mid-2023. Daily crypto-to-USD exchange rates were pulled from Yahoo Finance to standardize profit calculations.

Key Insights

  • The Illusion of Decentralization: Despite the web3 ethos of decentralized ownership, NFT games are heavily oligarchic. A tiny fraction of wallets control a massive percentage of the assets, while the average player usually holds just one or two NFTs and rarely trades them.
  • Hype is a Sugar Rush: Marketing pushes and major announcements successfully trigger massive spikes in trading volume and NFT prices. However, these effects are highly symmetric—prices pump and then dump right back to baseline, usually within a week.
  • Play-to-Lose: The P2E promise is currently failing the average gamer. The lion's share of profits is captured by the game developers during the initial sale. In the secondary market, ordinary players are mostly trading at a loss.

Key Results

The empirical findings reveal a stark reality for the P2E ecosystem:

  • Negative Profits: In 9 out of the 12 games analyzed, the average profit for players trading NFTs was negative. Even in games with a positive average profit, the median profit was often negative (e.g., Blankos Block Party had an average profit of $19.22, but a median of -$2.06).
  • Extreme Whale Dominance: Ownership is highly concentrated. For instance, in Decentraland (LANDD), a single wallet holds over 72% of the NFTs. Across 9 of the games, the top 50 wallets own more than 33% of the total supply.
Figure 1: Concentration of NFT ownership by a single wallet across various games.
  • Low Trading Velocity: Players are mostly holding rather than trading. In Decentraland, the average time between purchases for a single user is over 121 days, contributing to economic stagnation.
Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of time intervals between NFT purchases.
  • Simulation Success: When testing their proposed game-theoretic incentive mechanism, the authors found it significantly improved simulated player profits. Improvements ranged from a 14.2% increase in Blankos to a 299% increase in League of Kingdoms.

Conclusion

The current P2E model faces significant sustainability challenges due to asset hoarding and negative player profits. However, the authors demonstrate that mathematically sound incentive structures can stabilize these markets and improve outcomes for ordinary players. Future work will explore how external macroeconomic factors influence NFT price volatility to complete the puzzle of modeling player profitability in web3 economies.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{gao2026nft,
  author = {Yixiao Gao and Fei Li and Ruizhe Shi and Ruizhi Cheng and Jean Zhang and Bo Han and Songqing Chen},
  title = {{NFT Games: an Empirical Look into the Play-to-Earn Model}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2602.13882},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13882},
}
Figure