Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice

Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Emily Ryu, Éva Tardos

Abstract

A fundamental component in the theoretical school choice literature is the problem a student faces in deciding which schools to apply to. Recent models have considered a set of schools of different selectiveness and a student who is unsure of their strength and can apply to at most $k$ schools. Such models assume that the student cares solely about maximizing the quality of the school that they attend, but experience suggests that students' decisions are also influenced by a set of behavioral biases based on reputational effects: a subjective reputational benefit when admitted to a selective school, whether or not they attend; and a subjective loss based on disappointment when rejected. Guided by these observations, and inspired by recent behavioral economics work on loss aversion relative to expectations, we propose a behavioral model by which a student chooses schools to balance these behavioral effects with the quality of the school they attend. Our main results show that a student's choices change in dramatic ways when these reputation-based behavioral biases are taken into account. In particular, where a rational applicant spreads their applications evenly, a biased student applies very sparsely to highly selective schools, such that above a certain threshold they apply to only an absolute constant number of schools even as their budget of applications grows to infinity. Consequently, a biased student underperforms a rational student even when the rational student is restricted to a sufficiently large upper bound on applications and the biased student can apply to arbitrarily many. Our analysis shows that the reputation-based model is rich enough to cover a range of different ways that biased students cope with fear of rejection, including not just targeting less selective schools, but also occasionally applying to schools that are too selective, compared to rational students.

Introduction

In theoretical models of school choice, researchers usually assume students are "rational actors" who aim to maximize the quality of the school they eventually attend. In these models, a student with a limited number of applications ($k$) should spread them evenly across the spectrum of school selectivity to hedge their bets.

However, real-world behavior is different. Applying to college is an emotional process. Students feel a boost in morale when admitted to a selective school (even if they don't attend) and a painful sense of disappointment when rejected. This paper addresses the gap between rational theory and behavioral reality by modeling how expectations-based loss aversion—the tendency to feel the pain of a loss more than the joy of an equivalent gain relative to what one expected—distorts application strategies.

Methodology: Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences

The authors build upon the Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences (EBRD) framework to incorporate behavioral utility into the school choice problem.

  1. The Rational Base: Schools are ranked on a continuum from 0 to 1. A student’s "strength" is unknown to them but known to schools. A school at position $x$ accepts students with strength $\ge x$.
  2. The Behavioral Layer: A "behavioral utility" component is added. When a student applies to a school, they form an "anchor point" based on their expected outcome. If admitted, they get a subjective "reputation boost"; if rejected, they suffer a "disappointment loss."
  3. The Bias Parameter ($\gamma$): Because of loss aversion, the disappointment of rejection is weighted more heavily than the joy of admission. This creates a net negative expected behavioral utility for every application, represented by the parameter $\gamma$.
Behavioral utility function $U_\gamma$ for different levels of bias $\gamma$.

The authors analyze the "optimal portfolio" of schools for a $\gamma$-biased student compared to a rational student ($\gamma=0$) using mathematical proofs to establish bounds and numerical simulations to visualize strategy changes.

Key Insights and Results

The introduction of reputation-based bias leads to several counter-intuitive behaviors in application strategies.

Sparsity at the Top and the $h(\gamma)$ Bound

While a rational student applies more densely to top schools as their application budget $k$ grows, a biased student does the opposite. The authors prove that for any bias $\gamma > 0$, there is a selectivity level $h(\gamma) < 1$ such that the student will never apply to more than one school above that level, regardless of how many applications they are allowed.

Optimal portfolio for a biased student ($\gamma=0.1$) with $k=100$ applications, showing extreme sparsity at high selectivity levels.

The "Freezing" Phenomenon and Utility Gap

As the number of available applications ($k$) increases, a biased student’s top choices "freeze" in place. Instead of refining their reach schools, they spend all their extra applications on increasingly "safe" schools (downward expansion). This leads to a significant performance gap: a biased student with unlimited applications can still have a lower expected outcome than a rational student with a small, fixed number of applications. The fear of rejection effectively acts as a self-imposed barrier to success.

Strategic Overshooting

In a surprising twist, the model shows that some students might apply to schools that are too selective (beyond their reach). Because the probability of admission is so low, the "anchor" (expected gain) is near zero, which minimizes the potential pain of the inevitable rejection.

Conclusion and Future Work

This research highlights how behavioral biases can significantly degrade the outcomes of school choice processes. However, the current model assumes perfectly ordered selectivity and perfectly correlated admission events. Real-world admissions are noisier. Future work could explore non-linear costs of rejection or model competitive equilibria where many biased students compete for the same limited seats.

Summary updated

Abstract

A fundamental component in the growing theoretical literature on school choice is the problem a student faces in deciding which schools to apply to. Recent models have considered a setting with a set of schools of different selectiveness, and a student who is unsure of their strength as an applicant and can apply to at most k schools [Ali and Shorrer, 2023]. Such models assume that the student cares solely about maximizing the quality of the school that they will attend. However, experience suggests that students' decisions are additionally influenced by a set of crucial behavioral biases based on reputational effects: they experience a subjective reputational benefit when they are admitted to a selective school, whether or not they attend; and a subjective loss based on disappointment when they are rejected. Guided by these observations, and inspired by recent behavioral economics work on loss aversion relative to expectations [Dreyfuss et al., 2022, Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007, 2009, Meisner and von Wangenheim, 2023], we propose a behavioral model by which a student chooses schools in a way that balances these subjective behavioral effects with the quality of the school they eventually attend.
BibTeX
@misc{kleinberg2024modeling,
  author = {Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren and Emily Ryu and Éva Tardos},
  title = {{Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2403.04616},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04616},
}
Figure