Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in Integrated Electricity-Gas Systems

Rong-Peng Liu, Xiaozhe Wang, Bo Zeng, Rawad Zgheib

Abstract: We investigate load redistribution (LR) attacks on integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs) and proposes a bilevel mixed-integer model to identify the most severe LR attack from an economic perspective. Under a mild assumption, we prove that the proposed model does not exclude any possible upper-level attack. A modified reformulation and decomposition (R&D) algorithm is developed to solve this model in a master-subproblem framework. Particularly, we design a subproblem to address infeasibility issues in the master problem. Accordingly, two types of cuts are added to the master problem for ensuring algorithm feasibility and solution optimality.

Introduction

The modernization of energy infrastructure has led to the deep integration of electricity and natural gas sectors, forming Integrated Electricity-Gas Systems (IEGSs). While this integration improves efficiency and flexibility, it also expands the cyber-attack surface. Among various cyber threats, Load Redistribution (LR) attacks—a sophisticated form of False Data Injection (FDI)—pose a significant risk.

Unlike disruptive attacks that cause immediate outages, LR attacks manipulate meter readings to maintain a constant total load while shifting local values. This stealthiness allows attackers to bypass traditional bad data detection while inducing sub-optimal dispatch decisions by system operators, leading to increased costs or localized load shedding. Previous research has largely focused on power-only systems; however, modeling these attacks on IEGSs is significantly more complex due to the non-convex physics of gas flow and the interdependencies between the two networks.

Methodology

The core of this research is a Bilevel Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) designed to identify the most damaging LR attacks:

  • Upper Level (Attacker): Seeks to maximize total system cost (damage) by injecting false data into power and gas load measurements, subject to "stealthiness" constraints.
  • Lower Level (Operator): Seeks to minimize system costs (Economic Dispatch) based on the falsified data.

A primary challenge in modeling IEGSs is the non-convex nature of gas flow, governed by the Weymouth equation. To maintain computational efficiency within an MILP framework, the authors employ an incremental Piecewise Linear (PWL) approximation to linearize these relationships.

Linearization of the Weymouth equation using an incremental PWL approach.

Furthermore, the model incorporates binary Unit Commitment (UC) variables. The authors demonstrate that including UC is critical for maintaining mathematical feasibility during extreme attack scenarios. Without it, the model might incorrectly suggest an attack is impossible simply because the system would reach a breaking point under the assumed dispatch. By allowing the operator to shut down plants or shed load, the model more accurately reflects real-world responses to stress.

To solve the resulting bilevel problem, a modified Reformulation and Decomposition (R&D) algorithm is proposed. This algorithm operates in a master-subproblem framework, utilizing Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and specialized feasibility and optimality "cuts" to ensure convergence to a global optimum.

Flowchart of the modified Reformulation and Decomposition (R&D) algorithm.

Experimental Results

The model was validated on two benchmark systems: IEGS-6-7 (small-scale) and IEGS-39-20 (medium-scale). The system data and topologies were sourced from established literature to ensure reproducibility.

Key Findings

  • Economic Impact: In the 6-node test case, a successful LR attack increased system costs by 18.2%, primarily by forcing expensive load shedding.
  • Stealthiness vs. Impact: The model successfully identified high-impact attacks that remained within a 50% "forecasting error" margin, making them indistinguishable from normal load fluctuations to standard detection systems.
  • System Congestion: Results show that LR attacks are most effective when the system is operating near its transmission or pipeline limits. If a system has excess capacity, redistributing load has minimal economic impact.
  • Gas-Electric Coupling: Attacks on the gas side can force expensive changes on the electricity side. For example, manipulating gas load data can force gas-fired generators to shut down, leading to massive power-side load shedding.
  • Algorithm Performance: The modified R&D algorithm outperformed standard bilevel solvers, which failed to find the true optimal attack in several scenarios. The medium-scale 39-node system was solved in approximately 608 seconds, demonstrating viability for near-real-time vulnerability analysis.

Conclusion

This work provides a rigorous framework for assessing the vulnerability of IEGSs to LR attacks. By accounting for unit commitment and gas flow physics, the proposed bilevel model offers a realistic view of potential economic damage. While the model assumes a "worst-case" scenario where the attacker has perfect information, it serves as a critical tool for grid operators to identify weak points. Future research will explore multi-period attack scenarios that exploit gas "line pack" storage and the development of automated detection strategies.

Summary updated

Abstract

We investigate load redistribution (LR) attacks on integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs) and proposes a bilevel mixed-integer model to identify the most severe LR attack from an economic perspective. Under a mild assumption, we prove that the proposed model does not exclude any possible upper-level attack. A modified reformulation and decomposition (R&D) algorithm is developed to solve this model in a master-subproblem framework. Particularly, we design a subproblem to address infeasibility issues in the master problem. Accordingly, two types of cuts are added to the master problem for ensuring algorithm feasibility and solution optimality.
BibTeX
@article{liu2024modeling,
  author = {Rong-Peng Liu and Xiaozhe Wang and Bo Zeng and Rawad Zgheib},
  title = {{Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in Integrated Electricity-Gas Systems}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Smart Grid},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=jLfE2iTKR1},
}
Figure