Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas

Abstract

We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei (2014) introduced a powerful multi-to-single agent reduction based on an ex-ante relaxation of the multi-agent problem. This reduction employs a rounding procedure which is an online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) in disguise, a now widely-used method for rounding fractional solutions in online Bayesian and stochastic optimization problems. In this paper, we leverage our vantage point, 10 years after the work of Alaei, with a rich OCRS toolkit and modern approaches to analyzing multi-agent mechanisms; we introduce a general framework for designing non-sequential and sequential multi-agent, revenue-maximizing mechanisms, capturing a wide variety of problems Alaei's framework could not address. Our framework uses an interim relaxation, that is rounded to a feasible mechanism using what we call a two-level OCRS, which allows for some structured dependence between the activation of its input elements. For a wide family of constraints, we can construct such schemes using existing OCRSs as a black box; for other constraints, such as knapsack, we construct such schemes from scratch. We demonstrate numerous applications of our framework, including a sequential mechanism that guarantees a 3.16 approximation to the optimal revenue for the case of additive agents subject to matroid feasibility constraints. We also show how our framework can be easily extended to multi-parameter procurement auctions, where we provide an OCRS for Stochastic Knapsack that might be of independent interest.

Introduction

In algorithmic game theory, designing auctions that maximize revenue under complex feasibility constraints—such as limiting the number of items sold (knapsack) or ensuring the set of sold items satisfies specific structural properties (matroid)—remains a fundamental challenge. While previous breakthroughs utilized "ex-ante" (average) relaxations to reduce multi-agent problems to single-agent ones, these methods often struggled with correlated items or the requirements of sequential mechanisms where buyers arrive one by one.

This paper introduces a significant advancement by shifting the focus to "interim" (conditional) relaxations. By developing a novel mathematical tool called two-level Online Contention Resolution Schemes (tOCRS), the authors provide a general recipe for building sequential auctions that achieve state-of-the-art approximation guarantees for complex constraints.

The Proposed Framework

The authors' framework is built upon three main pillars that allow for the translation of fractional solutions into real-world allocations:

  1. Interim Relaxation: Instead of global averages, this approach looks at the probability of an allocation conditioned on a specific agent’s reported value. This "interim" view captures more granular information than ex-ante views while remaining computationally tractable via polynomial-sized Linear Programs (LPs).
  2. Two-Level OCRS (tOCRS): Standard OCRSs assume item independence. In contrast, tOCRS manages independence across different buyers while accounting for the structured dependence inherent in a single buyer's set of items.
  3. Bernoulli Factories: These algorithms allow the mechanism to function even when the underlying rounding scheme is a "black box," enabling the flipping of coins with specific probabilities (e.g., $p/q$) using only coins with probabilities $p$ and $q$.
Overview of the mechanism design framework using interim relaxation and tOCRS.

Key Insights and Methodology

The "Interim" Sweet Spot

The interim level serves as an ideal point for relaxing constraints. It is detailed enough to support sophisticated sequential mechanisms—essential for real-world systems like ad auctions—yet simple enough to be solved efficiently for many common constraints.

Decoupling Complexity

The tOCRS allows researchers to "mix and match" constraints. For instance, a rounding scheme for "items per buyer" can be combined with another for "total items sold" into a single, robust auction framework. This modularity extends to procurement auctions, where the framework achieves a 3.13-approximation for budget-constrained buyers.

Advancements in Knapsack Problems

Beyond the framework itself, the authors developed a new OCRS for the "Stochastic Knapsack" problem from scratch. This new scheme outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods for certain parameters, demonstrating the framework's utility in solving specific, difficult optimization problems.

Key Results

The framework yields significant improvements in approximation ratios compared to previous sequential mechanisms:

  • Matroid Constraints: Achieves a 3.16-approximation ($\frac{2e}{e-1}$). For comparison, the previous best-known sequential mechanism for similar problems had an approximation factor of 70.
  • Knapsack Constraints: Provides a 10-approximation for general knapsack constraints and a 9-approximation for multi-choice knapsacks.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the core Linear Program is polynomial-sized, representing the feasibility polytope for highly complex constraints can still be computationally intensive. Furthermore, the current results focus on agents with "additive" preferences. Extending this framework to "subadditive" agents—where items might be redundant—remains a challenging open problem. Finally, while Bernoulli factories enable black-box implementations, they introduce a small "epsilon" loss in approximation; eliminating this loss without internal knowledge of the OCRS is a potential area for future research.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei2014bayesian} introduced a powerful multi-to-single agent reduction based on an ex-ante relaxation of the multi-agent problem. This reduction employs a rounding procedure which is an online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) in disguise, a now widely-used method for rounding fractional solutions in online Bayesian and stochastic optimization problems. In this paper, we leverage our vantage point, 10 years after the work of Alaei, with a rich OCRS toolkit and modern approaches to analyzing multi-agent mechanisms; we introduce a general framework for designing non-sequential and sequential multi-agent, revenue-maximizing mechanisms, capturing a wide variety of problems Alaei's framework could not address. Our framework uses an \emph{interim} relaxation, that is rounded to a feasible mechanism using what we call a two-level OCRS, which allows for some structured dependence between the activation of its input elements. For a wide family of constraints, we can construct such schemes using existing OCRSs as a black box; for other constraints, such as knapsack, we construct such schemes from scratch. We demonstrate numerous applications of our framework, including a sequential mechanism that guarantees a $\frac{2e}{e-1} \approx 3.16$ approximation to the optimal revenue for the case of additive agents subject to matroid feasibility constraints. We also show how our framework can be easily extended to multi-parameter procurement auctions, where we provide an OCRS for Stochastic Knapsack that might be of independent interest.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bhawalkar2025mechanism,
  author = {Kshipra Bhawalkar and Marios Mertzanidis and Divyarthi Mohan and Alexandros Psomas},
  title = {{Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=LqgWOxDlrI},
}
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