Looking for a Black Cat in a Dark Room: Security Visualization for Cyber-Physical System Design and Analysis

Georgios Bakirtzis, Brandon J. Simon, Cody Harrison Fleming, Carl R. Elks

Abstract

Today, there is a plethora of software security tools employing visualizations that enable the creation of useful and effective interactive security analyst dashboards. Such dashboards can assist the analyst to understand the data at hand and, consequently, to conceive more targeted preemption and mitigation security strategies. Despite the recent advances, model-based security analysis is lacking tools that employ effective dashboards—to manage potential attack vectors, system components, and requirements. This problem is further exacerbated because model-based security analysis produces significantly larger result spaces than security analysis applied to realized systems—where platform specific information, software versions, and system element dependencies are known. Therefore, there is a need to manage the analysis complexity in model-based security through better visualization techniques. Towards that goal, we propose an interactive security analysis dashboard that provides different views largely centered around the system, its requirements, and its associated attack vector space. This tool makes it possible to start analysis earlier in the system lifecycle. We apply this tool in a significant area of engineering design—the design of cyber-physical systems—where security violations can lead to safety hazards.

Introduction: The Complexity Gap in CPS Security

In Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)—such as autonomous vehicles, medical devices, or power grids—security is often treated as a late-stage addition. However, a breach in a CPS is not merely a data leak; it is a potential safety hazard. A significant "complexity gap" exists during the early design phase: there is an overwhelming amount of data but very little specific information, such as exact software versions. Traditional security tools are designed for "realized" systems already in operation. Furthermore, system designers (focused on safety and requirements) and security analysts (focused on exploits) often lack a common language. This research introduces a visualization-based dashboard to bridge this gap, helping analysts find the "black cat" (hidden vulnerabilities) in the "dark room" of complex system design.

The Interactive Security Analyst Dashboard

The proposed dashboard integrates three interconnected interactive panes to provide a holistic view of the system's security posture:

  1. System Topology (Σ): A graph representing physical and digital components. It highlights the "attack surface" (entry points) in red and traces potential "exploit chains" in yellow.
  2. Specification (S): A hierarchical view mapping mission-level requirements (e.g., "Safe Flight") to functional requirements and specific hardware/software components.
  3. Attack Vector Space (AV): A graph of known vulnerabilities and attack patterns, abstracted to group thousands of specific entries into manageable classes.
The Security Analyst Dashboard, featuring the system topology (left), specification/attack vector space (top right), and vulnerability list (bottom).

To populate the attack vector space, the tool leverages industry-standard datasets including MITRE CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) and MITRE CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration). By focusing on CWEs and CAPECs rather than individual CVE entries, the researchers reduced data noise from over 114,000 entries to approximately 1,200, maintaining traceability without overwhelming the analyst.

Traceability and "What-if" Analysis

A core strength of the dashboard is its ability to provide traceability between low-level software weaknesses and high-level mission failures. This makes abstract risks tangible for project managers and safety engineers. By using computational linguistics to map system models to CWE/CAPEC hierarchies, the tool filters out irrelevant attacks, leaving only those physically possible within the specific design.

Traceability analysis showing how a compromised component (Imagery Application Processor) impacts functional and mission-level requirements.

The tool was validated using an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) case study. The analysis revealed that all radio modules shared a common vulnerability in the ZigBee protocol. Visualizing this allowed the team to see that a single exploit could simultaneously compromise three critical mission requirements. The dashboard also supports "What-if" analysis, enabling designers to simulate component swaps—such as removing the ZigBee attribute—and immediately observe changes in the attack surface and safety risks.

Conclusion and Future Work

While the dashboard effectively bridges the gap between design and security, several challenges remain. The niche nature of CPS security makes large-scale user studies difficult. Additionally, the current research focuses on the design phase and does not yet integrate real-time operational data. Future work will explore alternative rendering algorithms to manage graph complexity and improve navigation as system models grow.

Summary updated

Abstract

Today, there is a plethora of software security tools employing visualizations that enable the creation of useful and effective interactive security analyst dashboards. Such dashboards can assist the analyst to understand the data at hand and, consequently, to conceive more targeted preemption and mitigation security strategies. Despite the recent advances, model-based security analysis is lacking tools that employ effective dashboards---to manage potential attack vectors, system components, and requirements. This problem is further exacerbated because model-based security analysis produces significantly larger result spaces than security analysis applied to realized systems---where platform specific information, software versions, and system element dependencies are known. Therefore, there is a need to manage the analysis complexity in model-based security through better visualization techniques. Towards that goal, we propose an interactive security analysis dashboard that provides different views largely centered around the system, its requirements, and its associated attack vector space. This tool makes it possible to start analysis earlier in the system lifecycle. We apply this tool in a significant area of engineering design---the design of cyber-physical systems---where security violations can lead to safety hazards.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bakirtzis2018looking,
  author = {Georgios Bakirtzis and Brandon J. Simon and Cody Harrison Fleming and Carl R. Elks},
  title = {{Looking for a Black Cat in a Dark Room: Security Visualization for Cyber-Physical System Design and Analysis}},
  booktitle = {VizSEC},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=BNuzuj5pYve},
}
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