Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic Credentials

Arseny Kurnikov, Andrew Paverd, Mohammad Mannan, N. Asokan

Abstract

Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms. Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.

Introduction

Managing personal cryptographic keys—essential for PGP, code signing, and file decryption—presents a significant trade-off between usability and security. Local storage is device-specific and vulnerable to malware. Hardware tokens like YubiKeys offer robust security but are prone to loss and often lack mobile compatibility. Traditional cloud storage offers convenience but necessitates absolute trust in the service provider.

The Cloud Key Store (CKS) addresses these issues by utilizing hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), specifically Intel SGX, to create a secure, centralized repository for keys. This approach provides the accessibility of the cloud with the security of a local hardware enclave, while introducing advanced features like auditability and delegation.

System Design and Methods

The CKS architecture centers on an Intel SGX enclave, which acts as a "black box" on the server. Data within this enclave remains encrypted and inaccessible even to the server's operating system or administrators.

High-level architecture of the Cloud Key Store (CKS) system.

Key technical components include:

  • Remote Attestation: Users verify the integrity of the CKS code before transmitting data, using a streamlined protocol to minimize latency.
  • Secure Channel: A Diffie-Hellman key exchange establishes an encrypted tunnel directly between the user's device and the enclave.
  • Rate-Limited Authentication: To thwart password-guessing attacks, the enclave enforces exponential back-off for failed attempts. Since this logic resides within the TEE, it cannot be bypassed by a malicious administrator.
  • Policy-Based Access: Users can define specific policies for keys, such as expiration dates or usage limits, ensuring keys never leave the secure environment.

Evaluation and Results

The CKS was evaluated using cryptographic benchmarks (RSA 3072-bit and ECC) and network simulations across various AWS regions. The system demonstrates high throughput, handling approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop CPU. Memory efficiency is also notable, with a footprint of roughly 700 bytes per user record.

Comparison of CKS with alternative key storage solutions across security and functionality dimensions.

As shown in the comparison table, CKS provides a unique combination of security and functionality. It resists both offline and online guessing attacks while supporting multi-device use, recovery, and auditability without requiring additional user hardware. In terms of performance, local signature operations take approximately 15ms, significantly faster than physical smart cards, which averaged 1,282ms in tests.

Discussion and Future Work

A key innovation of CKS is its focus on auditability. The system is designed to log every operation before execution, preventing attackers from erasing their tracks. Furthermore, CKS enables delegation without key sharing; users can grant temporary access to others (e.g., for 24 hours) without exposing the underlying private key.

Future work will focus on mitigating side-channel attacks through hardened libraries and improving availability using consensus protocols like Raft or Paxos across multiple enclaves. Additionally, the authors propose "legal locking," a feature allowing users to prove they could not have accessed certain data during a specific timeframe.

Summary updated

Abstract

Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms. Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{kurnikov2018keys,
  author = {Arseny Kurnikov and Andrew Paverd and Mohammad Mannan and N. Asokan},
  title = {{Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic Credentials}},
  booktitle = {ARES},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=K9uTEz2_qA6},
}
Figure