Jamming Intrusions in Extreme Bandwidth Communication: A Comprehensive Overview

Richa Priyadarshani, Ki-Hong Park, Yalçin Ata, Mohamed-Slim Alouini

TL;DR

As we transition toward 6G, "Extreme Bandwidth Communication" (EBC)—spanning millimeter-wave, Terahertz, and optical bands—is essential for hitting 1 Tb/s data rates. However, these massive pipes are prime targets for jamming; this paper provides a comprehensive survey of how jammers exploit the unique physics of high-frequency signals and the cutting-edge countermeasures, from AI-driven detection to Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS), needed to keep 6G secure.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The roadmap for 6G demands performance leaps that traditional microwave frequencies simply cannot support. To achieve peak spectral efficiency and massive data volumes, researchers are moving into the EBC spectrum: mmWave (30–300 GHz), Terahertz (0.1–10 THz), and Optical Wireless Communication (FSO and VLC).

While these high frequencies offer "extreme" bandwidth, they introduce novel security vulnerabilities. Traditional jamming research focuses on omnidirectional, lower-frequency RF. EBC signals are highly directional and sensitive to atmospheric conditions. This paper addresses the gap in literature by systematically categorizing jamming threats and mitigation strategies specifically tailored to the physical properties of these next-generation frequency bands.

Methods

This is a comprehensive survey paper that synthesizes current research into a unified framework for EBC security. The authors categorize jammers into three main archetypes:

  • Proactive Jammers: Send constant, random, or deceptive signals regardless of legitimate traffic.
  • Reactive Jammers: Monitor the channel and only attack when they sense active transmission (highly energy-efficient and harder to detect).
  • Advanced Jammers: Use "Follow-on" strategies to track frequency-hopping or "Smart" logic to maximize disruption with minimal power.

The paper maps these threats against specific EBC technologies and evaluates mitigation techniques including Machine Learning (ML) for anomaly detection, Beam-slicing to isolate jammer energy, and Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS) to "steer" signals around compromised paths.

Datasets

As a survey paper, it does not introduce a new primary dataset. However, it highlights the use of a comprehensive dataset in reference [25] used to train ML classifiers (Random Forest, SVM, Neural Networks) for jamming detection in mmWave systems. This dataset utilized parameters like Received Signal Strength (RSS), Carrier Sensing Time (CST), and bad packet ratios to achieve high detection accuracy.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Directionality Paradox: In THz and FSO, narrow beams are inherently more secure because a jammer must be precisely aligned with the beam. However, if a jammer does manage to align (or hit a sidelobe), the high-gain nature of the link makes it incredibly fragile.
  • Atmospheric Defense: One of the most novel ideas discussed is Distance-Adaptive Absorption Peak Modulation (DA-APM). In the THz band, signals are absorbed by water vapor. Researchers are proposing to "hide" signals by modulating them at specific molecular absorption peaks, making the communication covert to a distant jammer while remaining readable to a nearby legitimate receiver.
  • VLC’s "Visible" Vulnerability: Visible Light Communication (VLC) is often touted as secure because "what you see is what you get." Yet, the paper points out that any ambient light source (sunlight, a hijacked smart bulb) can act as a devastating jammer, and "impersonation" attacks can trick receivers into sync-ing with a rogue light source.
  • RIS as a Security Layer: Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces are usually discussed for coverage extension, but the authors emphasize their role in jamming nulling—dynamically adjusting the phase of reflected signals to create a "black hole" for the jammer’s energy.

Key Results

The paper summarizes quantitative benchmarks from the literature it reviews:

  • ML Detection Accuracy: ML-based classifiers (specifically Random Forest) can detect jamming in mmWave massive-MIMO systems with an accuracy of approximately 97.5%.
  • THz Covertness: Alternative spread-spectrum techniques in the THz band have shown a 60% improvement in minimal covert distance compared to standard FHSS.
  • FSO Resilience: Using spatial diversity (multiple apertures) and LDPC coding, FSO links can maintain 10 Gbps throughput even in the presence of strong atmospheric turbulence and jamming.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors identify several critical gaps where the research community needs to focus:

  • THz Jamming Detection: While there is research on making THz links robust, there is a "noticeable gap" in methods for actually detecting when a THz link is being jammed versus experiencing natural atmospheric fading.
  • Optical Noise Modeling: Most FSO/VLC research assumes Gaussian noise, but real-world jamming (like a flickering LED) is non-Gaussian. Future work needs better models for these "optical" jammers.
  • Hybrid Mitigation: There is a lack of research on combining multiple techniques (e.g., using AI to control an RIS) to create a multi-layered defense in EBC.
  • Energy Efficiency: Many advanced anti-jamming techniques (like hyperchaotic frequency hopping) are computationally expensive; 6G IoT devices will need "lighter" versions of these protocols.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{priyadarshani2025jamming,
  author = {Richa Priyadarshani and Ki-Hong Park and Yalçin Ata and Mohamed-Slim Alouini},
  title = {{Jamming Intrusions in Extreme Bandwidth Communication: A Comprehensive Overview}},
  journal = {IEEE Open J. Commun. Soc.},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1109/ojcoms.2025.3594284},
}
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