Intactness verification in anonymous RFID systems

Kai Bu, Jia Liu, Bin Xiao, Xuan Liu, Shigeng Zhang

Abstract

Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has fostered many object monitoring systems. Along with this trend, tagged objects' value and privacy become a primary concern. A corresponding important problem is to verify the intactness of a set of tagged objects without leaking tag identifiers (IDs). However, existing solutions necessitate the knowledge of tag IDs. Without tag IDs as a priori, this paper studies intactness verification in anonymous RFID systems. We identify three critical solution requirements, that is, deterministic verification, anonymity preservation, and scalability. We propose Cardiff and Divar, two crypto-free, lightweight protocols that isolate tag IDs from intactness verification and satisfy solution requirements. Cardiff explores tag cardinality as intactness proof while Divar leverages Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) enabled RFID. Both analytical and simulation results demonstrate that Cardiff and Divar can satisfy the requirements of accuracy, privacy, and scalability.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bu2014intactness,
  author = {Kai Bu and Jia Liu and Bin Xiao and Xuan Liu and Shigeng Zhang},
  title = {{Intactness verification in anonymous RFID systems}},
  booktitle = {ICPADS},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1109/padsw.2014.7097801},
}

Loading related content...

Figure