Infochain: A Decentralized, Trustless and Transparent Oracle on Blockchain

Naman Goel, Cyril van Schreven, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Boi Faltings

Abstract

Smart contracts are inherently isolated from real-world data, necessitating the use of oracles. However, traditional centralized oracles introduce single points of failure. Infochain addresses this by utilizing game-theoretic peer-consistency mechanisms to elicit truthful data from self-interested contributors on the Ethereum blockchain. By implementing novel smart contract optimizations, Infochain overcomes the high gas costs typically associated with complex on-chain incentive structures, making decentralized data elicitation economically viable even when external incentives to lie exist.

Introduction

The utility of smart contracts is often limited by their inability to verify external events. While oracles bridge this gap, centralized solutions contradict the decentralized nature of blockchain technology. Crowdsourcing data is an alternative, but it faces the "outside incentive" problem: if a contract triggers a payout based on a specific report, users are incentivized to report that outcome regardless of the truth. Furthermore, the computational overhead of verifying these reports on-chain can be prohibitively expensive. Infochain proposes a decentralized, trustless framework that aligns user incentives with truth-telling while minimizing operational costs.

System Architecture and Workflow

Infochain operates through a structured interaction between information requesters and providers, mediated by a smart contract. The process is designed to prevent collusion and "copycat" behavior through a cryptographic commit-reveal protocol.

The five-step workflow of the Infochain decentralized oracle system.

The workflow consists of five primary stages:

  1. Deployment: The requester deploys the smart contract with a budget and deposit, posting the questions to be answered.
  2. Selection: Information providers select questions to answer.
  3. Commitment: Providers submit cryptographic hashes (commitments) of their answers along with a deposit to ensure participation.
  4. Revelation: After the commitment phase, providers reveal their actual answers and secret keys.
  5. Settlement: The contract processes payments and returns deposits based on the chosen peer-consistency mechanism.

Peer-Consistency Mechanisms

To determine the truth without a ground-truth source, Infochain employs peer-consistency mechanisms. These mechanisms reward users based on the statistical correlation of their reports with those of their peers. The system evaluates three primary models:

  • Output Agreement (OA): Rewards simple agreement between peers.
  • Dasgupta and Ghosh (DG): A more complex mechanism that handles multi-task settings.
  • Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourcing (PTSC): Rewards "surprising" agreement, making honesty the most profitable strategy even in the face of external bribes.

On-Chain Optimizations

A critical contribution of Infochain is its focus on gas efficiency. On Ethereum, storage operations (writing to the blockchain) are significantly more expensive than computation.

Bit-Packing

To minimize storage costs, Infochain uses bit-packing to store multiple binary answers within a single 256-bit Ethereum word. By treating the word as a bit vector, the system can store up to 42 answers simultaneously. This approach results in a near-constant writing cost regardless of the number of tasks, as shown in the optimization analysis.

Comparison of writing gas costs between baseline and optimized implementations.

Memory Management

The system further reduces costs by precomputing shared values—such as report frequencies—in memory during execution. By avoiding intermediate writes to the blockchain's permanent storage, Infochain significantly lowers the total gas consumption for complex calculations.

Evaluation and Results

The researchers evaluated Infochain using a real-world Quality of Service (QoS) dataset containing response times for thousands of web services. Simulations involving honest, random, and adversarial agents demonstrated that the PTSC mechanism effectively incentivizes truth-telling.

Key findings include:

  • Economic Viability: For a typical service with 95% uptime, the cost to ensure truthfulness is approximately 1.2% of the potential refund amount.
  • Scalability: The optimized implementation maintains low writing costs as the number of tasks increases, whereas baseline costs scale linearly.
  • Mechanism Efficiency: OA and PTSC were found to be more gas-efficient than the DG mechanism, which requires more complex tracking of peer interactions.

Conclusion and Future Work

Infochain demonstrates that decentralized oracles can be both secure and economically feasible. By combining game theory with low-level smart contract optimizations, it provides a robust framework for trustless data elicitation. Future research will explore extending these mechanisms to continuous data spaces and utilizing Layer 2 scaling solutions to further enhance performance and reduce costs for larger peer groups.

Summary updated

Abstract

Blockchain based systems allow various kinds of financial transactions to be executed in a decentralized manner. However, these systems often rely on a trusted third party (oracle) to get correct information about the real-world events, which trigger the financial transactions. In this paper, we identify two biggest challenges in building decentralized, trustless and transparent oracles. The first challenge is acquiring correct information about the real-world events without relying on a trusted information provider. We show how a peer-consistency incentive mechanism can be used to acquire truthful information from an untrusted and self-interested crowd, even when the crowd has outside incentives to provide wrong information. The second is a system design and implementation challenge. For the first time, we show how to implement a trustless and transparent oracle in Ethereum. We discuss various non-trivial issues that arise in implementing peer-consistency mechanisms in Ethereum, suggest several optimizations to reduce gas cost and provide empirical analysis.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{goel2020infochain,
  author = {Naman Goel and Cyril van Schreven and Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Boi Faltings},
  title = {{Infochain: A Decentralized, Trustless and Transparent Oracle on Blockchain}},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2020/635},
}
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