Incentivizing Secure Software Development: The Role of Liability (Waiver) and Audit

Ziyuan Huang, Gergely Biczók, Mingyan Liu

TL;DR

This paper explores how a proposed liability waiver, tied to voluntary security audits, can incentivize software vendors to develop more secure products. By modeling the vendor's decision-making process as a sequential game, the authors find that the optimal strategy for vendors is to never quit the audit process and to invest cumulatively. The research also identifies that the most effective audit design for encouraging participation and higher effort is one that is accurate but not overly strict.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The core problem this paper tackles is the persistent misalignment of incentives in secure software development. Historically, software vendors have had little financial motivation to invest heavily in security because the costs of security breaches are largely borne by consumers, not producers. This "moral hazard" is exacerbated by the fast-paced software market, which often prioritizes rapid feature releases over thorough security testing. Recent high-profile cyberattacks and evolving regulations (like GDPR) are pushing for a shift, suggesting that vendors should be held more accountable. The paper specifically investigates a proposed mechanism: a liability waiver offered to vendors who voluntarily undergo and pass IT security audits. The challenge is to understand how this mechanism works from both the vendor's and the auditor's perspectives, and crucially, how to design the audit itself to be effective.

Methods

The authors employ a sequential decision-making framework to model the vendor's behavior. This is framed as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the vendor repeatedly decides on investment levels to pass an audit. Key elements of the model include:

  • Vendor's Utility: Modeled as a discounted reward, incorporating investment costs, potential revenue, and risk aversion.
  • Audit Process: Modeled as a sequence of tests with imperfect accuracy (false positives and negatives). Initially, tests are assumed to be static and independent.
  • Liability Waiver: A crucial incentive where passing the audit leads to a waiver of future product liability.
  • Auditor's Role: Modeled as a neutral party designing the audit parameters to maximize vendor participation and desired effort.

The paper analyzes the vendor's optimal strategy (investment levels and quitting time) and then shifts to the auditor's perspective, exploring how audit parameters (like test difficulty and accuracy) influence vendor participation and effort. They also introduce and analyze dynamic audit schemes, where audit tests can change based on past outcomes, to further enhance incentivization.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Vendors Never Quit: A key finding is that under the proposed audit and waiver system, an optimal strategy for a vendor is to never quit the audit process, even after failures. This suggests the waiver is a strong enough incentive to pursue completion.
  • "One-and-Done" vs. "Incremental" Investment: Vendors have two broad categories of optimal investment strategies: a "one-and-done" approach where they invest a significant amount upfront and wait, or an "incremental" approach where they invest in stages. Both yield the same utility, reflecting different risk/patience trade-offs.
  • Audit Design Matters Greatly: The effectiveness of the audit hinges on its design. An audit that is accurate (low noise) but not overly strict (easier test) is found to be most effective in encouraging participation and higher vendor effort.
  • Risk Aversion Threshold: Vendors' willingness to participate in the audit mechanism is directly tied to their risk aversion. More risk-averse vendors are more likely to opt in to transfer their risk.
  • Dynamic Audits Can Improve Incentives: By making audit tests dynamic (e.g., an easier initial test followed by harder ones), it's possible to incentivize even higher investments than static audits, particularly for vendors with a certain level of risk tolerance.

Key Results

  • Optimal Vendor Strategy: Characterized by never quitting and investing cumulatively, either in a single large upfront investment or in stages.
  • Audit Parameter Impact:
    • Threshold (Difficulty): A lower threshold (easier test) leads to higher vendor utility and encourages higher investment. A high threshold can paradoxically lead to lower effort as vendors rely on chance.
  • Noise (Accuracy): Lower noise (higher accuracy) drives higher investment and increases the likelihood of participation.
  • Participation Threshold: A specific risk aversion threshold exists; vendors above it will participate, while those below will not.
  • Dynamic Audit Improvement: A two-step dynamic audit (easier first test, then harder) can improve incentivizable investment compared to static audits, especially for certain vendor risk profiles.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Model Simplifications: The paper acknowledges using simplified functional forms for costs and probabilities (e.g., linear cost functions, specific normal distributions for noise).
  • Auditor Neutrality: The auditor is modeled as neutral, not profit-maximizing. This simplifies the analysis but differs from real-world scenarios where auditors might have their own objectives.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest a comprehensive comparison with liability insurance, exploring constrained optimization frameworks for audit coverage, and investigating more complex dynamic audit schemes. They also note the potential for a more detailed analysis of vendor risk attitudes and their impact on participation.

Summary updated

Abstract

Misaligned incentives in secure software development have long been the focus of research in the economics of security. Product liability, a powerful legal framework in other industries, has been largely ineffective for software products until recent times. However, the rapid regulatory responses to recent global cyber attacks by both the United States and the European Union, together with the (relative) success of the General Data Protection Regulation in defining both duty and standard of care for software vendors, may enable regulators to use liability to re-align incentives for the benefit of the digital society. Specifically, the recent United States National Cybersecurity Strategy suggests shifting responsibility for cyber incidents back to software vendors. In doing so, the strategy also puts forward the concept of the liability waiver: if a software company voluntarily undergoes and passes an IT security audit, its future product liability is (fully or partially) waived. In this paper, we analyze this audit scenario from the perspective of the software vendor and the auditor, respectively. From the vendor's view, this is formulated as a sequential decision problem: a vendor with a product or process needs to pass a mandatory audit to release the product onto the market; it is allowed to go through the audit repeatedly, and thus the vendor needs to determine what level of effort to put into the product following each failed test. We show that the optimal strategy for an opt-in vendor is to never quit and to exert cumulative investments in either a ``one-and-done'' or ``incremental'' manner. From the auditor's view, we examine what type of audit might be the most effective in incentivizing voluntary participation and, at the same time, a more desirable effort from the vendor. We also showed how dynamic audits can be exploited to increase the vendor's incentivizable investment.
BibTeX
@article{huang2025incentivizing,
  author = {Ziyuan Huang and Gergely Biczók and Mingyan Liu},
  title = {{Incentivizing Secure Software Development: The Role of Liability (Waiver) and Audit}},
  journal = {ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1145/3765287},
}
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