Incentives for Truthful Information Elicitation of Continuous Signals

Goran Radanovic, Boi Faltings

Abstract

We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contributed from many independent agents, such as product reviews, community sensing, or opinion polls. We propose a novel mechanism that elicits both private signals and beliefs. The mechanism extends the previous versions of the Bayesian Truth Serum (the original BTS, the RBTS, and the multi-valued BTS), by allowing small populations and non-binary private signals, while not requiring additional assumptions on the belief updating process. For priors that are sufficiently smooth, such as Gaussians, the mechanism allows signals to be continuous.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{radanovic2014incentives,
  author = {Goran Radanovic and Boi Faltings},
  title = {{Incentives for Truthful Information Elicitation of Continuous Signals}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8797},
}

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