Incentives for Subjective Evaluations with Private Beliefs
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Abstract
The modern web critically depends on aggregation of information from self-interested agents, for example opinion polls, product ratings, or crowdsourcing. We consider a setting where multiple objects (questions, products, tasks) are evaluated by a group of agents. We first construct a minimal peer prediction mechanism that elicits honest evaluations from a homogeneous population of agents with different private beliefs. Second, we show that it is impossible to strictly elicit honest evaluations from a heterogeneous group of agents with different private beliefs. Nevertheless, we provide a modified version of a divergence-based Bayesian Truth Serum that incentivizes agents to report consistently, making truthful reporting a weak equilibrium of the mechanism.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{radanovic2015incentives,
author = {Goran Radanovic and Boi Faltings},
title = {{Incentives for Subjective Evaluations with Private Beliefs}},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9311},
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