Incentive Engineering for Concurrent Games

David Hyland, Julian Gutierrez, Michael J. Wooldridge

This paper, presented at TARK 2023, explores the intersection of game theory and formal verification. It investigates how an external "principal" can use taxation to steer a multi-agent system toward a desired global objective, even when agents are primarily focused on their own individual goals.

TL;DR

The authors introduce a framework for "Incentive Engineering" in concurrent games, using taxation to influence agent behavior. They demonstrate that history-dependent (dynamic) taxation is strictly more powerful than fixed (static) taxation for ensuring all rational outcomes meet a system-wide goal.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In multi-agent systems (MAS), autonomous agents act according to their own interests. Often, we want to verify if these systems will behave correctly—a field known as Rational Verification. However, verification is reactive; if the system fails to meet a global objective, we need a way to fix it.

The challenge is that agents in these models often have lexicographic preferences. Their absolute priority is satisfying a logical goal (expressed in Linear Temporal Logic, or LTL). Only after their goal is secured do they care about secondary factors like minimizing costs. This makes traditional mechanism design difficult: you cannot simply "buy off" an agent to abandon its primary mission.

This paper asks: Can a principal impose taxes on specific actions to ensure that the resulting Nash Equilibria of the game satisfy a global objective $\Upsilon$?

Methods

The authors model the system as a Concurrent Game Arena, where agents choose actions simultaneously over an infinite number of rounds.

Key technical components include:

  • LTL Goals: Both agents and the principal define their objectives using Linear Temporal Logic, allowing for complex requirements like "eventually deliver the package" or "never crash."
  • Taxation Schemes:
    • Static: A fixed tax is applied to a specific action profile in a specific state, regardless of when it happens.
  • Dynamic: The tax is determined by a finite-state machine that tracks the history of the game. This allows the principal to "punish" specific sequences of behavior.
  • Implementation Problems:
    • E-Nash Implementation: Does there exist a taxation scheme such that at least one Nash Equilibrium satisfies the principal's goal?
  • A-Nash Implementation: Does there exist a scheme such that all Nash Equilibria satisfy the goal?

Datasets

As a theoretical study in computer science and game theory, this paper does not use empirical datasets. Instead, it employs formal proofs and a illustrative "Two Robots" grid-world example to demonstrate the necessity of dynamic taxation.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Power of Memory: The most significant insight is that dynamic taxation is strictly more powerful than static taxation. In infinite games, static taxes are "prefix-independent"—they can't effectively target the early stages of a run to prevent agents from falling into "bad" (but goal-satisfying) equilibria. Dynamic taxes, by contrast, can use memory to eliminate undesirable paths.
  • Taxes as Tie-Breakers: Because agents prioritize their LTL goals above all else, taxes function as a sophisticated tie-breaking mechanism. The principal cannot force an agent to fail its goal, but they can make "bad" ways of achieving that goal so expensive that the agent rationally chooses a "good" path instead.
  • Eliminability Characterization: The paper provides a formal characterization (Proposition 2) of when a set of "bad" behaviors can be eliminated. This involves constructing a "deviation graph" and ensuring that any cycles in that graph involve at least two agents, preventing any single agent from having a "free" deviation back to an undesirable state.

Key Results

  • Complexity: The authors prove that E-Nash Implementation is 2EXPTIME-complete. This matches the complexity of the underlying rational verification problem, suggesting that adding a principal doesn't necessarily make the problem computationally harder in the worst case.
  • A-Nash Implementation: They show that A-Nash implementation is also 2EXPTIME-hard. While they provide a characterization for when it is possible (Theorem 3), the exact upper bound for complexity remains an open question due to the potential for infinite-memory strategies.
  • Formal Proof of Dynamic Superiority: Through a specific game construction (Figure 2), they prove there are scenarios where a principal's goal can be implemented via dynamic taxes but is impossible to achieve with static ones.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Infinite Memory: The authors acknowledge that in some quantitative settings, Nash Equilibria might require infinite memory. Their current characterization of eliminability focuses on finite sets of strategy profiles, which may not cover all edge cases in the most general settings.
  • Computational Bounds: Finding a matching upper bound for the A-Nash implementation problem is a primary area for future work.
  • Stochasticity: The current model is deterministic. Extending this to probabilistic or stochastic games (where actions have uncertain outcomes) would be a significant next step for real-world applications like autonomous traffic management or robotic swarms.
  • Learning: The paper suggests exploring how these taxation schemes could be integrated into multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environments.

Summary updated

Abstract

:We consider the problem of incentivising desirable behaviours in multi-agent systems by way of taxation schemes. Our study employs the concurrent games model: in this model, each agent is primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of a goal, expressed as a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula; secondarily, agents seek to minimise costs, where costs are imposed based on the actions taken by agents in different states of the game. In this setting, we consider an external principal who can influence agents' preferences by imposing taxes (additional costs) on the actions chosen by agents in different states. The principal imposes taxation schemes to motivate agents to choose a course of action that will lead to the satisfaction of their goal, also expressed as an LTL formula. However, taxation schemes are limited in their ability to influence agents' preferences: an agent will always prefer to satisfy its goal rather than otherwise, no matter what the costs. The fundamental question that we study is whether the principal can impose a taxation scheme such that, in the resulting game, the principal's goal is satisfied in at least one or all runs of the game that could arise by agents choosing to follow game-theoretic equilibrium strategies. We consider two different types of taxation schemes: in a static scheme, the same tax is imposed on a state-action profile pair in all circumstances, while in a dynamic scheme, the principal can choose to vary taxes depending on the circumstances. We investigate the main game-theoretic properties of this model as well as the computational complexity of the relevant decision problems.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{hyland2023incentive,
  author = {David Hyland and Julian Gutierrez and Michael J. Wooldridge},
  title = {{Incentive Engineering for Concurrent Games}},
  booktitle = {TARK},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=cXPtiOl6sM},
}

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