Hierarchical Multi-stage Gaussian Signaling Games

Muhammed O. Sayin, Emrah Akyol, Tamer Basar

Abstract

We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver interact repeatedly. Different from the classical communication (control) models, however, the sender (sensor) and the receiver (controller) have different objectives and there is a hierarchy between the players such that the sender leads the game by announcing his policies beforehand. He needs to anticipate the reaction of the receiver and the impact of the actions on the horizon while controlling the transparency of the disclosed information at each interaction. With quadratic cost functions and multivariate Gaussian processes, evolving according to first order auto-regressive models, we show that memoryless "linear" sender signaling rules are optimal (in the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium) within the general class of measurable policies in the noncooperative communication context. In the noncooperative control context, we also analyze the hierarchical equilibrium for linear signaling rules and provide an algorithm to compute the optimal linear signaling rules numerically with global optimality guarantees.

Introduction

In classical communication and control theory, the sender (e.g., a sensor) and the receiver (e.g., a controller) are typically assumed to be cooperative agents working toward a shared objective. However, modern cyber-physical systems often involve agents with conflicting goals. This introduces the challenge of strategic information transmission, where a sender may intentionally distort or withhold information to influence the receiver's actions. Examples include compromised sensors attempting to deceive a controller or privacy-preserving agents sharing only the minimum necessary data.

While strategic communication has been extensively studied in static, "one-shot" scenarios—most notably the Crawford-Sobel model—real-world systems are inherently dynamic. The state of the world evolves over time, and players interact repeatedly over multiple stages. This paper addresses whether simple linear signaling rules remain optimal in these complex, dynamic, and non-cooperative settings.

System Model and Game Formulation

The interaction is modeled as a Hierarchical (Stackelberg) Multistage Game. In this framework, the sender acts as the leader, announcing their signaling policy beforehand. The receiver, acting as the follower, observes the disclosed information and reacts accordingly.

Block diagram of the hierarchical multi-stage signaling game between a sender and a receiver.

The system dynamics follow a discrete-time, multivariate Gaussian process governed by a first-order auto-regressive (AR-1) model:

$$x_{k+1} = Ax_k + Bu_k + \omega_k$$

where $x_k$ is the state, $u_k$ is the receiver's decision, and $\omega_k$ represents Gaussian noise. As illustrated in Figure 1, the sender observes the state $x_k$ and transmits a message $y_k$ to the receiver. Both players aim to minimize their respective quadratic cost functions, which may have different weight matrices and bias terms, reflecting their mismatched objectives.

The Optimality of Linear Signaling

A central contribution of this work is the proof that memoryless linear signaling rules are optimal within the general class of measurable policies. This is a significant finding because it implies that the sender does not need to store the entire history of the system to act optimally; the current state $x_k$ provides sufficient information.

To establish this, the authors formulate the sender's problem as a functional minimization and utilize Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) to determine a theoretical lower bound on the sender's cost. They demonstrate that this lower bound is achievable using linear transformations. This result extends the known optimality of linear signaling from static settings to dynamic, multi-stage hierarchical games.

Key Insights and Algorithmic Framework

Several key insights emerge from this theoretical framework:

  • Gaussianity and Deception: The Gaussian distribution is uniquely suited for strategic deception. Because uncorrelatedness implies independence for Gaussian variables, a linear projection can effectively "hide" information in specific directions without leaking data through higher-order statistics.
  • Inter-stage Coupling: Unlike cooperative control, where problems often decouple into independent stages, strategic games are tightly coupled. The sender must balance the immediate impact of a message against its influence on the receiver's future beliefs and subsequent actions.
  • Global Optimality Guarantees: The paper provides a numerical algorithm (Algorithm 1) that uses standard optimization toolboxes (such as CVX) to compute the optimal linear signaling matrices. This algorithm is guaranteed to find the global optimum for any given set of system parameters.

Results and Discussion

The authors evaluated their framework using synthetic illustrative scenarios. These simulations demonstrated how optimal signaling behavior evolves over a time horizon. For instance, when a bias term is temporally correlated, the sender may gradually adjust the degree of signal distortion to maintain a strategic advantage. The results hold true for both pure communication (strategic disclosure) and closed-loop non-cooperative control systems.

Conclusion and Future Work

This research provides a robust mathematical foundation for understanding and designing resilient control systems in non-cooperative environments. By proving the optimality of linear rules, the authors offer a computationally efficient path for managing strategic information flow.

Future research directions include extending these proofs to infinite horizon cases to determine if strategies reach a steady state. Additionally, exploring the impact of non-Gaussian noise and incorporating information regularization (e.g., bandwidth constraints or communication costs) would further enhance the applicability of this model to real-world security and privacy challenges.

Summary updated

Abstract

We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver interact repeatedly. Different from the classical communication (control) models, however, the sender (sensor) and the receiver (controller) have different objectives and there is a hierarchy between the players such that the sender leads the game by announcing his policies beforehand. He needs to anticipate the reaction of the receiver and the impact of the actions on the horizon while controlling the transparency of the disclosed information at each interaction. With quadratic cost functions and multivariate Gaussian processes, evolving according to first order auto-regressive models, we show that memoryless "linear" sender signaling rules are optimal (in the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium) within the general class of measurable policies in the noncooperative communication context. In the noncooperative control context, we also analyze the hierarchical equilibrium for linear signaling rules and provide an algorithm to compute the optimal linear signaling rules numerically with global optimality guarantees.
BibTeX
@article{sayin2016hierarchical,
  author = {Muhammed O. Sayin and Emrah Akyol and Tamer Basar},
  title = {{Hierarchical Multi-stage Gaussian Signaling Games}},
  journal = {Automatica},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.1609.09448},
}
Figure