Game-Theoretic Neyman-Pearson Detection to Combat Strategic Evasion

Yinan Hu, Juntao Chen, Quanyan Zhu

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic framework to build "evasion-aware" intrusion detection systems (IDS) that can proactively counter sophisticated attackers. By modeling the strategic interaction between an attacker and a detector using Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, the authors show that their proposed proactive detectors significantly outperform traditional passive detectors, especially in detecting stealthy, evasive attacks.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Modern cyberattacks are increasingly sophisticated, employing "evasive" tactics to bypass traditional detection systems. These attackers strategically modify their behavior to appear normal, making it difficult for standard anomaly detection methods to identify them. Existing countermeasures often fail because they don't account for the attacker's rational, strategic decision-making process. This paper addresses this gap by developing a theoretical framework that models the adversarial game between an attacker and a detector, enabling the detector to anticipate and adapt to the attacker's evasive strategies.

Methods

The core of this work lies in applying game theory to the Neyman-Pearson (NP) hypothesis testing framework. The authors model the interaction as a game between a user (who can be normal or abnormal), an attacker (who intercepts and distorts messages), and a detector. They differentiate between two types of detectors:

  • Passive Detector: This detector is unaware of the attacker and applies standard NP hypothesis testing to the distorted messages. The interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the attacker is the leader.
  • Proactive Detector: This detector is aware of the attacker and uses a signaling game framework. It can update its beliefs about the user's type based on the distorted messages and adapt its detection strategy accordingly. This allows the detector to infer the attacker's private information and mitigate the impact of distortions.

The performance of these detectors is characterized using Equilibrium Receiver-Operational-Characteristic (EROC) curves. The authors also extend their framework to sequential settings, where multiple observations are made over time.

Datasets

The paper uses a portion of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset for a case study on intrusion detection evasion. This dataset was originally prepared for the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program. The authors specifically focus on the "log-in" feature from connection records to simulate a scenario where a detector distinguishes between normal and abnormal users based on login success/failure rates.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Strategic Evasion is Key: Attackers aren't just random noise; they are rational agents strategically trying to fool detectors. Ignoring this strategic element leads to suboptimal detection.
  • Proactive Defense Wins: Detectors that anticipate and model the attacker's behavior (proactive detectors) significantly outperform those that don't (passive detectors). This proactive stance allows them to leverage the attacker's own actions against them.
  • Game Theory as a Tool: Game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to model the adversarial dynamics and derive optimal strategies for both attackers and detectors.
  • EROC Curves for Performance: Equilibrium Receiver-Operational-Characteristic (EROC) curves are crucial for visualizing and comparing the fundamental performance trade-offs of these evasion-aware detectors.
  • Sequential Observations Matter: In real-world scenarios, multiple observations over time provide more information, and the proposed framework can effectively handle these sequential interactions, leading to better detection over time.

Key Results

  • Proactive Detectors Outperform: The EROC curves demonstrate that proactive, evasion-aware detectors consistently outperform passive detectors and even non-adversarial (no attacker) scenarios in certain aspects.
  • Attacker Strategies Adapt: The attacker's optimal strategies are shown to adapt based on the detector's capabilities (passive vs. proactive) and the penalty for distortion (λ).
  • Case Study Validation: A case study using the KDD Cup 1999 dataset for intrusion detection evasion shows that the evasion-aware IDS can identify abnormalities even when features are strategically modified by attackers. The results indicate that the proactive IDS can achieve better detection rates than robust IDS in certain regimes.
  • Sequential Detection Improves: In multi-stage analysis, the attacker's influence on detection diminishes over time as the proactive detector learns and adapts, suggesting potential for combating advanced persistent threats.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Assumptions: The framework relies on assumptions such as the attacker having full knowledge of the detector's operations (Kerckhoffs' principle) and specific properties of message distributions (e.g., full-overlapping support). The impact of violating these assumptions is not fully explored.
  • Computational Complexity: While the framework provides theoretical solutions, implementing and computing these optimal strategies in real-time for complex systems could be computationally intensive.
  • Generalizability: The paper focuses on Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing. Extending the framework to other statistical detection methods or machine learning-based detectors would be valuable.
  • Decentralized Detection: The authors suggest future work on designing decentralized detection schemes for M-ary hypothesis testing.
  • Statistical Estimation: Combining the signaling game framework with statistical estimation techniques for applications like analyzing spoofing attacks is another avenue for future research.

Summary updated

Abstract

The security in networked systems depends greatly on recognizing and identifying adversarial behaviors. Traditional detection methods target specific categories of attacks and have become inadequate against increasingly stealthy and deceptive attacks that are designed to bypass detection strategically. This work proposes game-theoretical frameworks to recognize and combat such evasive attacks. We focus on extending a fundamental class of statistical-based detection methods based on Neyman-Pearson’s (NP) hypothesis testing formulation. We capture the conflicting relationship between a strategic evasive attacker and an evasion-aware NP detector. By analyzing both the equilibrium behaviors of the attacker and the NP detector, we characterize their performance using Equilibrium Receiver-Operational-Characteristic (EROC) curves. We show that the evasion-aware NP detectors outperform the non-strategic ones by allowing them to take advantage of the attacker’s messages to adaptively modify their decision rules to enhance their success rate in detecting anomalies. In addition, we extend our framework to a sequential setting where the user sends out identically distributed messages. We corroborate the analytical results with a case study of an intrusion detection evasion problem.
BibTeX
@article{hu2025game,
  author = {Yinan Hu and Juntao Chen and Quanyan Zhu},
  title = {{Game-Theoretic Neyman-Pearson Detection to Combat Strategic Evasion}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=3HGmsfIcrr},
}
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